Module 5 - UNAMID

UNAMID
Country and Mission Overview

Country overview

1. Darfur is a region in western Sudan, which covers an area of some 493,180 square kilometers, approximately the size of Spain. It is largely an arid plateau with the Marrah Mountains (Jebel Mara), a range of volcanic peaks, in the centre, and its main towns are Al Fashir and Geneina. The population is between 6 million and 7.5 million people. Darfur's economy is primarily based on subsistence agriculture as well as livestock in the drier north. Much of the region is dry and sandy, with the Sahara desert encroaching in the north. It suffers from frequent droughts during the summer although some places experience heavy rainfall in the winter.

2. Darfur was incorporated into Sudan by Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1916, having previously existed as an independent Sultanate for several hundred years. It is a complex mix of more than 36 ethnic groups, of which the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit are the most significant. **Tensions have existed for generations, between the nomadic herders, often identified as Arabs, and sedentary farmers, often identified as indigenous, over access to water and grazing land.** Until recently, these were generally resolved through traditional methods of conflict resolution. **Ethnicity is not in itself clear-cut, given the long history of racial mixing between 'indigenous' peoples and the 'Arabs'**, who are distinguished by cultural-linguistic attachment as much as race.

3. A civil war escalated in Darfur in 2003. **Tens of thousands of people were killed during the first two years of the conflict and the total death toll, including from conflict-related disease and malnutrition is estimated in the hundreds of thousands. According to OCHA, three million people are also believed to have been displaced from their homes by the fighting**. **Under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and with support of the UN and other partners, a Darfur Peace Agreement was signed between the government and one group of rebels, a faction inside the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), in 2006.** However, this was rejected by other rebel groups and the conflict continued. **In July 2011 a new Document for Peace in Darfur was signed, in Doha, Qatar, between the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), although others boycotted this as well. Implementation of the agreement has been slow and uneven, however, and, although the levels of violence are much lower than in 2003-04, sporadic fighting between government and rebel forces has continued**.

Mission structure and organization

4. In 2006, the African Union deployed a peacekeeping mission to Sudan (AIMS), which was transitioned in 2008 by a joint African Union/United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). **The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur was formally established by the Security Council on 31 July 2007 through the adoption of Resolution 1769, referred to by its acronym UNAMID, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNAMID formally took over from AMIS on 31 December 2007.** The mandate is renewed yearly, and the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2063 on 31 July 2012 extended it for a further 12 months, until 31 July 2013. The composition of personnel in UNAMID is predominantly African, in respect of the wishes expressed by the Government of Sudan.

5. The Mission's core mandate, as outlined in Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007) and subsequent Resolutions, has been to ensure the protection of civilians (POC) throughout Darfur. UNSC Resolution 2063 of July 2012 emphasized: 'UNAMID's Chapter VII mandate, as defined in resolution 1769, **to deliver its core tasks to protect civilians without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Government of Sudan**. It also urged UNAMID 'to deter any threats against itself and its mandate' and noted the 'that it is important to ensure that contingents are properly prepared and effectively equipped to be able to carry out UNAMID's mandate'.

6. UNAMID has the protection of civilians as its core mandate, but is also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.

UNAMID Facts and Figures

7. Initial authorization

- 19,555 military personnel
- 6,432 police
- 3,772 police personnel
- 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each
- A significant civilian component

8. Current authorization

By resolution2063 of 31 July 2012, the Security Council decided to decrease strength of military and police components, over the next 12 to 18 months, as follows:

- 16,200 military personnel
- 4,690 police
- 2,310 police personnel
- 17 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each

9. Current (31 January 2013)

- 20,888 total uniformed personnel
- 15,778 troops (15 Battalions)
- 310 military observers
- 4,800 police (including formed units)
- 1,087 international civilian personnel*
- 2,935 local civilian staff*
- 449 United Nations Volunteers

Parties and conflict dynamic

10. The current conflict in Darfur began in February 2003, **when two loosely allied rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/SLA), took up arms against the government of Sudan**. The government responded with an aerial bombardment campaign against communities suspected of sympathizing with the rebels and supporting ground attacks by an **Arab militia, pejoratively nicknamed the Janjaweed**. These forces are accused of committing numerous human rights violations, including mass killing, looting and systematic rape of the non-Arab population, as they burned and destroyed hundreds of villages throughout the region.

11. The roots of this war can be traced back to a series of deadly undeclared conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s. Armed raids on rich agricultural areas and skirmishes with rival groups of Arab nomadic herders were historically common occurrences in Darfur. The settled farmers did not traditionally have the same degree of military organization, but, as drought-stricken livestock herders increasingly encroached, they fought back to retain what they saw as 'their' land. At the same time, Darfur was becoming a theatre in a wider set of conflicts, between the government of Sudan and the rebels of South Sudan; between rival forces in neighboring Chad; as a staging ground during the conflict between Chad and Libya; and between different factions within Sudan's own National Islamic Front. Arms were channeled into Darfur, and proxy militias backed, by different power-brokers, making these localized struggles increasingly deadly.

12. Earlier years of the Darfur conflict, 2003–2004, were characterized by widespread violence, systematic destruction of livelihoods and large-scale displacement. By early 2005, levels of conflict had decreased, though fighting continued in parts of South and West Darfur, creating further displacement. In May 2006, the government of Sudan and a faction of the SLA under Minni Minnawi (SLA/MM) signed the **Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)**. However, another faction of the SLA, led by Abdel Wahid Mohammed Ahmed El-Nur (SLA-AW), together with the JEM refused to sign and continued fighting.

13. Opposition to the DPA exacerbated tribal divisions and sparked new waves of violence between various rebel factions. Arab groups increasingly turned against both the government and each other. Between 2008 and 2010, violent deaths in Darfur were dominated by intra-Arab fighting, notably between *abbala* (camel-herding) and *baggara* (cattle-herding) groups in South Darfur. At one point there were an estimated 30 rebel groups in Darfur and their distinction from government forces became increasingly blurred. Government-supported Arab militias sometimes allied with rebel groups, while these often struck bargains with the government.

14. There have been a series of ceasefires agreed between the Sudanese government and various rebel groups, but most have fallen apart, sometimes just days after being signed. By 2009, however, the foundation was set for a peace conference in Qatar, which took place in February of that year. However, sporadic clashes between the SAF and rebel groups continued through 2010, often triggered by inter-tribal rivalries.

15. In October 2010, Minni Minawi, withdrew from the DPA and returned to rebellion. This triggered new fighting between the government and rebels, starting in December of that year. It also led to a resumption of violence against Zaghawa civilians, with which the SLA/MM was identified. The SAF carried out aerial bombardments on areas controlled by the rebels, and communities suspected of sympathizing with them, and also recruited for a militia group, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), which reportedly carried out widespread human rights violations. Although formally under the control of the SAF, the PDF operate semi-autonomously, like the Janjaweed, often pursuing its own agendas and vendettas, related to land and local political dominance. Rebel movements, it should be noted, were accused of carrying out human rights violations as well. Previously marginalized groups—including the Bergid, Berti, and Tunjur— were armed and deployed in the PDF against Zaghawa communities, though often in response to attacks by Zaghawa militias. This generated significant ethnically directed violence between January and July 2011.

16. December 2010 also saw a brief resumption of talks between representatives of the JEM and LJM with the Sudanese Government in Doha, Qatar. **A new agreement, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), was signed in July 2011 between the government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement, (LJM) an umbrella organization of ten rebel groups**. However, the JEM had by then withdrawn from the negotiations and the SLA-AW and SLA/MM also did not participate. Some critics have noted that many of the LJM's leading members had been living abroad for many years at the time of the negotiations and have questioned how representative they are of people on the ground. In <u>November 2011, the JEM, SLA-AW and SLA/MM, together with SPLM-N, formed a new political and military alliance, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF)</u>, which is pledged to fight for the overthrow of Sudan's government.

17. <u>The number of clashes both between rebel groups and the government of Sudan and due to inter-tribal conflicts has, however, considerably declined in 2012, compared to 2003-04</u>. The rebel groups have either lost or abandoned many of the 'liberated areas' formerly under their control and the government continues to extend its administrative authority over Darfur. The signing of the DDPD, improved relations between Sudan and Chad and contributed significantly to the improved security situation in West Darfur. Relations with Libya have also improved since the downfall of the previous regime, which had backed the rebels. South Sudan, which had also allegedly provided the rebels with support is now also increasingly preoccupied with more immediate problems of its own. The JEM, which had been the strongest Darfur rebel movement militarily for a number of years has been weakened by the loss of support from Chad and Libya, a series of internal splits and the death of its leader Khalil Ibrahim in December 2011.

18. <u>A Darfur Regional Authority has been established</u>, in accordance with the power sharing provisions of the DDDPD, which will include some members of the LJM. <u>A National Human Rights Commission has also been established and a Prosecutor for the Special Court for Darfur appointed,</u> with jurisdiction over gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian laws committed in Darfur since 2003. While the latter has yet to undertake an official visit to Darfur, it has allegedly concluded an investigation and issued arrest warrants over a notorious attack that occurred on a marketplace in September 2010, in which 37 villagers were killed.

19. The decline in violence means that there are fewer instances of fresh displacement, with some returns occurring in West Darfur. However, criminality is a problem, particularly in areas where the rule of law is underdeveloped or does not exist. Thefts and assaults in IDP camps and attacks on UNAMID personnel and humanitarian convoys and aid workers remain a concern. This partly reflects the sense of impunity with which the attackers act. The human rights situation in Darfur remains a significant cause for concern with frequent cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and violations of the right to physical integrity.

20. Although the humanitarian situation has improved, it could easily worsen if there was a return to conflict. Darfur is located in a violent and unstable region. Its borders remain porous to arms flows from neighboring states and its recent history of ethnically based clashes has created a deep legacy of bitterness. It also remains mired in poverty, which as well as prolonging the suffering of civilians, also creates conditions which feed the conflict through clashes over access to land and other scarce resources.

Mission strategy for the Protection of Civilians

21. The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established in December 2007. The Mission's core mandate, as outlined in Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007) and subsequent Resolutions, has been to ensure the protection of civilians (POC) throughout Darfur.

22. Resolution 1935 (2010) stated that POC was the priority task for UNAMID and this was reiterated in Resolution 2063 of July 2012 which underlined 'the need for UNAMID to make full use of its mandate and capabilities, giving priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources to: (a) the protection of civilians across Darfur, including through the implementation of a mission-wide early warning strategy; proactive military deployment and increased patrols in areas at high risk of conflict; securing, through increased police patrols, IDP camps, adjacent areas and areas of return; and supporting the development and training of community policing for IDP camps and areas of return; and (b) ensuring safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access, and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and humanitarian activities, so as to facilitate the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Darfur'.

23. UNAMID is confronted with numerous logistical and security constraints as it must operate in unforgiving terrain and in a complex and often hostile political environment. The Mission also faces shortfalls in critical transport, equipment, infrastructure and aviation assets. Between 2008 and 2012 UNAMID has suffered 38 fatal casualties due to the conflict, which is by far the highest number of peacekeepers killed on any UN mission. As the world's largest UN mission it also carries the burden of managing high expectations about what it can realistically achieve with regard to protecting civilians. Clearly the mission cannot protect all civilians, at all times throughout the region. It experienced considerable delays in reaching its mandate strength of troops and equipment and has been the target of attacks by rebel groups, armed criminals and occasionally by mobs of civilians.

24. The government of Sudan has also placed numerous bureaucratic obstacles in front of the hybrid mission fulfilling its mandate. This includes placing restrictions on UNAMID peacekeepers and humanitarian organizations, which prevent them from accessing large swathes of territory in Darfur, seriously undermining their efforts to protect and monitor civilians affected by the fighting. Following the indictment of Sudan's President al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) the government expelled thirteen international humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from northern Sudan, including Darfur, and revoking the licenses of three Sudanese relief agencies. The organizations expelled employed 40 percent of all humanitarian staff working in Darfur, supplying food and water to 1.1 million people and medical care to 1.5 million people. In 2010, the government expelled key staff of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who were involved in overseeing programs to facilitate the return of displaced persons. In February 2011, the government expelled, Médecins du Monde, the only medical organization providing services in Jebel Mara, and has repeatedly threatened to expel another group from West Darfur involved in food distribution.

25. The combined impact of all of these factors has clearly hampered UNAMID's operational capacity and increased the threats that civilians face. UNAMID has, nevertheless, been criticized for sometimes failing to take sufficiently robust action to protect civilians as it is mandated to do. The Protection of Civilians strategy that the mission has developed has been largely in reaction to the dynamics of the conflict, which, as discussed above, has gone through various stages. **In January 2011, UNAMID issued a POC strategy reflecting the strategic environment at the time. During the course of 2012 a multi-disciplinary task force reviewed this strategy and issued recommendations on ways to strengthen its implementation.** The review recommended the need for a strong coordination structure for POC activities, a process for shared risk analysis, and the need for an early warning and analysis mechanism. It also emphasized the need for POC activities to be multi-dimensional and community-based and suggested mechanisms to advance further integration in the conduct of those activities. The POC strategy identifies the current major threats to the civilians in Darfur as:

- Continued albeit reduced clashes between the SAF and some rebel groups, including the JEM, SLA/MM and SLA/AW
- Inter-tribal clashes, including those over scarce resources such as water
- sexual violence
- Increased criminality, including in areas of return.

26. The range of threats is diverse and the level of insecurity is not uniform throughout Darfur. While some areas are still insecure, others may be moving towards early recovery, voluntary return, and long-term promotion of human rights and the rule of law. UNAMID must, therefore, tailor its overall strategy towards the evolving needs of each Darfuri community. The implementation of the POC strategy is defined along five priority pillars:

- Physical protection;
- Humanitarian assistance;
- Protection through access to rights;
- Early recovery and social empowerment;
- Protection through political engagement.

27. A cluster is being formed for each priority pillar to ensure horizontal integration across the civilian, military, and police components. Each cluster will have a lead component, section, and or unit, with relevant Mission entities supporting its efforts. The POC strategy will be implemented through these integrated clusters, which will guide mid-term planning and inform responses. The clusters will establish quarterly POC benchmarks to guide their work. In addition, each cluster will engage with its counterparts in the UN Country Team (UNCT), government institutions, and civil society to develop joint programming where necessary.

28. The Physical Protection Cluster is led by the military component in close coordination with the police and other relevant substantive sections and units. It relies on heightened situational awareness, an effective communication and early warning mechanism, scenario-based exercises for contingency preparedness, and capabilities to effectively mitigate risks to civilians. To that end, **UNAMID is establishing Sector Joint Protection Groups (SJPGs), Field Protection Teams (FPTs), Mission Protection Maps (MPM), and community-based early warning mechanisms**. It also conducts public awareness campaigns, particularly aimed at the most vulnerable members, such as women, children, disabled and elders, to ensure that community members are aware of any imminent danger and take proper individual actions to reduce their exposure to threats. Mission Protection Maps are maps especially developed to assist in planning of UNAMID operations / actions concerning the mission POC Strategy.

29. Addressing the challenges of protection against physical violence requires enhanced military presence at areas where civilians are most at risk of violence. This includes a permanent presence by both the military and Formed Police Units (FPUs) at IDP camps, and increased and extensive patrolling on main axes and known risk areas. In addition, targeted patrols for specific activities such as firewood collection, market activities, and grass cutting are required for immediate-term protection.

A key factor, however, is deterrence, which is achieved through developing close community relationships that provide early warning, by maintaining a robust posture, and using proportional force when required, in accordance with the Mission's mandate.

30. **SJPGs**, comprised of civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, human rights, child protection, military, police, and other officers, as needed, are being established at the Sector-level to carry out fact-finding missions to assess and report on protection risks, challenges. SJPGs will guide FPTs, which will be established at the Team Site-level to coordinate with Community Focal Points (CFPs) and communicate with vulnerable communities, including those not in the immediate vicinity of Team Sites. SJPGs will also conduct capacity-building and training to establish and operate communications equipment, perimeter lighting, and other capacities to dissuade threats from targeting those communities. **Based on the information from FPTs and CFPs, the SJPGs will guide the engagement of the UNAMID Force in carrying out long-range patrols and establishing when necessary Temporary Forward Operating Bases (TFOBs) to show force and deter targeted attacks against civilians**. The SJPGs will also establish Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) that can be deployed to areas where the Mission lacks permanent presence.

31. The Humanitarian Assistance Cluster is led by the Humanitarian Protection Strategy Coordination Division (HPS) and consists of representatives from relevant substantive sections and units, and the military and police components. It focuses on the coordination of the provision of escorts to humanitarian convoys and, where necessary, expanding the scope and scale of such operations. It also aims to increase access to more at-risk areas and ensure proper and timely engagement of the Mission in assisting the UNCT and humanitarian actors with their responses to humanitarian crises and emergencies.

32. The Early Recovery and Social Empowerment Cluster is led by the Humanitarian, Protection Strategy Coordination Division. It supports initiatives that increase self-sufficiency of communities by helping them to build sustainable livelihoods, which, in turn, can help to reduce clashes over access to resources. It also explores possible joint programmes and activities with the UNCT and non-UN actors and informs the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Community Labor-Intensive Projects (CLIPs) to help vulnerable communities, including in IDP camps and return areas, and address their economic challenges and their lack of basic services.

33. The Protection through Access to Rights Cluster is led by the Human Rights Section and includes representatives from all relevant sections and units as well as the military and police components. It focuses on creating a protective and conducive environment for cultural, social, economic, political, and other human rights. The protection of these rights is critical for protecting civilians against arbitrary arrest, detention, and punishment, and other unlawful application of authority. It also advances needed programmatic activities and political engagement to this end. It will strengthen the implementation of the various rights mandates entrusted to the Mission, such as child protection, gender, human rights, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). It will also ensure that the policies and activities of the Mission are fully informed of the various local sensitivities as well as human rights standards.

34. This cluster will also ensure capacity and institution-building initiatives to advance the rule of law and the establishment of strong judicial institutions and prison system in Darfur, including through training and program implementation in the areas of human rights, rule of law, law enforcement, judicial reforms, child protection, and women empowerment. Such an approach will ensure the development and strengthening of government institutions that will be necessary to ensure long-term protection of civilians. The cluster will also ensure a coordinated engagement of the Mission in existing Task Forces relevant to the work of its priority pillar (such as child protection and SGBV). The cluster will also coordinate the Mission's engagement with relevant external stakeholders, particularly the UNCT and civil society actors in achieving its objectives and will work towards empowering relevant national and local institutions, including the newly established National Human Rights Commission.

35. The Protection through Political Engagement Cluster is led by the Civil Affairs Section (CAS). It seeks to engage the government of Sudan to ensure its commitment to its responsibility to protect all people of Darfur. In this regard, the implementation of the DDPD, particularly its security and military provisions, as well as the establishment of an inclusive and effective Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) and the relevant Commissions, provides an additional opportunity to advance POC in Darfur. This engagement is led by the Political Affairs Division (PAD). It also focuses on preventive political engagement and mediation to reinvigorate traditional community mediation reconciliation and conflict resolution mechanisms. UNAMID's early engagement with concerned parties, including civil society groups, provides forums for consultations and dialogue that effectively address and resolve disputes. This will require an enhanced capacity to monitor inter-tribal and resource-based conflicts on the ground and to produce better analysis on trends and local dynamics. It will also necessitate better coordination between the military personnel, police advisers, and the civilian staff in the field, particularly civil affairs, humanitarian, and human rights staff, as well as between the Mission and the UNCT.

36. Protection of human rights and women from SGBV will continue to be a key objective of the POC strategy. Many women in areas where the Mission's POC activities are most urgently needed lack the ability to advocate their rights or protect themselves. However, the Mission will make full efforts to accurately assess the risks they face and effectively protect them, while ensuring gender-mainstreaming in all relevant POC programmes and activities The implementation of a multidimensional and community-based POC approach will take into consideration immediate term, medium-term, and longer-term POC challenges that will be reflected in Mission Protection Maps, action plans, and cluster protection benchmarks.

37. The circumstances in which force can be used and the prohibitions against it are described in more detail in the Rules of Engagement for UNAMID's military component and the Directives on Detention, Searches and Use of Force for members of UNAMID's Formed Police Units. The general principles governing the use of force are proportionality, minimum use of force commensurate with the level of threat and the requirement to minimize the risk of collateral damage. Any force used must be limited, in its modus, intensity and duration, to that which is necessary to achieve the authorised objective. UNAMID's military component shall, wherever the operational situation permits, make every reasonable effort to resolve potentially hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force.

Module 5 - UNAMID

Scenarios

Important Remarks

1. The following scenarios are based on UNAMID's experiences on Protection of Civilians (POC) issues in Darfur. Similar training modules are being produced for South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Côte d'Ivoire. **Although the scenarios are based on real incidents, they should not be seen as literal descriptions of events that have actually occurred**. Places and names have been changed, some incidents have been amalgamated and other details added to draw out particular learning point. All of the scenarios are, therefore, set in the province of Koloni in the fictional case-study of Carana, which has its own national army, police and rebel groups. For legal reasons it should be clearly understood that the actions described by these fictitious groups in these case-studies do not reflect on the reputations of any real organizations or individuals.

Carana Context (See supporting map)

2. Koloni is a region in western Carana, which covers an area of some 493,180 square kilometers, approximately the size of Spain. It is largely an arid plateau with the Kasso Mountains, a range of volcanic peaks, in the west, and its main towns are Norke Sureen and Karo. The population is between 6 million and 7.5 million people. Koloni's economy is primarily based on subsistence agriculture as well as livestock in the drier north. Much of the region is dry and sandy, with the desert encroaching in the north. It suffers from frequent droughts during the summer although some places experience heavy rainfall in the winter.

3. Koloni was incorporated into Carana by Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1916, having previously existed as an independent Sultanate for several hundred years. It is a complex mix of more than 36 ethnic groups, of which the Falin, Tatsi and Kori, together with the Abbas, are the most significant. Tensions have existed for generations, between the nomadic herders, often identified as Abbas, and sedentary farmers, often identified as indigenous, over access to water and grazing land. Until recently, these were generally resolved through traditional methods of conflict resolution. Ethnicity is not in itself clear-cut, given the long history of racial mixing between 'indigenous' peoples and the 'Abbas', who are distinguished by cultural-linguistic attachment as much as race.

4. A civil war escalated in Koloni in 2003. Tens of thousands of people were killed during the first two years of the conflict and the total death toll, including from conflict-related disease and malnutrition is estimated in the hundreds of thousands. Many of the worst atrocities were committed by an Abba militia, particularly in the conflict's first two years. According to OCHA, three million people are also believed to have been displaced from their homes by the fighting. A Koloni Peace Agreement was signed between the government and one group of rebels, a faction inside the Carana Liberation Army (CLA), in 2006. However, this was rejected by other rebel groups and the conflict continued. The number of rebel and militia groups multiplied and the distinction between them became increasingly blurred as all sides formed and broke opportunistic alliances for tactical gains. Civilians continued to be targeted by all sides.

5. In July 2011 a new Document for Peace in Koloni was signed, in Doha, Qatar, between the government and a newly formed alliance of rebel groups, the Justice and Liberation Movement (JLM), although other groups boycotted this as well. Implementation of the agreement has been slow and uneven, however, and, although the levels of violence are much lower than in 2003-04, sporadic fighting between government and rebel forces has continued.

Scenario 1: Policing a demonstration

1. The province of Koloni has been governed under emergency laws since 1989, which allow for detention incommunicado and without charge and for limitations in freedom of expression and assembly. One of the primary tools of government repression in Carana is the National Intelligence Central Executive (NICE), which uses its broad powers to harass, intimidate, arrest and detain human rights activists, journalists, and those who speak out against the government or who are suspected of links to rebel movements.

2. Other security forces, such as military and police officials, also carry out arrests, then transfer detainees into NICE custody. **NICE is well-known for ill-treating and torturing political detainees**, documented in many cases by human rights monitoring organizations, including the January crackdown on peaceful protesters. The security forces have targeted Koloni civil society activists for detention and torture. In late October and early November 2010, for example, NICE arrested a group of 13 journalists and human rights activists and detained them in their offices before transferring them to prison. The authorities released 10 of the group in January but then re-arrested others; six currently remain in detention. Those who were released reported being subjected to beatings and other ill-treatment and torture while in detention.

3. The UN's own staff members have occasionally been targeted for arrest and detention. In February 2012, one national and one international staff member of the United Nations Mission in Rimosa (UNMIR), Carana's neighbor to the south with which it has fought two long and bitter wars, were arrested in the province of Leppko. On 21 March, a local judge heard the case against the staff and recommended to the Minister of Justice that they be released. UNMIR and UNAMID are coordinating efforts for the immediate release of the two staff members.

4. According to the Koloni Bar Association, **64 civilians are currently detained in prisons arbitrarily without charge, some for prolonged periods in violation of Carana's own National Security Act of 2010**, which allows for detention without judicial review for up to four and a half months. The Koloni lawyers alleged that one detainee, a 30-year-old pro-democracy activist from Norke has been arbitrarily detained since July 2008 during a peaceful protest following a rebel attack on Omdurman in May 2008, and is in urgent need of medical treatment. In May 2011, the minister of justice appointed a representative to investigate allegations of unlawful detentions.

5. A demonstration has been planned in Sureen, Koloni's main town, to protest the continued detention of a group of activists. The organizers have said that the demonstration will be peaceful and will focus on the humanitarian treatment of the prisoners. The march will assemble in a suburb of Sureen and proceed to a rally in its main square. However, the detained group includes a number of people who are known to have links to the rebel leadership whose followers are likely to attend in large numbers. UNAMID has an FPU and an Infantry Battalion deployed in Sureen.

See sketch below.



6.. Fill in the attached annex A - Model Operational Plan, covering various scenarios and options. You are to consider the extent and involvement of the Formed Police Units (FPUs) and other mission elements as well as coordination with the national authorities. Your plan should outline specific measures to be taken a) before the demonstration b) during the demonstration c) if clashes occur d) after the demonstration as consolidation.

7. Participants will be told that this exercise contains a real-time scenario element. They will receive additional information while they are working in small groups, which they will need to incorporate into their planning and presentations. (Facilitator to allow enough time, up to 3hrs for consideration).

After 45 minutes: Tell participants the following).

8. The CNP deployed 100 police officers along the route and has another fifty dispersed at the square area. The CDF has deployed a company as reserve at a near by street and its Commander watches the scene. The demonstration proceeds peacefully to the square and speakers begin to address the rally. However, as they are speaking shots ring out from some buildings on one side of the square. Several demonstrators are injured and two fatally. Some

demonstrators respond by throwing stones at the police on duty. The police broke ranks and ran and the army has just begun to fire live ammunition into the crowd.

9. According to the previous discussion and the conceived plan, how should UNAMID actors respond to these tactical challenges?

10. The day after the demonstration which resulted in the deaths of three people, the organizers brought the dead bodies of the victims to the front of UNAMID MHQ, blaming the UN for having done nothing to protect them from the government forces. What can the different components of UNAMID do to address the issue?

Scenario 2: Displacement and return

1. The improved security situation has led to a sustained flow of spontaneous returns of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well as refugees from neighboring countries. The government of Carana has been offering incentives, such as land, to returnees and humanitarian agencies, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization of Migration (IOM) have been providing return packages of food and non-food items. Part of the incentive to return has also been a reduction of food distribution in some displacement camps by the World Food Programme (WFP).

2. However, returnees have experienced challenges, including a lack of access to basic services, livelihoods opportunities, and agricultural support. Return in many cases remains fragile and its sustainability will depend upon security and livelihood opportunities, as well as on the provision of basic services and community infrastructure, such as health centers, schools and markets.

3. Koloni has been suffering from the effects of land degradation, deforestation and desertification in recent years. The number of livestock has risen from close to 27 million animals to around 135 million, in the past four decades while some estimates show that the population has grown six-fold. **Overgrazing of fragile soils combined with declining and highly irregular patterns of rainfall have contributed to this environmental crisis** that has led to the desert advancing by around 100 kilometers. Large scale returns could, therefore, lead to an increase in disputes over access to water and land for cultivation or for pasture, which could turn into resource-based conflicts. The lack of adequate basic services on the ground could also increase tensions between existing communities and returnees.

4. Many IDPs may choose not to return to their rural areas of origin and instead to settle in urban areas. The fact that many IDP camps and settlements are in or near the urban sites, and have increasingly come to resemble urban settlements themselves, is changing Koloni from a predominantly rural society into an increasingly urban one. While this may ease pressure on rural land, it has other implications for society as rapid urbanization creates increased demands for education, health care, water and livelihood opportunities, which, if not met, often results in increasing crime and squalor. Experience from around the world shows that the rapid growth of 'shanty towns' almost always leads to serious law and order problems. Increasing crime is already being reported in many urban centres.

5. Security remains the biggest single concern of displaced people and returnees, followed by livelihood opportunities, access to basic services and agricultural support. The visible presence of a police post is often one of the most important assurances that it is safe to return to an area.

6. You are the company /FPU detachment commander/ /HR officer and you have received a report that a group of recently returned families have been the victims of attacks, arson and other forms of harassment. Local police are understaffed and unable to address the problem. A routine UNAMID patrol arrives at the village to see a group of youths throwing stones at a house. Another house is on fire and its owners are standing in front of it being jeered at by a crowd, some of whom are armed. A man who identifies himself as head of the local militia tells the UN patrol to leave the area.

7. What will your response to the situation be as the* company /FPU detachment commander/ /HR officer*? What should the patrol commander do (assuming that he tries to but does not get any instructions from his company commander because of radio communication problems)? What can be done at the tactical level to address the broader problems that this scenario illustrates?

Scenario 3: Protection of Civilians assessment

1. Oladi is a town in the north-west Koloni, located around a Wadi (dry river bed and seasonal wet-land) near to the Bubeel Mountains. It has a population of around 45,000 people, who are a mix of ethnic groupings, including Falin, Tatsi and Kori. It also lies on one of the traditional north-south migration routes used by Koloni's Abba pastoralists and there are a number of Abba villages surrounding the town. Oladi was briefly occupied by troops from neighbouring Sumora during that country's civil war in 1989. Armed opposition groups from Sumora had used Oladi as a base for cross-border attacks. They had also committed numerous human rights violations (HRVs) against local people, threatening and robbing farmers and carrying out rapes and sexual assaults on local women.

2. Oladi has also experienced significant insecurity during the conflict in Koloni. While mostly government-controlled, the Tatsi and Kori are associated with the rebel groups, and the town was briefly taken by the rebels in August 2003. **The area northeast of town is still largely controlled by the rebel Carana Liberation Movement (CLM), while the generally pro-government Abba militias have bases to the south and west. Two camps for internally displaced person (IDPs), formed near the town.** Violence broke out in Oladi, in August 2012, when the head of the district, Afir Almort, was shot and seriously injured during a carjacking attempt. Almort was a leading Falin and his supporters retaliated with looting and attacks on Tatsis in a nearby camp for internally displaced people (IDPs), located near to Oladi. Four civilians and four members of the Carana National Police (CNP) were killed and the entire population of the camp— 25,000 people — fled because of the fighting.

3. The government of Carana responded by imposing a curfew and placed Oladi under military rule. **By late August most of the IDPs had returned to the camp**. However, on 24 August, Almort was again attacked by unknown gunmen who stormed his office. Although he was rescued by soldiers from the Carana Defence Force (CDF), some of his staff were killed. **In a separate incident, two UNAMID soldiers were abducted by unknown gunmen near Oladi**.

4. An inter-agency assessment team, consisting of three UN agencies, recently visited Oladi to carry out a humanitarian assessment. They reported that security is the over-arching concern for residents, both inside the town and in surrounding rural areas. **Access to markets is limited or cut off because of these security threats. Farmers have been attacked working in their fields and the movement of animals for grazing purposes has also been curtailed.** It is reported that historically, residents used local tribal mechanisms to resolve conflicts. The relationship between the different ethnic groups has largely been one of mutual cooperation and benefit. There were good social ties between the tribes, including exchange of goods and even inter-marriages. However, the Koloni conflict had largely divided the rural population into those perceived to be supporting the government of Carana and those perceived to be supporting the rebels. With the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms faltering, at the time of the assessment, there was growing competition between the groups regarding access to natural resources: livestock routes for the nomads and agricultural land for the sedentary farmers.

5. In Oladi itself, and the two IDP camps that had grown up alongside it, crime was reported as the main security threat. It was reported that robberies and assaults were frequent and that women were increasingly afraid to leave their homes. Those interviewed were aware of UNAMID, but not clear about its role. **The general perception was that it was a neutral protection force, and its presence could increase safety, but those interviewed noted they had not seen it until recently and that its soldiers did not conduct regular patrols**.

6. What are the POC issues contained in this scenario and how can the various components of the mission respond to them at the tactical level? Discuss how Sector Joint Protection Groups (SJPGs), Field Protection Teams (FPTs), Mission Protection Maps (MPM), and community-based early warning mechanisms could be employed in Oladi.

Scenario 4: Denial of access

1. One of the central problems facing UNAMID in implementing its protection of civilians (POC) mandate is obstructions of access to places where civilians are reportedly at risk. For example, during the period January – June 2011 the following incidents were recorded, but UNAMID was not able to verify them due to access restrictions.

2. In Central Koloni, local sources reported fighting between a rebel group and an Abba militia on 5 and 10 January in the Rekl area (west of Karo). No casualties were recorded. Despite several attempts, **UNAMID was prevented by armed groups from accessing the area to verify the reports**. On 8 January, Government authorities and local sources informed UNAMID that a National Intelligence Central Executive (NICE) convoy was ambushed by an unidentified armed group in Cerska (west of Karo), resulting in injuries to seven NICE personnel. On 22 January, approximately 30 unidentified armed men attacked a Government police station at Maxell Village (south of Karo), resulting in the death of one police officer and injuries to another. Three police officers are also missing following the attack. Clashes between the Carana Defence Force (CDF) and an unidentified group occurred on 29 January at Zigzag camp for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) (near to Norke), resulting in injuries to a 16-year-old girl. **All these incidents have definitively increased the risk to civilians.**

3. In Southern Koloni, local sources informed UNAMID that rebels attacked Nusbet village (south east of Sureen) on 12 February, a market day, in an attempt to obtain supplies. The CDF responded and clashes ensued, reportedly resulting in the death of four rebels. Attempts by UNAMID to verify the reports were obstructed by Government authorities. In Northern Koloni, on 6 March, hostilities broke out between the CDF and armed movement forces in the vicinity of Leergut. On 11 and 12 March, Government Border Guard forces attacked the villages of Xaxi and Lopkas. **Local sources reported three civilian fatalities and the looting of livestock. UNAMID verification patrols were denied access by Government authorities.**

4. Government authorities informed UNAMID that on 29 April, SPLA rebel groups had taken control of Muni in western Koloni, from the CDF. A CDF spokesperson claimed that Government forces regained control of the town on 7 May. According to local sources, 7,000 civilians were displaced by the fighting. Furthermore, the Government of Carana alleged that Carana Liberation Army (CLA) elements conducted operations around Bubeel and Rimee, near to the border with neighboring Katasi on 17 and 18 May. **UNAMID has thus far been unable to verify the reports because of access restrictions.**

5. On 8 May, a rebel group took control of Recke (south east of Sureen) from the CDF, until Government forces regained control of the town the following day. UNAMID verified that a total of 14 Government soldiers and police were killed and two injured; three civilians were killed and 13 injured; Government installations and shops were destroyed; and the market was looted of fuel and other supplies. In Northern Koloni, on 26 June, armed men ambushed a CDF military convoy at Soda. **UNAMID was unable to verify the reports of casualties claimed by the parties, which varied considerably**. A UNAMID patrol verified the aerial bombing by the CDF near Bondallo village on 27 June. No casualties or cases of displacement were recorded.

6. Where UNAMID is able to gain access to areas it carries out investigations and steps up patrolling. It has established Sector Joint Protection Groups (SJPGs), Field Protection Teams (FPTs), Mission Protection Maps (MPM), and community-based early warning mechanisms. Based on the information from FPTs, CFPs, and the SJPGs UNAMID carries out long-range patrols and establishes Temporary Forward Operating Bases (TFOBs) to show force and deter targeted attacks against civilians. The SJPGs have also helped to establish Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) that can be deployed to areas where the Mission lacks permanent presence.

7. Clashes have been reported between Leergut and Xoxi, in north eastern Koloni. **Both villages are reported to have been razed by an Abba militia. There have also been reports of aerial bombardments by the CDF.** UNAMID and United Nations humanitarian agencies are aware of claims of population movement into the surrounding mountains as a result of these clashes and

are attempting to verify the numbers**.** A verification patrol has been sent to the area and observed two craters with metallic fragments and crushed stones in the area, but there was no report of injury or death from the explosion. **It also received reliable reports that a militia group is in the area, heading towards the village of Wuxli, which it is likely to attack. This is the same militia group that had clashed with the CDF and attacked Leergut before.**

8. An UNAMID patrol comprising four Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) with 22 infantry personnel with personal and crew-served weapons – is dispatched from its base in Karo. Just outside Wuxli it encounters a Carana National Police (CNP) check-point, consisting of ten officers in two police cars; the police officers informs the patrol that access to the village is prohibited.

9. What should the commander do and what issues does this raise for all of the component parts of the mission working at the tactical level?

Scenario 5: Land disputes

1. Competition over land and natural resources has long been a source of tension between different groups in Koloni. In colonial times, confrontation mainly took place over land access, especially among pastoralists and between pastoralists and farmers. The British administration accepted customary rules over land, though the title to land was vested in the government and a Native Administration was delegated to arbitrate between different groups. After independence the colonial system was abolished and tribal leaders were replaced by administrators. New laws were developed on the principle, introduced by the British, that unregistered land is assumed to be owned by the government unless the contrary is proven.

2. Land is a central issue for both rural and urban communities in Koloni. It is not just a means of livelihood, but also has cultural and socio-political dimensions. There is a long history of local conflicts over access to natural resources. However, these have become increasingly serious as the region has descended into conflict. The inability of Koloni's land ownership and land management systems to cope with the demand for agricultural land and pasture has been one of the key elements of the conflict. Agricultural expansion in particular remains a key dynamic in sparking group conflict, mainly by disrupting pastoral movement, to which both drought and insecurity have contributed. The impoverishment of pastoralists has made them willing to be used as militia in the wider conflict.

3. There is no unified legal framework of land tenure across Carana. The official land law is essentially founded on colonial land laws. However, **the traditional hakura framework, a system of land concessions, that pre-date colonial rule, is still widely recognized, particularly in rural areas**. The Koloni Peace Agreement of 2006 delegated the resolution of land issues to a future Land Commission. However, this was slow to establish itself and its activities have so far been limited.

4. Most pastoralist groups in Koloni do not own land on the basis of the hakura landholding system. Several Abba camel pastoralist groups, especially in North Koloni, were not assigned any land, though access to land and water along transhumant routes was generally accepted through customary practices. The breakdown of cooperative relations with settled farmers, particularly after devastating droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, left many pastoralists impoverished and deprived them of a sustainable livelihood base. When the conflict broke out, landless Abba groups saw an opportunity to expand their access to land and water.

5. Land issues are not limited to rural areas. The status of urban land tenure in and around cities in the north where IDPs have built temporary housing is also a significant source of concern. Forced removals, though in accordance with the law, are inconsistent with international human rights standards. At present there appear to be no adequate strategy in place to integrate IDPs who may not wish to return to their home areas. Appropriate strategies would include accelerating urban planning processes, facilitating legal access to a residential plot and investing in water and electricity services, and possibly in government-subsidized low-cost housing. Instead, urban plots occupied by IDPs are being forcibly vacated to make land available to private investors.

6. A clash has just been reported between two ethnic groups in the village of Bondallo (20 Km North of Norke), which has resulted in 50 people being killed. It is the third time this month that the two groups have clashed leading to the deaths of 100 people so far. The conflict apparently began after the killing of an officer in the Carana Defence Force (CDF) in an ambush. His relatives demanded compensation from the ethnic group which they blamed for his killing and this set off a cycle of violence that has yet to be resolved. **While on the surface this appears to be a simple blood-feud, local sources indicate that it has deeper roots, linked to an ongoing struggle for control of fertile grazing land. There is a high likelihood that new clashes will occur since the roots of the problem have not been yet addressed.**

7. UNAMID presence in the area is comprised of an Infantry Battalion in Sureen with two companies deployed in different locations (Norke and Karo), three FPUs (Sureen, Karo and Norke), a Joint Protection Groups in Norke and Field Protection Team in Bondallo. What should UNAMID do and how should the various components of the mission respond at the tactical level?

Scenario 6: Conflict Related Sexual Violence

1. It is difficult to develop a definitive picture of conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) in Koloni, due to lack of access to monitor the situation as well as the social stigma associated with reporting. **When the conflict was at its most intense, there was evidence that CRSV was widespread and systematic**, being used by some militia groups as part of a counter-insurgency strategy**. In more recent years, CRSV crimes are often opportunistic in nature** and capitalize on the physical and socio-economic vulnerabilities of women and children affected by conflict and displacement.

2. There have been numerous reports of CRSV during outbreaks of fighting and these are carried out by rebel and militia groups as well as government police and soldiers. For example, On December 22, in the context of attacks near to the town of Norke, three soldiers raped a 17-year-old girl. On February 18, two soldiers from Speka military camp abducted and raped a 10-year-old girl while she was herding sheep with her uncle to Zigzag displaced persons (IDP) camp. They were fleeing fighting in the area of Muni. On March 22, armed police forcibly abducted four women from their home in Bondallo, near Norke, and detained them overnight. Two of the men raped the youngest, a 25-year-old woman, and tied her and one of the others with rope and subjected all of them to beatings. The women had returned to their village from Zigzag displaced persons camp to collect belongings after fleeing fighting in January. The government has not arrested any of the perpetrators of these attacks. A human rights non-governmental organization has claimed that the government has not taken steps, such as lifting legal immunities for crimes by soldiers and police, that are needed to hold soldiers or allied militia criminally accountable.

3. Some other UN agencies and international agencies had been providing women and child victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) with legal assistance. For example, in February 2006, a 26-year-old woman was raped by a policeman in the area of Muni. The rape was witnessed by four people. The woman's brother, also a policeman, took her to hospital where the assault was noted officially. He sought legal assistance from an agency whose lawyers filed a case with the police. Under Caranese law, members of the police enjoy immunity from prosecution. In May 2006, however, he was dismissed, thus permitting the lawyers to pursue a criminal case against him. The lawyers filed a request for private prosecution and lodged a psychiatric report noting that rape victim suffered from severe mental health problems and needed psychiatric treatment, which was subsequently provided. The Court found the accused guilty and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment.

4. In February 2004, a 14-year-old girl was forced by her father to marry a soldier, threatening to kill her if she refused. Legal aid lawyers took on the case, requesting the Court to dissolve the marriage. In court, her father confessed that he had indeed forced his daughter to marry. Her husband agreed to a divorce if reimbursed for the marriage expenses. The girl's father agreed and the marriage was dissolved.

5. Such cases have helped to change social attitudes. **However, in 2009 most international NGOs were expelled from Carana by the government, after charges had been filed against the country's President by the International Criminal Court**. This has greatly diminished the social services that are being provided to people in Koloni. Although **UNAMID continues to monitor SGBV in the region**, as well as how the issue is dealt with by the police, courts and prosecuting authorities, it cannot provide legal aid to individuals. It does, however, **attempt to protect women and children from CRSV, particularly in vulnerable locations, such as IDP camps. This includes providing escorts to women when leaving the camp to fetch water and collect firewood as well as supporting the national authorities efforts to improve security inside the camps.**

6. An international monitoring organization has just published a report on conditions in Zigzag IDP camp. Amongst other issues it noted that **sexual violence against women and children is extremely prevalent both within the camp and in its immediate environs.**

7. You are members of a Field Protection Team (FPT) that interacts with the UNHCR representatives, those responsible for running the camp. Due to staff turn-over and troop rotations your team members are all new to the area and your team has to discuss with UNHCR colleagues on POC related issues.

8. Make a comprehensive list of the tasks that each component of the mission should undertake at the tactical level, both to address the immediate concerns highlighted in the report and, more broadly, to address the POC concerns that this scenario raises. Finally, how, in practical terms, would you distinguish between SGBV and CRSV?

9. While on a confidence building patrol within IDP Camp Zigzag, the FPU platoon commander along with the Police Advisor team leader interacted with the Community leader who reported that during the previous night, six armed men with Arab accent attacked the camp. They beat up two elderly people and sexually abused five women who were on their way to collect firewood. Before leaving the camp, the aggressors threatened the IDP community that they will return if these actions are ever reported to the police.

10. What should be done by UNAMID to tackle this issue and avoid recurrence?

Scenario 7: Migration and Conflict over Resources

1. Approximately 1.5 million of Koloni's population are nomads. The nomads in North Koloni are animal herders; specializing in camels, goats, and sheep. They traditionally moved along prescribed routes in search of pasture and drinking water during particular times of the year. Recurrent drought and desertification, expansion of farmland corresponding to the population growth of Koloni as well as conflict-related insecurity have severely affected the livelihood of these nomads, who are increasingly finding their migration routes blocked. **As farmers expand cultivated areas, pastoralists crowd herds onto smaller parcels, increasing the pressure on these tracts. Nomads have also herded their animals around fertile agricultural lands, leading to crop destruction in many of these areas**.

2. Koloni has low and variable rainfall, which has decreased in recent years. This is exacerbated by the limited groundwater storage in most of the more populous parts of Koloni. During the dry season, livestock migrates off the rangeland to the wadi (dry river bed and seasonal wet-land) areas for shade and to feed on crop residues. This movement is then reversed as the risk of livestock diseases increases with the approaching rainy season. Nomadic livestock herding is usually a collective activity shared by members of the herding unit, often on the territory or lands of other groups. While livestock may be owned individually, livestock herding is usually carried out as part of a herding unit or community. Not all nomadic families moved with the animals, as the elderly, school children, and some women remained at permanent residential villages called damras. Like in any other village, these damras have facilities such as schools and health centres, and the residents also undertake some small scale agricultural activities. Given the limited cultivatable land around the damras, and the typical dry and arid climate, crop production is always less than required to meet the needs of the residents.

3. A wide range of traditional rules have been established for the management of long-distance routes, access to water sources at wadis through vegetable gardens, the timing of different shepherding rules, and dispute resolution. Although there were some changes in migration routes over the centuries, the rules governing livestock migration have changed little. To work effectively, the system requires a high degree of cooperation between pastoralist and farming communities. Unfortunately, many of the traditional land and migration management mechanisms are in decline or have broken down altogether over the past several years, affected by the conflict, large-scale displacement of populations, and the changing livelihoods strategies of the inhabitants of Koloni.

4. While the intensity of the 2003–2004 conflict is often cited as the breaking point, the traditional migratory system had been under duress for nearly three decades. Larger areas are needed to support the same yields and herds, but demands for farm land and herds are increasing, **leading to increased competition between herders and farmers as they compete for access to resources.** In the aftermath of the 2003–2004 conflict, humanitarian actors within Koloni noted a widespread pattern of apparent opportunistic settlement of nomads in abandoned villages in the months prior to the 2005 rainy season. They also received regular reports of trees and mango orchards being burned in areas originally belonging to displaced sedentary populations. The displacement of many rural farmers to towns and camps gave pastoralists access to land and the upper hand in rural power dynamics but, at the same time, it removed a critical part of the social and economic fabric of pastoralist society. For instance, the absence of rural farming communities has destroyed local markets, which nomads depend on to buy essential goods and sell their own produce.

5. Improving security in your region has led to an increase of the return of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) to their areas of origin. At the same time, a severe drought has been predicted for this year and the annual migration is about to start. What are the POC implications of these two developments and make a comprehensive list of how the various components of the mission should respond at the tactical level? What kind of military and police tactical actions an Infantry Battalion/FPU Commander might have to plan and prepare in order to address potential developments?

Scenario 8: Ethnic clashes

1. In 2006 one of Koloni's rebel factions, the Carana Liberation Army (CLA), signed a peace agreement with the Government of Carana, which resulted in its leader, Ahmad Thoffin, being appointed as a Special Adviser to Carana's President. Another faction of the CLA refused to sign and the group formally split.

2. However, towards the end of 2010, the CLA/MM withdrew from the agreement and returned to rebellion. This triggered new fighting between the government and rebels, starting in December of that year. It also led to a resumption of violence against Tatsi civilians, with which the CLA/MM was identified. **The Carana Defence Force (CDF) carried out aerial bombardments on areas controlled by the rebels, and communities suspected of sympathizing with them, and also recruited for a militia group, the Popular Attack Forces (PAF), which reportedly carried out widespread human rights violations**. Although formally under the control of the CDF, the PAF operate semi-autonomously, often pursuing its own agendas and vendettas, related to land and local political dominance. Previously marginalized groups—including the Kori and Falin — were armed and deployed in the PAF against Tatsi communities, though often in response to attacks by Tatsi militias. **This generated significant ethnically directed violence between January and July 2011.**

3. Militias systematically harassed and intimidated Tatsi civilians, looting their property, burning houses, and arresting—and reportedly torturing, raping, and killing—some individuals. Between February and early April, this harassment made almost all the Tatsi who had remained in the area around the town of Sureen, including those who had gathered around the UNAMID camp, to leave the area for safer places farther north. **In May and June of 2011, there were a series of attacks on civilians by both the CLA/MM and the PAF in eastern Koloni, where UNAMID has a strong military presence**. In one of the most violent incidents, on 31 May, a clash took place between armed men and a group of Tatsi civilians who were trying to retrieve stolen livestock. According to some media reports, the armed men were members of a PAF militia who subsequently executed 17 members of the group after they had been taken prisoner. Another four prisoners were saved from execution by the arrival of a CDF patrol who took them into custody. The Government of Carana subsequently conducted an inquiry into the killings, which concluded that the prisoners had been unarmed, with their hands tied, when they were shot.

4. The incident occurred only two kilometers from a UNAMID Infantry Company base. However, the first visit of UNAMID's Human Rights Section to the area took place almost two weeks after the alleged executions, by which time much evidence was no longer present. **This attack set off a spiral of retaliatory killings in which thousands of civilians were displaced from their homes**. **Up to 15,000 civilians sought protection around the UNAMID base, but were subsequently harassed and intimidated by the PAF into fleeing the area.** It was reported that over a four month period uniformed PAF members repeatedly appeared in front of the camp, threatening the IDPs and telling them to leave. **Although the Company did twice prevent the PAF and CDF from physically entering the compound area, it was unable to prevent arrests, attacks and rapes of civilians immediately in front of its base.**

5. UNAMID has also been criticized by other ethnic groups for its failure to protect them against revenge attacks by predominantly Tatsi rebel groups such as the CLA/MM.

6. You are the commander of the base. What could you have done differently and what are the likely factors that could have prevented you from acting more assertively? Could UNAMID have done more to protect the civilians who gathered around its base? What components of the mission would need to have been involved in coordinating a response to the developments outlined in this scenario at the tactical level? In what ways can all three mission components (civilian, military, police), initiate a response to the protection challenges inherent in the scenario?

Annex A

Model Operational Protection Plan

Beforehand

1. Information, liaison and cooperation: Who needs to meet with whom and for what purposes? Who should information be shared with and how often for early warning purposes? What specialist knowledge and skills will UNAMID need to draw on? Who are the relevant national actors and should they be regarded as potential allies or spoilers? What key messages need to be communicated and to whom?

2. Security and assurance: What are the potential flash-points? When and where might it be necessary to deploy UN troops and police? What civilian expertise should be deployed? Who might be involved in potential clashes? Who may need to be protected and from what? How reliable are the national forces that are likely to be deployed? How can the situation be monitored?

3. Assistance: What specific police, military and civilian assistance can UNAMID provide and how should this be planned and coordinated?

2. During the events

4. Information, liaison and cooperation: How will this be coordinated and who needs to be involved? How will information be gathered and disseminated? What key messages need to be communicated and to whom?

5. Security and assurance: What particular developments should trigger what particular responses? What risks may be involved in particular deployments of force and how can these be minimized?

6. Assistance: Who needs to be deployed where?

3. If clashes/human rights violations occur

7. Information, liaison and cooperation: What key messages need to be communicated and to whom?

8. Security and assurance: Who needs to be deployed where?

9. Assistance: Who needs to be protected and from what?

4. Consolidation

10. Information, liaison and cooperation: Who needs to meet with whom and for what purposes? How will information be gathered and disseminated? What key messages need to be communicated and to whom?

11. Security and assurance: How long will it be necessary to keep police and military forces deployed? Who still needs to be protected and from what?

12. Assistance: What specific civilian assistance can UNAMID continue to provide?

Module 5 - UNAMID

Instructor Guidance Notes and Training Pack Orientation

How to use this pack

1. This pack has been developed as a resource for trainers who are running the UNAMID scenario-based exercises on the Protection of Civilians (POC). The training pack contains 8 scenario-based exercises.

2. The **Scenarios are conceived for a detailed analysis of critical POC situations,** each of them consist of a one page hand out that participants are given to work on in groups of five to eight people. They are tasked with preparing a 10 minute presentation back to the plenary, which will be followed by a general discussion and de-brief. There is some flexibility around the timing of these exercises (depending on whether they are delivered as part of a broader training module or in a stand-alone format, and depending on how detailed the discussions on each scenario should be and obviously depending on the audience), but they will probably take between 1.5 and 2.5 hours to deliver. In addition, **the previous knowledge of the UN Core Pre-deployment training Materials is mandatory and essential**. Module 1 (Introduction to POC) is a pre-requisite before taking the scenarios. This will be broken down as follows:

Introduction	15 minutes
Scenario planning exercise	60 – 90 minutes
Presentations and de-brief	30 - 60 minutes

3. The scenario-based exercises can be cut or reduced if the scenarios are delivered as part of a broader training course, but more time should be allotted to an advanced course, to allow for more detailed discussion. The scenarios can either be run in conjunction with the generic POC pre-deployment modules that DPKO has produced, or with a smaller set of mission-specific materials. The latter consists of:

- **Introductory presentations**: a Map and a power-point presentation on the Carana context.
- **Country and Mission Overview**;
- **Scenario-Based Exercises**;
- **Instructor Guidance Notes and Training Pack Orientation**;
- **Glossary of Acronyms.**

4. Country and Mission Overview consists of a short briefing on Darfur and the POC challenges that it faces, which should be handed out in advance of the training. Full understanding of the Country and Mission Overview is an essential pre-condition to take the course. A summary of the UNAMID protection strategy is also contained in these Guidance Notes. DPKO has also produced other resource material, such as DVDs/Videos, which are available on request.

5. The scenarios are intended to provide a practical setting to explore the set of issues related to the implementation of POC. Participants need to decide what actions to take at the tactical level, but also to understand the context of their actions for the mission as a whole (operational level). They need to plan and implement actions, understand the impact of this within the overall context of the whole UN operation and be able to coordinate with other actors to ensure a synchronized response. By being pre-deployment training, most of the scenarios are mainly aimed at the military, or police, but all involve integrated planning between all the different elements of the mission. It is particularly important for all components of the mission to have a common understanding of the circumstances under which UNAMID troops may be used to deter attacks on civilians and in what circumstances they would be permitted to use force**.** It is important to understand that better training results will be achieved if the audience is comprised of military, police and civilian personnel**.** If the participants are exclusively military, civilian or police, the trainer/facilitator should remind them to factor the role of other mission components into their planning. This does not involve role-playing, but is intended to ensure that they think about all elements of mission rather than just their own professional discipline. Member States are encouraged to bring civilian representatives to the training sessions (from the UN Country Team, ICRC, NGOs etc).

6. These Instructor Guidance Notes are intended to bring out learning points from the exercise and emphasize certain issues. They are not intended to be a comprehensive list of all of the issues contained in each scenario and hopefully more points will emerge during the discussion amongst the

participants themselves. For some of the scenarios, there is no clearly right or wrong answer and the most important point will be for participants to have understood the dilemmas that the mission is facing and the constraints that it is operating under.

7. The trainer/facilitator should encourage interactive discussion amongst the participants and reflection on learning points that have come out of the modules rather than adopt a directive approach. Most groups of adults learn far more from discussing things amongst themselves than from sitting passively to listen to lectures. The trainer/facilitator should, therefore, use these notes to prompt questions and only interject if participants miss important issues, misunderstand things or state something that is clearly wrong. The trainer/facilitator should see his or her task as being to guide a boat with a rudder rather than to drive a car with a steering wheel.

Which scenarios to use?

8. Despite the fact that the training is more focused on military and police audiences, all of the scenarios are aimed at the tactical level and all contain issues of concern to civilians, police and military. Since the scenarios are all based on real incidents, they contain considerable detail and the trainer/facilitator should ensure that groups have sufficient time to read them through before starting their discussions. Each scenario contains a sufficient number of issues to be run over one or two hours and the easiest way to divide them into levels of complexity is to allow more time for the more advanced scenarios to allow more points to come out in the discussions and de-briefs. The table below gives a rough division of the scenarios by target and level of complexity, but different audiences may respond to each scenario differently. The facilitator/trainer should read them all through and decide which to use.

9. The scenarios have also been designed so that two or more can be run in conjunction with one another. To avoid repetition, much of the detail provided in the Guidance Notes to the earlier scenarios is not repeated in the later ones. The trainer/facilitator should, therefore, read the whole of these Guidance Notes as some of the information given for one scenario will be relevant to others.

10. Although the scenarios are set in a factional country, all of the information contained within them is based on real incidents and challenges which have confronted the UN mission in implementing its POC mandate. Since there will probably not be time to run more than two or three scenarios in any course, the trainer/facilitator could consider giving out the one page descriptions as hand-outs to participants. Some of the scenarios contain inter-related information and so after participants have completed an exercise based on one, the trainer/facilitator could give them another as a hand-out to reflect upon this as well.

Scenario	Description	Target	Level of complexity
1	**Policing a demonstration**	Police, military and civilians	Basic/Intermediary
2	**Displacement and Return**	Military, police and civilians	Basic/Intermediary
3	**Protection Assessment**	Military, police and civilians	Basic/Intermediary
4	**Denial of Access**	Military, police and civilians	Basic/Intermediary
5	**Land Disputes**	Military, police and civilians	Intermediary
6	**Conflict Related Sexual Violence**	Military, police and civilians	Intermediary/Advanced
7	**Migration Routes**	Military, police and civilians	Intermediary/Advanced
8	**Ethnic Clashes**	Military, police and civilians	Intermediary/Advanced

General Guidance Points

Mission Strategy for the Protection of Civilians

11. The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established in December 2007. The Mission's core mandate, as outlined in Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007) and subsequent Resolutions, has been to ensure the protection of civilians (POC) throughout Darfur.

12. Resolution 1935 (2010) stated that POC was the priority task for UNAMID and this was reiterated in Resolution 2063 of July 2012 which underlined 'the need for UNAMID to make full use of its mandate and capabilities, giving priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources to: (a) the protection of civilians across Darfur, including through the implementation of a mission-wide early warning strategy; proactive military deployment and increased patrols in areas at high risk of conflict; securing, through increased police patrols, IDP camps, adjacent areas and areas of return; and supporting the development and training of community policing for IDP camps and areas of return; and (b) ensuring safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access, and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and humanitarian activities, so as to facilitate the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Darfur'.

13. UNAMID is confronted with numerous logistical and security constraints as it must operate in unforgiving terrain and in a complex and often hostile political environment. The Mission also faces shortfalls in critical transport, equipment, infrastructure and aviation assets. Between 2008 and 2012 UNAMID has suffered 38 fatal casualties due to the conflict, which is by far the highest number of peacekeepers killed on any UN mission. As the world's largest UN mission it also carries the burden of managing high expectations about what it can realistically achieve with regard to protecting civilians. Clearly the mission cannot protect all civilians, at all times throughout the region. It experienced considerable delays in reaching its mandate strength of troops and equipment and has been the target of attacks by rebel groups, armed criminals and occasionally by mobs of civilians.

14. The Government of Sudan has also placed numerous bureaucratic obstacles in front of the hybrid mission fulfilling its mandate. This includes placing restrictions on UNAMID peacekeepers and humanitarian organizations, which prevent them from accessing large swathes of territory in Darfur, seriously undermining their efforts to protect and monitor civilians affected by the fighting. Following the indictment of Sudan's President al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) the government expelled thirteen international humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from northern Sudan, including Darfur, and revoking the licenses of three Sudanese relief agencies. The organizations expelled employed 40 percent of all humanitarian staff working in Darfur, supplying food and water to 1.1 million people and medical care to 1.5 million people. In 2010, the government expelled key staff of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who were involved in overseeing programs to facilitate the return of displaced persons. In February 2011, the government expelled, Médecins du Monde, the only medical organization providing services in Jebel Mara, and has repeatedly threatened to expel another group from West Darfur involved in food distribution.

15. The combined impact of all of these factors has clearly hampered UNAMID's operational capacity and increased the threats that civilians face. UNAMID has, nevertheless, been criticized for sometimes failing to take sufficiently robust action to protect civilians as it is mandated to do. The Protection of Civilians strategy that the mission has developed has been largely in reaction to the dynamics of the conflict, which, as discussed above, has gone through various stages. In January 2011, UNAMID issued a POC strategy reflecting the strategic environment at the time. During the course of 2012 a multi-disciplinary task force reviewed this strategy and issued recommendations on ways to strengthen its implementation. The review recommended the need for a strong coordination structure for POC activities, a process for shared risk analysis, and the need for an early warning and analysis mechanism. It also emphasized the need for POC activities to be multi-dimensional and community-based and suggested mechanisms to advance further integration in the conduct of those activities. **The POC strategy identifies the current major threats to the civilians in Darfur as:**

- **Continued albeit reduced clashes between the SAF and some rebel groups, including the JEM, SLA/MM and SLA/AW**
- **Inter-tribal clashes, including those over scarce resources such as water**
- **sexual violence**
- **increased criminality, including in areas of return.**

16. The range of threats is diverse and the level of insecurity is not uniform throughout Darfur. While some areas are still insecure, others may be moving towards early recovery, voluntary return, and long-term promotion of human rights and the rule of law. UNAMID must, therefore, tailor its overall strategy towards the evolving needs of each Darfuri community. **The implementation of the POC strategy is defined along five priority pillars:**

- **Physical protection;**
- **Humanitarian assistance;**
- **Protection through access to rights;**
- **Early recovery and social empowerment;**
- **Protection through political engagement.**

17. A cluster is being formed for each priority pillar to ensure horizontal integration across the civilian, military, and police components. Each cluster will have a lead component, section, and or unit, with relevant Mission entities supporting its efforts. The POC strategy will be implemented through these integrated clusters, which will guide mid-term planning and inform responses. The clusters will establish quarterly POC benchmarks to guide their work. In addition, each cluster will engage with its counterparts in the UN Country Team (UNCT), government institutions, and civil society to develop joint programming where necessary.

18. The Physical Protection Cluster is led by the military component in close coordination with the police and other relevant substantive sections and units. It relies on heightened situational

awareness, an effective communication and early warning mechanism, scenario-based exercises for contingency preparedness, and capabilities to effectively mitigate risks to civilians. **To that end, UNAMID is establishing Sector Joint Protection Groups (SJPGs), Field Protection Teams (FPTs), Mission Protection Maps (MPM), and community-based early warning mechanisms**. It also conducts public awareness campaigns, particularly aimed at the most vulnerable members, such as women, children, disabled and elders, to ensure that community members are aware of any imminent danger and take proper individual actions to reduce their exposure to threats.

19. Addressing the challenges of protection against physical violence requires enhanced military presence at areas where civilians are most at risk of violence. This includes a permanent presence by both the military and Formed Police Units (FPUs) at IDP camps, and increased and extensive patrolling on main axes and known risk areas. In addition, targeted patrols for specific activities such as firewood collection, market activities, and grass cutting are required for immediate-term protection. A key factor, however, is deterrence, which is achieved through developing close community relationships that provide early warning, by maintaining a robust posture, and using proportional force when required, in accordance with the Mission's mandate.

20. SJPGs, comprised of civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, human rights, child protection, military, police, and other officers, as needed, are being established at the Sector-level to carry out fact-finding missions to assess and report on protection risks, challenges. **SJPGs will guide FPTs, which will be established at the Team Site-level to coordinate with Community Focal Points (CFPs) and communicate with vulnerable communities, including those not in the immediate vicinity of Team Sites**. SJPGs will also conduct capacity-building and training to establish and operate communications equipment, perimeter lighting, and other capacities to dissuade threats from targeting those communities. Based on the information from FPTs and CFPs, the SJPGs will guide the engagement of the UNAMID Force in carrying out long-range patrols and establishing when necessary Temporary Forward Operating Bases (TFOBs) to show force and deter targeted attacks against civilians. The SJPGs will also establish Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) that can be deployed to areas where the Mission lacks permanent presence.

21. The Humanitarian Assistance Cluster is led by the Humanitarian Protection Strategy Coordination Division (HPS) and consists of representatives from relevant substantive sections and units, and the military and police components. It focuses on the coordination of the provision of escorts to humanitarian convoys and, where necessary, expanding the scope and scale of such operations. It also aims to increase access to more at-risk areas and ensure proper and timely engagement of the Mission in assisting the UNCT and humanitarian actors with their responses to humanitarian crises and emergencies.

22. The Early Recovery and Social Empowerment Cluster is led by the Humanitarian, Protection Strategy Coordination Division. It supports initiatives that increase self-sufficiency of communities by helping them to build sustainable livelihoods, which, in turn, can help to reduce clashes over access to resources.
It also explores possible joint programmes and activities with the UNCT and non-UN actors and informs the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Community Labor-Intensive Projects (CLIPs) to help vulnerable communities, including in IDP camps and return areas, and address their economic challenges and their lack of basic services.

23. The Protection through Access to Rights Cluster is led by the Human Rights Section and includes representatives from all relevant sections and units as well as the military and police components. It focuses on creating a protective and conducive environment for cultural, social, economic, political, and other human rights. The protection of these rights is critical for protecting civilians against arbitrary arrest, detention, and punishment, and other unlawful application of authority. It also advances needed programmatic activities and political engagement to this end. It will strengthen the implementation of the various rights mandates entrusted to the Mission, such as child protection, gender, human rights, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). It will also ensure that the policies and activities of the Mission are fully informed of the various local sensitivities as well as human rights standards.

24. This cluster will also ensure capacity and institution-building initiatives to advance the rule of law and the establishment of strong judicial institutions and prison system in Darfur, including through training and program implementation in the areas of human rights, rule of law, law enforcement, judicial reforms, child protection, and women empowerment. Such an approach will ensure the development and strengthening of government institutions that will be necessary to ensure long-term protection of civilians. The cluster will also ensure a coordinated engagement of the Mission in existing Task Forces relevant to the work of its priority pillar (such as child protection and SGBV). The cluster will also coordinate the Mission's engagement with relevant external stakeholders, particularly the UNCT and civil society actors in achieving its objectives and will work towards empowering relevant national and local institutions, including the newly established National Human Rights Commission.

25. The Protection through Political Engagement Cluster is led by the Civil Affairs Section (CAS). It seeks to engage the government of Sudan to ensure its commitment to its responsibility to protect all people of Darfur. In this regard, the implementation of the DDPD, particularly its security and military provisions, as well as the establishment of an inclusive and effective Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) and the relevant Commissions, provides an additional opportunity to advance POC in Darfur. This engagement is led by the Political Affairs Division (PAD). It also focuses on preventive political engagement and mediation to reinvigorate traditional community mediation reconciliation and conflict resolution mechanisms. UNAMID's early engagement with concerned parties, including civil society groups, provides forums for consultations and dialogue that effectively address and resolve disputes. This will require an enhanced capacity to monitor inter-tribal and resource-based conflicts on the ground and to produce better analysis on trends and local dynamics. It will also necessitate better coordination between the military personnel, police advisers, and the civilian staff in the field, particularly civil affairs, humanitarian, and human rights staff, as well as between the Mission and the UNCT.

26. Protection of human rights and women from SGBV will continue to be a key objective of the POC strategy. Many women in areas where the Mission's POC activities are most urgently needed lack the ability to advocate their rights or protect themselves. However, the Mission will make full efforts to accurately assess the risks they face and effectively protect them, while ensuring gender-mainstreaming in all relevant POC programmes and activities The implementation of a multidimensional and community-based POC approach will take into consideration immediate term, medium-term, and longer-term POC challenges that will be reflected in Mission Protection Maps, action plans, and cluster protection benchmarks.

Use of force and the physical protection of civilians

27. The UNSC resolution gives UNAMID the authority to act independently to protect civilians within their capabilities and areas of deployment, where the government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibility to do so. UNAMID is mandated to ensure that all available resources and capacities are used to protect civilians; this requires a continuous prioritization of risks to civilians to ensure that its assets are deployed accordingly. All components of the mission should have a common understanding about the overall approach.

28. UNAMID will deploy its military forces according to the priority threats to civilians identified by the mission. This means that the Force will be placed on high alert, ready to deploy additional reinforcements at short notice in places where attacks seem likely or are already underway. In such situations the Force Commander will review the Mission's Rules of Engagement for the Force, and issue any necessary clarifications. Bearing in mind that all UN missions operate within the principles of peacekeeping and in accordance with the mandate, missions are authorized to use force against any party, including elements of government forces, where such elements are themselves engaged in physical violence against civilians. Only a reasonable belief in hostile intent is required before the use of force can be authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be determined by the on-scene commander based on his or her professional judgement on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:

- the capability and preparedness of the threat;
- the available evidence which indicates an intention to attack; and
- historical precedents within the Mission's Area of Responsibility (AOR), depicting patterns of behaviour exhibited by parties to the conflict which may require the application of a worst case scenario.

29. The circumstances in which force can be used are described in more detail in the Rules of Engagement for UNAMID's military component and the Directives on Detention, Searches and Use of Force for members of UNAMID's Formed Police Units. The general principles governing the use of force are proportionality, minimum use of force commensurate with the level of threat in terms of modus, duration and intensity in view of the minimization of the risk of collateral damage. UNAMID military component shall, wherever the operational situation permits, make every reasonable effort to resolve potentially hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force (e.g. through negotiations or assistance from local authorities). Force may be used only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the immediate objective. Before resorting to the use of force, every reasonable step must be taken to deter any person or group from demonstrating a hostile intent or committing a hostile act. When force is used, all feasible precautions are to be taken with a view to avoiding and in any event minimising collateral damage. Any confrontation involving the use of force or detention is to be reported to the chain of command immediately upon occurrence whether it results in casualties or not.

30. Short of the actual use of force, the basic elements of a strategy to protect civilians from imminent threat of violence could include: a) provide early warning through their leaders to civilian populations in areas which may come under attack so that they could remove themselves from harm's way; b) continue to help deter violence against civilians through physical presence in heavily populated areas where attacks are expected; c) evacuate highly vulnerable civilians, and d) provide life-saving medical assistance to wounded civilians. Civilians who have gathered around any UN bases for protection and are under imminent threat of attack should be allowed in and protected. Care should be taken to ensure that they are unarmed (or are disarmed) and UN facilities should not be used as a base for political or military activity by any parties to a conflict. UNAMID is only mandated to protect civilians, not combatants, but the distinction between the two may sometimes be difficult to draw. Possession of a weapon, or previous participation in hostilities, does not necessarily make someone a combatant. Other scenarios and options might include the following:

- **Civilians being attacked seek refuge at a location with UNAMID's Area of Responsibility** – The UN, in coordination with the national army and police, and other friendly forces, will protect civilians with the minimum force necessary and, where possible, provide them with a safe corridor to leave the affected area. This depends on prior liaison and detailed passage of information to all concerned parties.

- **Attackers are seen to be looting and burning civilian property but the UNAMID forces do not believe civilians are under threat**- UN forces will continue to monitor the situation and constantly check for any danger to civilians. The use of deadly force is not permissible unless there is a physical threat to UN personnel or civilians.

- **Attackers approach UNAMID position to take individuals they suspect of having fought prior to taking refuge with the UNAMID** – UNAMID forces will protect all civilians seeking refuge with the minimum force necessary.

- **UNAMID personnel witness or suspect imminent physical violence against civilians** – UN forces will protect all civilians seeking refuge with the minimum force necessary.

- **UNAMID personnel believe killing or physical violence is being visited upon civilians not within their immediate area of influence** – The Senior UNAMID Commander on the ground must make an assessment of his/her options with the forces available. It is possible that leaving the current position might weaken it to such an extent that civilians already being protected

would be at additional risk. At a minimum, the Commander should alert HQ to establish whether another friendly force can intercede.

31. Obviously not all scenarios can be predicted in advance and it will be up to the Senior Mission Leadership to decide how to respond to specific situations. **Most Rules of Engagement authorise detaining, searching and disarming individuals in all situations where the use of armed force or unarmed force is authorized.** All detained persons must be treated in compliance with human rights standards and handed over to the appropriate local authorities as soon as possible within the time limits and conditions foreseen in the procedures on detention by UN personnel. However, hand over must not be carried out if there are substantial grounds to believe that the person runs a risk of being subjected to certain violations of his or her fundamental rights, in particular torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary deprivation of life (including as the result of a death sentence pronounced without fundamental guarantees of fair trial); persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

32. Military units also have an 'inherent right to use force in self-defence' which can include 'pre-emptive self defence against an anticipated attack'. The use of force should be governed by the principle of military necessity, which 'authorises the use of only that force which is required to achieve the authorised objective. Military necessity does not authorise acts otherwise prohibited under international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL), sometimes referred to as the laws of armed conflict.' When force is used, all feasible precautions are to be taken with a view to avoiding and in any event minimising collateral damage. Any confrontation involving the use of force or detention is to be reported to the chain of command immediately upon occurrence whether it results in casualties or not. The force used should be minimum and proportional to the threat. However, in some cases the force used to respond to a threat may have to be higher in order to minimise United Nations casualties and civilian casualties. Evacuation of aid workers and civilian staff of the mission should be a priority, so long as this can be done with available capacity and without diverting resources that could be better used to protect greater numbers of civilians from attack.

33. Even when a UN force cannot impose its will on the parties to a conflict, its visibility may have a calming effect. Mobile patrols may deter parties from committing crimes or human rights violations and can also be used to gather evidence of these which can subsequently be pursued through in-depth investigations by the mission's human rights component or referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC). If clashes escalate into all-out conflict, the Security Council will need timely and accurate information on which to base its decisions. The concept of 'protection by presence' is, however, a controversial one – as it sometimes cuts against a strategy of threatening to withdraw from an area where the Mission is being prevented from fulfilling its mandate. There are also circumstances where it could be directly counter-productive to the mission mandate. Peacekeepers can be taken hostage and their presence in an area may also inhibit the UN from taking more forceful action to protect civilians, such as air strikes. Civilians may also believe that the presence of UN peacekeepers will provide them with protection even when the force has neither the means nor mandate to do so. This could increase their vulnerability by encouraging people to stay in an area, which cannot in fact be protected.

34. It should be stressed that this is general guidance about the broad parameters of how the Chapter VII mandated powers that the UN Security Council has given to UNAMID to ensure the physical protection of civilians might be carried out at the tactical level. In all circumstances, the Head of Mission/Special Representative of the Secretary-General will have the discretion to interpret these powers and orders will be issued through the usual chain of command.

Military and civilian cooperation

35. Some of the following scenarios involve primarily a military response, some primarily a policing response and some primarily a civilian approach. All require the civilian, military and police elements of the UN mission to cooperate closely together and one of the intended learning outcomes is for the different components of the mission to gain a better understanding of how military, police

and civilian peacekeepers/units plan, coordinate and implement actions in a given situation with the ultimate objective of protecting the lives of civilian populations against violence.

36. UNAMID civilian staff cannot physically protect people from violence as this can only be done by the military or police. However, as the scenarios demonstrate, civilians have a tremendously important role in monitoring, reporting and political advocacy. Given the constraints which the mission is operating under, it is obvious that such monitoring, reporting and advocacy will be important in helping to prevent violence against civilians. The civilian component of the mission has a number of specific tasks which involve building close links with both local communities and the state authorities at a national and local level. Many civilians have also spent longer amounts of time in the mission, since they are not subject to regular rotations, and so have built up experience and contacts which the military often do not possess. They should, therefore, be seen as a valuable resource to draw on and partners to work with.

37. Civilians often have training in taking statements (particularly from traumatised or vulnerable people), writing reports and investigating incidents, which some soldiers may not possess. Equally, soldiers and police may come across information or witness events the civilian component of the mission may not. Sharing such information and ensuring that it is reported properly – while obviously respecting issues such as confidentiality and informed consent – will be a vital part of the mission's work during any crisis and the different component of the mission must work together to achieve this.

38. In any major crisis, consideration should be given to the establishment of a Joint Operations Room, to act as a hub of information-gathering and decision-making during a crisis, is a vital necessity. The civilian and military leadership of the Mission must coordinate effectively at Sector level. Too often the various components of a mission 'stove-pipe' their decision-making processes, fail to share information and coordinate and sometimes even cut across one another, which can have life-threatening consequences on the ground. Setting up one room, through which all information is passed and where all major strategic decisions get made is vital and should be amongst the first responses to a crisis.

Working with humanitarian actors

39. The humanitarian actors that the mission is likely to encounter (both UN and non-governmental) are likely to have been in place before the establishment of the mission, and will continue their functions after its departure, so will have considerable experience that can be drawn on. They can also play a critical bridging role between the mission and external protection actors including civil society and NGOs. It is important for military actors to understand the complex network of humanitarian assistance. This includes international organizations and local, national and international NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. Humanitarian access to a conflict zone is also largely dependent on acceptance by the parties to the conflict so humanitarian actors must remain independent and impartial at all times.

40. Humanitarian actors often use the term 'protection' as well, but it has a very different sense from the POC concept. The humanitarian conception of protection, sometimes referred to as a 'Rights Based Approach', encompasses 'all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.' This includes issues such tackling poverty and food insecurity, which are not POC concerns. While there are obvious links between the two issues, the differences between them need to be understood and some of the scenarios are designed to illustrate this point.

41. Humanitarian responses are increasingly coordinated through a 'cluster approach', which has been designed as a way of addressing gaps and strengthening effectiveness through building partnerships. Protection is defined as a specific cluster and agencies involved in protection activities meet regularly to coordinate their activities. The Global Protection Cluster (GPC) is chaired by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which is the global lead agency for protection. Other UN agencies – including UNICEF, UN-Habitat and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) act as focal points within it. Some UN agencies maintain separate field offices in countries where the Security Council decides to deploy such missions. Others, such as

OHCHR, are normally fully integrated into the Mission, with the head of the human rights component acting as a direct advisor to the Head of Mission, as well being a member of the UN Country Team and the Humanitarian Country Team. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can also provide invaluable expertise relating to the protection of civilians, while it is a neutral and independent organization whose mandate derives from the Geneva Conventions and its own statute, both of which emphasize its independence and impartiality.

Human rights and humanitarian law

42. Though UN peacekeepers are not generally considered parties to armed conflict (i.e. as fighters or combatants), the Secretary General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law (ST/SGB/1999/13) stipulates that peacekeepers will, when involved in hostilities, adhere to the principles of IHL as it relates to the use of force and the treatment of civilians and other non-combatants, as well as persons placed hors de combat. UNOCI's RoEs and DUFs have been drafted to ensure compliance with IHL. UN peacekeepers are also bound at all times by international human rights law, including its stipulations regarding the use of force.

Scenario One - Policing a demonstration

1. This scenario primarily relates to policing and could be used by the trainer/facilitator to illustrate the distinct role of the UN Police, as opposed to military, in the protection of civilians. Participants are given a model operational plan template to fill in at the start of the exercise and an example of the type of issues that should have been recorded is attached, which could be handed out during the de-brief.

2. No specific guidance is provided for the second part of the scenario, when shots are fired into the crowd, since its main point is to test participants' crisis management responses. During the de—briefing session they should also be asked how well they think that their pre-planning prepared them to respond to the development. **Clearly, there was an obvious potential for this demonstration to lead to violence given the recent history, current political fragility and poor human rights record of the security forces. UNAMID needed a contingency plan** to deal with this eventuality and to ensure that both its available police and military were prepared to respond. They must . As well as protecting vulnerable civilians UNAMID also needed to protect its own personnel and resources. The following notes should be used to guide the discussion along with the hand-out.

3. UN police officers support host-state police and law enforcement agencies in the execution of their functions. Their duties are defined by the mandates that the missions are given and can range from executive to advisory functions. **The Formed Police Units (FPUs) also provide support to UN operations in ensuring the safety and security of its personnel and missions, primarily in public order management.** UN Police are not considered as law enforcement officers under the legislation of the host country and their prerogatives are consequently limited. They may, however, stop, detain and search individuals in accordance with the mandate of the mission and specific directives issued by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

4. In most cases public order management will be in support of host state police, but FPUs can also be called upon to act independently in accordance with the mission mandate and authority allocated therein. The primary focus of public order management is to facilitate the population's exercise of their fundamental rights without any disturbance or unjustified hindrance and to prevent assemblies from threatening or actually harming public safety. This is the most central competence of FPUs and should be applied within a strict legal framework and with the minimum appropriate use of force, keeping in mind the principle of proportionality and the necessity of continued negotiation.

5. The FPUs should have primacy in addressing situations of public disorder of a *non-military* nature – that is where there is no sustained use of firearms or military weaponry – in support of or in cooperation with host state law enforcement agencies, as applicable. The Head of the Police Components (HOPC) may request personnel of the military component and/or other security personnel of the mission to perform specific missions or tasks, but will retain tactical control and overall command. The assignment of military personnel must be coordinated with the Head of the Military Component (HOMC) or Sector or Battalion Commander, as applicable.

6. FPUs will often be deployed where the main threat of violence arising is civil and in such situations it will probably be civil, it is vital that UNAMID's police are supplied with riot control equipment – such as riot shields, protective clothing, tear gas, rubber bullets, water cannons – and trained in riot control techniques in order to enable an effective and non-lethal response. A small number of properly trained police can have a greater impact than large numbers of ordinary police or soldiers without proper riot control training and equipment. **Where a situation escalates beyond the capacity of the United Nations police component, enhanced planning and coordination with the military component will be necessary. If mutual support operations to address situations of public order with FPU personnel and military forces**, with or without other security personnel of the mission, are necessary, actions must be coordinated in order to avoid unhelpful interference, misunderstandings or collisions. Violent mobs cannot be stopped with bare hands but should not be stopped with live ammunition – except as a last resort.

7. UNAMID peacekeeping soldiers also need to be on stand-by if the police are overwhelmed. In accordance with the Policy on Authority, Command and Control, the police remain in the lead until the Head of the Police Components (HOPC) deems a situation beyond his capabilities. Troops can be used in such circumstances, but it is vital that they understand that their task is to pacify civilians – most of whom will probably be unarmed – rather than to defeat an opposing military force.

8. Human rights components and other civilian staff should step up their monitoring and feed the senior leadership with real time information on the developments on the ground. If they cannot be deployed or they have to be withdrawn because of security reasons, they can at least engage in active information gathering through their civil society sources including local human rights NGOs.

9. Whatever is the plan conceived by participants, it should address at least two possible scenarios: a) the national security forces deploy enough personnel to handle the demonstration including the capability to react to riots and other forms of violence and UNAMID forces can stay in a stand by position of low likelihood of employment; b) the national security forces do not deploy in enough strength to control and intervene in case of necessity and UNAMID FPU an Infantry Battalion should be capable to manage the crowd.

10. In any case, the plan should contain elements of coordination between the two components, including issues as information collection and sharing, logistics, command and control etc. It is also requires coordination with the CNP and CDF and other elements.

11. To tackle a complex and difficult situation that escalates to a point in which CNP and CDF units start taking action against the demonstrators by using live ammunition, it is obviously necessary to have though and planned in advance. The question on what UNAMID actors "should do", could be responded by outlining the procedures planned for that contingency. It will depend on tactical and logistical factors, the local consent given by the national forces, good coordination and a degree of mutual confidence amongst all actors involved. Measures as pre-positioning of troops and police, joint rehearsals and communication exercises might be necessary.

12. This is an emotional and potentially explosive situation and needs to be handled carefully. Emotions could turn the gathering into another violent demonstration. Therefore, the police need to monitor the gathering carefully without showing massive overt presence. The military as well should be on standby to support if necessary. should then dialogue with the group to calm them down and get them to move the dead bodies and the gathering away. Whatever minor administrative assistance the UN could offer will be useful. The UN must however be careful not to make any promises especially as regards compensation.

Scenario Two – Displacement and Return

1. The Chapter VII mandate provides UNAMID with the authority to use force, up to and including lethal force, to protect civilians. The precise circumstances in which force can be used will be described in more detail in the Rules of Engagement for UNAMID's military component and the Directives on Detention, Searches and Use of Force for members of UNAMID's Formed Police Units. General guidance on the Use of Force is provided above.

2. The patrol commander should report back to his immediate superior to report the situation and then act to bring an end to the violence and protect the civilians who are under threat. Since the threat comes from other civilians – even though some of them are armed – it may be possible to accomplish this without resorting to the actual use of force. **The patrol commander should, however, maintain a robust posture, and be prepared to use proportional force, if necessary**. The patrol commander should call for reinforcements, if these are required, and stand firm until these arrive. UNAMID should send a clear signal to everyone that harassment of returnees is unacceptable and that forceful action will be taken.

3. The patrol commander on the scene has the elements to make an appropriate judgment on the situation and after a quick analysis, inform and seek advice from his immediate superior as to whether to arrest anyone who has been involved in committing unlawful acts. **If arrests are made** the detainees should be handed over to the local authorities for further prosecution, unless there are compelling reasons not to do so (ie good grounds for believing that they may be tortured or killed or subject to similar persecution). **The patrol should detain the men in custody until they can be handed over.** The maximum limit for such a detention is 48 hours if this is practically feasible**. After addressing the incident the Company or Infantry Battalion to which the patrol belongs to might revise its approach to these cases, seeking for increasing information gathering on the issue of returnees and liaison with local leaders to better understand the causes of the problems and potential violence**.

4. It is clearly impossible for UNAMID to protect all civilians at all times in a country emerging from a violent conflict, with weak state institutions and a fragile rule of law, nor to provide everyone with around the clock protection. In this case the two possible options appear to be either to provide safe passage out of the village to the affected families, or to find a way of neutralizing the threats that they face.

5. It is the primary responsibility of the government itself to protect its own population and to enforce the rule of law within its own territory. UNAMID should, therefore, liaise with the national and local authorities and attempt to persuade them to increase security in the area. UNAMID can supplement this capacity by stepping up its patrols on a short-term basis. **UNAMID could also engage in outreach to traditional, community and religious authorities and to support initiatives to defuse inter-community tensions**. It should also use these links to actively seek information about any potential new threats.

6. Refugees have a right to return in safety and dignity and on the basis of informed consent. If these conditions are absent people should not be pressurised into return. UNAMID's monitoring reports can, therefore, help to provide a picture of the type of problems that might confront returnees to a particular area. **It is not UNAMID's job to support the return of refugees to their homes**, **although this is an activity that UN agencies, such as UNHCR do undertake, but the POC mandate includes monitoring conditions which could lead to violent incidents.** Large-scale return of refugees and IDPs can lead to disputes over land ownership, occupation and usage, which could potentially generate more violence and so UNAMID should also be monitoring this issue. Rapid urbanization can also lead to increased social tensions, which can have implications for law and order and urban security, which might have implications on where UNAMID deploys its patrols and establishes its physical presence.

7. The trainer/facilitator should ensure in the de-brief that participants understand that this scenario raises issues which require a mission-as-a-whole approach. While the military can provide physical protection, the civilian and police components play a vital role in monitoring, advocacy and

liaison with local communities, government authorities and the national police force, which complement this activity and provide protection of civilians in the longer term.

Scenario Three – Protection Assessment

1. The POC issues in this scenario are those that directly involve threats to civilians. A key point to bring out of the discussion of this scenario is that the POC mandate is narrower than the mandate for the mission as a whole, but it often requires a mission-as-a-whole approach to addressing the challenges that it raises. DPKO have developed a three tier model of POC, which should have already been explained during the presentations. Tier I - Protection through Political Process, Tier II - Protection from physical violence, Tier III – Establishing a protective environment. **Those working at the tactical level will mainly be concerned with Tier II actions (protection from physical violence), but they should be aware of how their own actions contribute to, and often inform the development of the whole of mission POC strategy.**

2. It is the primary responsibility of the government itself to protect its own population and to enforce the rule of law within its own territory. **UNAMID can provide short-term physical protection** to limited groups of civilians in particular places (Tier II). However, this will only be viable in the medium and long term if it is linked to a strategy that also encompasses Tier I and Tier III actions. In the short-term, political advocacy is often needed to persuade the government to deploy security forces in areas where civilians are under threat. In the long-term, building the capacity of these forces and a justice system based on respect for human rights and the rule of law is the best way to ensure that the government can fulfill its responsibility to protect its own citizens. Through their monitoring and reports, those working in the field at the tactical level can help to inform the mission as a whole of progress and challenges in these areas.

3. As discussed in the guidance above, the term 'protection' is used differently by different actors and this can sometimes lead to confusion about roles and mandates. **UNAMID is mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Issues such as poverty and food insecurity are of obvious relevance to the humanitarian agencies, but they are not POC concerns** and so UNAMID should not attempt to address them directly. **Where such issues may directly impact on POC, for example, farmers have been attacked working in their fields, or people are afraid to leave their homes due to an increase in violence, UNAMID should develop responses**. **These might include: providing escorts to people to and from particular locations, lobbying for the government to increase its security presence, or promoting customary dispute resolution mechanisms.**

4. It is important to note UNAMID has developed instruments to implement its POC Strategy regarding physical protection. Joint Protection Groups (SJPGs), Field Protection Teams (FPTs), Mission Protection Maps (MPM), and community-based early warning mechanisms could be employed in Oladi bearing in mind the whole complex context and the several POC issues in the area.

5. SJPGs, comprised of civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, human rights, child protection, military, police, and other officers, as needed, are being established at the Sector-level to carry out fact-finding missions to assess and report on protection risks, challenges. **SJPGs will guide FPTs, which will be established at the Team Site-level to coordinate with Community Focal Points (CFPs) and communicate with vulnerable communities, including those not in the immediate vicinity of Team Sites**. SJPGs will also conduct capacity-building and training to establish and operate communications equipment, perimeter lighting, and other capacities to dissuade threats from targeting those communities. **Based on the information from FPTs and CFPs, the SJPGs will guide the engagement of the UNAMID Force in carrying out long-range patrols and establishing when necessary Temporary Forward Operating Bases (TFOBs) to show force and deter targeted attacks against civilians**. The SJPGs will also establish Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) that can be deployed to areas where the Mission lacks permanent presence. Mission Protection Maps are maps especially developed to assist in planning of UNAMID operations / actions concerning the mission POC Strategy.

6. On the specific issues raised in this scenario

7. The first paragraph provides an historical context, which it is important to understand, but no current threats that need to be addressed.

8. The POC issue identified in the second paragraph was the **attack on the IDP camp**. Although this was triggered by the shooting of a government official**, this did not, in itself raise POC concerns and nor would fighting between rebel and militia groups or rebels and government forces unless these placed civilians under threat.** In circumstances **where civilians are under physical threat UNAMID should consider deploying its military assets** to deter attacks and provide protection to those who come under attack.

9. The two incidents described in the third paragraph – another attack on the same official and the abduction of two UNAMID soldiers – are obviously extremely serious for the mission, and the death of the staff of the government official poses POC concerns.

10. The POC issue raised in the fourth paragraph is that **farmers have been attacked working in their fields** and that security (ie physical safety) is the over-arching concern for residents, both inside the town and in surrounding rural areas. One solution to this may be to step up patrols in the area.

11. The POC issue raised in the fifth paragraph is that tribal conflict resolutions had previously been effective in preventing violence and so consideration should be given as to whether and how these could be supported in the future.

12. The POC issue raised in the final paragraph relates to **urban crime and violence**, which is becoming an increasing concern and could have implications for where UNAMID deploys its forces. **The police component is primarily focused on this kind of issue but in particular situations it might require military participation where violence against civilians reaches a scale and national security forces are not capable or willing to take action.**

13. All of the POC issues raised in this scenario take place within a context and they can only be successfully tackled through a whole of mission approach. The military, civilian and police components of the mission will all need to be involved in addressing these issues and the trainer/facilitator should encourage participants to reflect on how the different elements can respond to them at the tactical level.

Scenario Four – Denial of Access

1. Denial of access to certain areas is a huge and ongoing problem for UNAMID, which is seriously inhibiting its ability to fulfill its POC mission mandate. Between 1 April 2012 and 30 June 2012, for example, **the mission's movements by land were restricted on 27 occasions and the Government authorities denied 357 of 5,037 flight requests**. The Government of Carana frequently bans access to areas citing planned and/or ongoing military action. These are areas where there is likely to be considerable insecurity, and so threats to civilians are consequently greatest.

2. UNAMID civilian staff members also face numerous operational restrictions such as continued delays in the issuance of visas and harassment of civilian contractors. Such restrictions limit the ability of UNAMID to effectively implement its mandated tasks. **Numerous international humanitarian agencies have already been expelled from the country** and those that remain work under the constant threat of expulsion and increasing government restrictions.

3. UNAMID continues to call upon representatives of the Government of Carana at all levels to allow the mission full and unrestricted freedom of movement. Government officials have publicly undertaken to reiterate to their field commanders that authorities may provide security advice to UNAMID, but are not to prevent its activities from proceeding. **However, local authorities still frequently try to impede UNAMID from entering particular areas. It should not, therefore, be assumed that the police officers who are seeking to prevent the UNAMID patrol from entering an area where civilians appear to be under imminent threat are acting with full authority or that the central government will be prepared to publicly support them in their actions. The threat to civilians in this case comes from a militia group which had already perpetrated attacks before in the same area.** While these often operate with tacit government support, the authorities have sometimes been prepared to take action against them when they are committing human rights violations (HRVs). It should also, therefore, not necessarily be assumed that the police check-point has been established specifically to prevent UNAMID from protecting the civilians against this militia group.

4. The patrol commander should inform the police of his intention of proceeding towards the village where civilians are under potential threat and of his lawful authority to do this under the Chapter VII powers given to him by the UN Security Council. **The UN patrol outnumbers and out-gun the police and so, although resort to the use of force should be the last possible option, the patrol commander is in a strong negotiating position**. The police should be informed that the UNAMID patrol does have permission to enter the area (since the scenario does not say otherwise) and impeding its access will be an unlawful act for which its senior officer will be held accountable.

5. After a quick analysis, the patrol commander should contact his immediate superior and inform him of the situation. UNAMID should use its own communication channels to contact the police commander in the area to demand that access be authorized. **The patrol commander should also tell the police that time is of the essence, as there is an imminent threat to the lives of civilians from the militia group, and so they are required to allow the patrol to enter immediately**. While the senior police officer should be given a reasonable sufficient amount of time to contact his own superiors, this should not be allowed to turn into a time-wasting exercise. **UNAMID should send a clear signal to everyone that such restrictions on the mission's freedom of movement are unacceptable, particularly when they place civilians' lives at risk.**

6. The trainer/facilitator should ensure that participants understand that this scenario raises issues which require a mission-as-a-whole approach. While the role of the military is clear, the role of the civilian and police components may need to be drawn out of the discussion. In order to negotiate his way through the police check-point the patrol commander will be drawing on the work of the civilian component and possibly also utilizing contacts that UNPOL have established with the local police. Participants should also be asked to think about what happens when the patrol arrives at the village, either before or after it is attacked by the militia group, and who might be involved in POC activities in this case.

Scenario Five - Land disputes

1. There are two separate issues in this scenario: a) the violent clashes that are taking place which may result in civilians being killed and b) the potential underlying land dispute which may have given rise to the clashes. Both should be investigated, but UNAMID needs to be clear on the extent to which its POC mandate requires it to be involved.

2. Civilian staff should visit the area, take statements and interview the local state authorities. **The military should give consideration to stepping up patrols. Formed Police Units (FPUs) may also be deployed for the same purpose. By showing the presence of UNAMID in troubled areas they can enhance confidence, improve intelligence and provide prompt and timely responses to hostilities**. The Chapter VII mandate provides UNAMID with the authority to use force, up to and including lethal force, to protect civilians. The precise circumstances in which force can be used will be described in more detail in the Rules of Engagement for UNAMID's military component. UNAMID soldiers have authority to arrest disarm and detain members of the armed group and to use reasonable force, up to and including lethal force, if it is absolutely necessary to do so. The prisoners should then be handed over to the national authorities as soon as is practicable (subject to the qualifications above concerning their likely treatment).

3. In the present situation the **Battalion Commander in Sureen would need its Company in Norke to quickly find out what happened and asses the current situation. Recce patrols with sufficient strength and power to deal with situation concerning physical protection of civilians would be a desirable course of action**. **UNAMID Sector Headquarter should convene a meeting to discuss the situation and make sure the Police Component should is on board and the FPU in Norke is ready to act if the situation develops to public order issues. Participation of civilian components is discussed below and is connected with improving the capacity of State institutions. The existing Joint Protection Group in Norke and the Field Protection Team in Bondallo are excellent mission assets to assess, verify and investigate under the angle of protection of civilians in close coordination with the mission components tactically deployed in the province.**

4. It is important to observe that after taking immediate action to protect civilians under imminent threat, it would be necessary to get a full picture of the situation and conduct an analysis of POC risks in Bondallo for a coordinated tactical mission response to possible upcoming developments on related to POC. This tends to be a complex situation and peacekeepers should monitor, be alert and on standby to assist civilians if needed, take measures for orce protection and try to make contact with faction leaders to encourage them to end the fighting.

5. UNAMID should not involve itself in clashes between different armed groups, but restrict its involvement to when civilians come under imminent threat.

6. The root of this problem is a governance one. There is growing competition over access to land and other scarce resources and the local justice mechanisms cannot be relied upon to arbitrate any disputes that arise in a fair and transparent manner. Land disputes are one of the commonest causes of violence in societies emerging from conflicts and so they should be monitored as part of the early warning and early response mechanisms developed to improve the protection of civilians. **The long-term solution is to strengthen the institutions** that uphold the rule of law, address the relationship between customary and state law and develop a strategy to reconcile the rights and interests of all stakeholders in a non-discriminatory way.

7. Since most disputes over rural land are settled through customary law, the UN needs to understand how such mechanisms work and have a detailed knowledge of their 'jurisprudence'. However, given the complexities of the issues involved in land rights and customary law, **it would be unwise for UNAMID to directly involve itself in any attempts to mediate land disputes** or to form judgements about who are the legitimate owners of a particular piece of land. UNAMID's main effort in tackling the broader problems raised in this scenario should be focussed on building the capacity of state institutions and official justice mechanisms.

Scenario Six – Conflict Related Sexual Violence

1. As discussed above, the overall responsibility both for conditions in the camp and for the physical protection of civilians rests with the national authorities. A number of humanitarian agencies are also delivering assistance to vulnerable individuals including those living in IDP camps. The work of these organizations has become increasingly difficult due to both the threats to their physical security from various armed groups, and the restrictions placed on their work by the government, which has physically expelled a number of them from the country. This has undoubtedly increased the suffering faced by the civilian population.

2. UNAMID has a mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat (POC). **Resolution 2063 of July 2012 underlined 'the need for UNAMID to make full use of its mandate and capabilities, giving priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources to: (a) the protection of civilians** across Darfur, including through the implementation of a mission-wide early warning strategy; proactive military deployment and increased patrols in areas at high risk of conflict; securing, through increased police patrols, IDP camps, adjacent areas and areas of return; and supporting the development and training of community policing for IDP camps and areas of return; and (b) **ensuring safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access**, and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and humanitarian activities, so as to facilitate the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Darfur'.

3. UNAMID cannot provide the sort of individual legal aid service referred to in the scenario and so cannot intervene in cases that are before the courts. **Your field Protection Team has to analyze how the several mission components can contribute under the angle of protection of civilians. UNHCR is the body responsible to set and run the IDP camp.**

4. The direct protection of IDPs is clearly within the mandate of the mission and there are various examples of good practice that can be drawn of from both within UNAMID and other missions. For example, 'firewood patrols' have been provided to women leaving camps, with the military escort being used to deter attacks and sexual harassment. Rotas for such trips need to be organized in advance so that there are sufficient soldiers or police available. These should be instructed to use minimum force, if strictly necessary, but should generally keep a low profile and take care not to antagonize people from neighbouring areas. **The area outside the site should also be subjected to regular day and night security patrols. However, the military should not patrol inside the camp, since this is a police function, unless there are exceptional circumstances and civilians are under threat.**

5. After discussing with UNHCR colleagues, your team may also liaise with the IDP camp representatives to address the issue of security for women within the camp itself: is there adequate lighting, are women vulnerable when using the latrines and showers, is the security for female-headed households sufficient? Ultimate responsibility for these issues rests with the national authorities, but **UNAMID needs to provide accurate and up to date information about potential POC challenges,** which can be used for advocacy purposes. UNAMID should also consider how they can strengthen the capacity of the national police on this issue, through training, awareness-raising, mentoring and monitoring. Remember that based on the information from FPTs and CFPs, the SJPGs will guide the engagement of the UNAMID Force in carrying out long-range patrols and establishing when necessary Temporary Forward Operating Bases (TFOBs) **to show force and deter targeted attacks against civilians**.

6. The distinction between Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) is, in practice, often difficult to and the trainer/facilitator should encourage participants to reflect on this. **Obviously SGBV is a broader term, and applies even when there is no armed conflict.** However, CRSV should not be interpreted narrowly. The context of an armed conflict exposes women and other vulnerable groups to a large number of threats and significantly weakens their defences against them. **The violence may be opportunistic as well as systematic** and may occur in the private as well as the public sphere. For example, instances of violence against women may occur due to a weak rule of law, or a general increase in violence in society during or after a conflict. While the relationship with the conflict may be indirect in many

cases, **UNAMID should, therefore, treat all sexual violence as potentially falling within its POC mandate.**

7. On the issue of the armed men, protection should be provided for the camp or beefed up if protection is already provided. Patrols should be stepped up, specifically, patrols should be provided for the collection of firewood. If it is possible to identify the group that the armed men belong to, their leaders could be contacted through the UN hierarchy and an official complaint launched. A report should be made to the local police as well. UN specialists should provide counselling to the women who were sexually abused.

Scenario Seven - Migration routes

1. This scenario raises similar issues to the ones discussed in the fifth scenario and so the guidance is not repeated here. Since the migration is annual event there should also be experience from previous years to draw on.

2. The obvious POC implications are that there will be increased clashes between IDPs returning to their areas of origin where these are on or close to traditional nomadic migration routes. The potential for violent clashes have also increased due to the large-scale nature of the current return and the imminence of a predicted drought. This could lead to clashes over access to land and water.

3. Patrols should be stepped up in areas of potential clashes. The patrols should maintain a robust posture, and be prepared to use proportional force when required, in accordance with the Mission's mandate. UNAMID should send a clear signal to everyone in the area that violence against civilians is unacceptable and that forceful action will be taken to protect them**. Formed Police Units (FPUs) may also be deployed for the same purpose.**

4. Civilian staff should also step up their visits to the affected areas and make pro-active efforts to talk to affected communities, their traditional leaders and local authorities. As discussed above, a knowledge of how customary law mechanisms work, and their jurisprudence, would be extremely useful.

5. The government should be lobbied to deploy extra security forces in the affected areas.

6. UNAMID should also liaise with humanitarian agencies providing assistance in the area and encourage them to use their distribution mechanisms to lessen the chances of clashes between nomads and returning IDPs. For example, food and water distribution points could be located in areas which encourage the two groups not to encroach on one another's territory.

7. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a Joint Operations Room, to act as a hub of information-gathering and decision-making at the UNAMID sector level once the migration actually starts. Too often the various components of a mission 'stove-pipe' their decision-making processes, fail to share information and coordinate and sometimes even cut across one another, which can have life-threatening consequences on the ground. Setting up one room, through which all information is passed and where all major strategic decisions get made could help to coordinate responses.

8. The trainer/facilitator should ensure in the de-brief that participants understand that this scenario raises issues which require a mission-as-a-whole approach. While the military can provide physical protection, the civilian and police components play a vital role in monitoring, advocacy and liaison with local communities, government authorities and the national police force, which complement this activity and provide protection of civilians in the longer term.

9. On the question of possible operations for a UN Infantry Battalion deployed in the area and besides what was already discussed above in terms of intensifying patrolling, including night patrols, it could be object of planning:

- **Development of an outreach plan to discuss issues with different local leaders, also including humanitarian organizations and deployed mission Field Protection Teams;**
- **Pre-position of troops or assembling of observation posts to key locations / terrain features to ensure a better monitoring capability;**
- **Preparation of small scale interposition operations;**
- **Secure key infrastructure.**

Scenario Eight – Ethnic clashes

1. UNAMID is confronted with numerous logistical and security constraints as it must operate in unforgiving terrain and in a complex and often hostile political environment. The Mission also faces shortfalls in critical transport, equipment, infrastructure and aviation assets. Between 2008 and 2012 UNAMID has suffered 38 fatal casualties due to the conflict, which is by far the highest number of peacekeepers killed on any UN mission.

2. It is clearly impossible for UNAMID to protect all civilians at all times in a country emerging from a violent conflict, with weak state institutions and a fragile rule of law, nor to provide everyone with around the clock protection. It is the primary responsibility of the government itself to protect its own population and to enforce the rule of law within its own territory. UNAMID cannot and should not seek to substitute itself for this task.

3. UNAMID also faces huge problems in accessing areas where civilians are potentially at risk, which is seriously inhibiting its ability to fulfill its POC mission mandate. The obstacles to this access come from two sources: government restrictions and attacks by armed groups.

4. All UNAMID military, civilian and police personnel are aware of these constraints, which clearly restrain them from acting as assertively as they would sometimes wish to. Nevertheless, UNAMID has a mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat (POC). Resolution 2063 of July 2012 underlined 'the need for UNAMID to make full use of its mandate and capabilities, giving priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources to: (a) the protection of civilians across Darfur, including through the implementation of a mission-wide early warning strategy; proactive military deployment and increased patrols in areas at high risk of conflict; securing, through increased police patrols, IDP camps, adjacent areas and areas of return; and supporting the development and training of community policing for IDP camps and areas of return; and (b) ensuring safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access, and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and humanitarian activities, so as to facilitate the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Darfur'.

5. This includes investigating all reports of human rights violations (HRVs) and attacks against civilians and this should be done as soon as is practically possible while the evidence is still fresh. A delay of two weeks before an initial investigation appears excessive.

6. Similarly, UNAMID should not tolerate the type of harassment, threats and violence perpetrated against civilians sheltering in and immediately in front of its base. **UNAMID should be prepared to use proportional force when required, in accordance with the Mission's mandate and should send a clear signal to everyone in the area that such harassment is unacceptable.**

7. The situation is quite complex and put a lot of pressure on the Company. Amongst other considerations:

- The population expects to be protected by the UN troops;
- There are new logistic demands by the new arrivals that will eventually be supplied by the Company while there is no UN agency or humanitarian organization present to prove food and water;
- There are issues regarding the own Company force protection.

8. The Company Commander clearly has to get the best possible picture of the situation and ask for higher guidance. Adoption of a more robust posture would be necessary including aggressive patrolling, investigation and control of the base external perimeter and any kind of decision must be the product of solid analysis that takes into account the consequences of action and inaction. The vulnerable population around the base and near by should be protected. The situation is grave and reinforcement might be necessary to enforce rule of law and reestablish security. Lack of security jeopardizes humanitarian assistance to the newly formed IDP camp outside the base.

9. It is also necessary to contact the Police Component and discuss operational possibilities as the deployment of formed police unit / UNPOL police officers to assist or be in charge of the newly formed IDP security.

10. As well as providing physical protection to the IDPs itself, UNAMID should lobby the government to fulfill its own responsibility to provide this protection. The harassment referred to in the scenario took place over a period of several months and so pressure should have been put on the national authorities to take action themselves to remove the militia. The importance of monitoring and reporting and political advocacy should not be under-estimated in such situations and the most direct and immediate source where such information is gathered is that the tactical level. Regular accurate and up to date reports of the situation should be submitted to mission headquarters, which could use them for direct advocacy with the national authorities as well as to draw public attention to the situation through its reports to the UN Security Council. Similar advocacy should take place at the regional and local level.

11. Such activity requires a **whole-of-mission response** and the trainer/facilitator should draw out the respective roles of the various mission components.

Annex A

Model Operational Protection Plan

Before the demonstration

1. Information, liaison and cooperation: Ensure that UNAMID has an effective system of information gathering and real time threat assessments in place. A team composed of UN police (UNPOL), military, and relevant civilian units including human rights should hold separate meetings before the demonstration with government representatives, the local police commander and the organizers of the demonstration. These meetings should obtain information on the orders given to security forces and overall command, define lines of communications, urge human rights compliance and discuss the participation of UN police and human rights officers as observers of the demonstration. They should exchange information on the purpose, participants and itinerary of the demonstration and stress the importance of it being conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner.

2. Security and assurance: The itinerary of the demonstration should be reviewed to identify buildings and facilities where it may be necessary to pre-position police and troops, especially in the areas dominated by displaced persons from the south. While the national police retains overall responsibility for security, the UN team should also identify additional security measures needed for their own headquarters, with representatives of the Formed Police Units (FPU) and military battalions that could be requested to intervene. A rapid response force should be placed on stand-by for activation if necessary. UNAMID human rights observers should be prepared to monitor the demonstration.

3. Assistance: UNAMID should propose providing the authorities with advice of UNPOL experts in crowd control and demonstration and to mix patrols UNPOL and national police elements during demonstration and oversee the plan of action in the field.

During the demonstration

4. Information, liaison and cooperation: UNAMID should establish a Crisis Management Group (CMG) to coordinate its potential responses to developments. It should also deploy human rights observers to monitor the proceedings and ensure timely and horizontal back and forth of information with FPUs and other UN Police officers deployed to assist or advice local police during the demonstration.

5. Security and assurance: If requested UNPOL officers should assist the national police in policing the demonstration. UNPOL patrols should also monitor local security forces, along the demonstration's route and around likely places for clashes. FPUs and Battalions should be prepared for crowd control from pre-positioned positions. UNAMID battalions should be prepared for intervention with force if local security apparatus disintegrates and civilians are under an imminent threat.

If clashes occur

6. Information: **liaison and cooperation**: The CMG should already be activated and liaison already established with the national security forces so quick decisions can be made on joint patrols or monitoring. Information should also already have been provided to the local police commander concerning modalities and limits of support of UNAMID. The mission should have previously conveyed a clear message of consequences if police forces attack civilians and provide clear instructions in this regard to peacekeepers. Precautions for coordination of forces and tactics, control, and general observation of the demonstration are presented to Commander and must be adhered prior to authorization of any intervention by UNAMID forces.

7. Security and assurance: UNPOL and military forces should be ready to deploy if intervention is decided. This engagement should only take place in so far as local forces are overwhelmed and civilians are under imminent threat. Intervention to assist local security forces should be decided by UNAMID mission leadership if above defined framework and modalities are approved by local security forces commander. A system needs to be in place for assessing who are the most vulnerable and how can they be best protected and for ensuring that this is translated into clear instructions to UNPOL and military commanders about force deployments.

8. Assistance: A system needs to be in place for providing non-military assistance (eg medical and psycho-social support) to vulnerable groups of civilians

Consolidation

9. Information, liaison and cooperation: UNAMID should conduct a human rights investigation and prepare a report (internal and public) on occurrences which establishes responsibilities, includes analysis and short and medium term recommendations on how to avoid reoccurrence. UNAMID should enter into dialogue with involved parties. It should also prepare and release a statement on the demonstration.

10. Security and assurance: If needed, UNAMID should keep forces deployed to prevent recurrence of conflict.

11. Assistance: UNAMID should present the human rights report to involved parties and teh national government, including factual account of what happened, lessons learned and proposals for the future. It should consider wider distribution of report and political action including offers of technical cooperation and support.

Module 5 - UNAMID

Glossary of Acronyms

UNAMID Glossary of Acronyms

AMIS	Africa Union Mission in Sudan
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
AU	Africa Union
CAS	Civil Affairs Section
CDF	Carana Defence Force
CFP	Community Focal Point
CLA	Carana Liberation Army
CLIP	Community Labour Intensive Project
CLM	Carana Liberation Movement
CRSV	Conflict Related Sexual Violence
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
DRA	Darfur Regional Authority
FPT	Field Protection Team
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GPC	Global Protection Cluster
HOMC	Head of Military Component
HOPC	Head of Police Component
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JLM	Justice and Liberation Movement
LJM	Liberation and Justice Movement
MPM	Mission Protection Maps
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NICE	National Intelligence Central Executive
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAD	Political Affairs Division
PAF	Popular Attack Forces
PDF	Popular Defence Forces
QIP	Quick Impact Project
QRT	Quick Reaction Team
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SJPG	Sector Joint Protection Team
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SRF	Sudanese Revolutionary Front
TFOB	Temporary Forward Operating Base
UNAMID	United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF	United Nations Children's fund
UNMIR	United Nations Mission in Rimosa
WFP	World Food Programme

Carana Context

Carana Context

- Scenarios were developed on the grounds of a fictitious country named Carana
- Although the scenarios are set in a fictional country, all of the information contained within them is based on real incidents and challenges which have confronted UNAMID in implementing its POC mandates
- Despite being mission-specific training materials, the scenario-based exercises can not furnish sensitive or classified information. They portray realistic situations but they do not use real names, locations and events

Carana Map


CARANA
Sumora
Katasi
Rimosa
Galasi
Koloni
Hanno
Fellari
Tereni
Mahbek
Barin
Guthar
Leppko
Akkabar
Maroni
Lisbo
Kalei
Jumi
Torta
Tekkla
Norke
Karo
Sureen
Lurok
Alur
Perkes
Maki
Faron
Maui
Folsa
Arum
Amsan
Balkro
Cereni
Lorat
Xalksa
Muka
Corma
Turen
Maldosa
Mia
Kika
Lora
Eres
Kilu Dam
Kalesi River
Saldbo Dam
Mogave River
Toronga River
Carana
Elevation
0 to 200 m
200 to 400 m
400 to 600 m
600 to 800 m
800 to 1000 m
>1million
100,000 to 1,000,000
10,000 to 100,000
< 10,000
Dam
Lake
International Border
Provincial Boundary
Galasi Capital
Maroni Provincial Capital
Paved Roads
Unpaved Roads
Track
Railway
River
Airport
Harbor
0
50 km
100 km

Module 5 - UNAMID

- Koloni is in West Carana, about the size of Spain. Arid plateau, dry with population of about 7m, economy based primarily on subsistence agric and livestock. Frequent droughts, heavy rainfall.
- Koloni incorporated into Carana in 1916, though previously independent for hundreds of years.
- Complex mix of 36 ethnic groups – Falin, Tatsi, Kori and Abbas main ones. Tensions have existed between the nomadic Abbas and farmers over water and grazing land usually resolved traditionally. Ethnicity not clear cut.



UNAMID

Civil war in 2003 led to hundreds of thousands of deaths. Many atrocities by an Abba militia. About 3m people displaced.

Peace agreement signed in 2006 but rejected by other rebel groups. Rebel and militia groups multiplied.

July 2011, new peace deal signed in Doha between government and JLM, an alliance of rebel groups.

Levels of violence now lower than in 2004, sporadic fighting continues.