Module 1

Introduction to Protection of Civilians

INTRODUCTION TO PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 1

POC basic concepts and overview

Preparatory Notes to Instructors

AIM

To familiarize peacekeeping personnel with:

- DPKO basic concepts on protection of civilians.

AUDIENCE

This module has been designed for UN uniformed personnel at **tactical level to be trained during the pre-deployment training (PDT) phase**, especially battalion and FPU commanders and staff and individually deployed military and police personnel as military observers, military liaison officers, military advisers and individual police officers.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

On completion of Introduction to POC 1, participants will be able to:

1. Describe what is protection and the types of violence facing civilians;
2. Highlight (Identify) protection actors and the role of peacekeepers in preventing and responding to those threats;
3. Explain how and why POC has become a priority objective for UN PKOs;
4. Identify the range of legal rules, authorities and obligations with regards to POC.

TRAINING SEQUENCE

Introduction to POC 1 is the first session of Module 1, Introduction to Protection of Civilians. This session should be followed by the Introduction to POC 2 and 3 and the Learning Activity.

DURATION

Part 1 Introduction to POC 1	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.
Part 2 Introduction to POC 2	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.
Part 3 Introduction to POC 3	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.

Part 4	Explanation of the exercise	Group discussion	Group presentations in plenary
Learning Activity	5 min	45 min	50 min

METHODOLOGY

- The following points outline a suggested methodology. Experienced instructors may choose to use alternative methods and activities to present the material and key messages in this unit. Availability of time may permit additional students to formulate questions after each presentation.
- Training is divided into 50 minute blocks with 10 minute break periods between each block.
- This module will include lecture issues followed by group questions/discussion and learning activities as appropriate.

Part 1, 2 and 3:

- Presentations using the provided PowerPoint slides;
- Informal question and answer periods (as determined by instructor).

Part 4:

- Small group discussion and solution to the requirements of the Learning Activity;
- Short presentations to be made by the small groups, followed by plenary discussion on the questions proposed by the Learning Activity.

INSTRUCTOR PROFILE

Module 1 (Introduction to POC 1, 2, 3 and the Learning Activity) is best presented by an instructor who has personal experience in a peacekeeping operation with a Protection of Civilian (POC) mandate, preferably as battalion and FPU commander or staff or company commander, with a solid understanding of the operational concept of POC and how it's implemented in the mission(s). Instructor should have undergone a formal training course on the UN Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) and UN POC at national or international level.

INSTRUCTOR PREPARATIONS

Required Readings:

- Charter of the United Nations;
- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (also known as the Capstone Doctrine);
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges (2009);
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians;
- DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations;

- DPKO/DFS Policy on Mainstreaming the Protection, Rights and Well-being of Children Affected by Armed Conflict within UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- Analytical and Conceptual Framing of Conflict Related Sexual Violence (UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict);
- Secretary General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law;

Equipment:

- Computer and provided session slides;
- Projector and screen for slides.

Materials:

- Copies of the *Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations* and of the *DPKO Protection of Civilians Operational Concept* (one per participant). For copies, please download the electronic file at:

http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx

PARTICIPANT PREPARATIONS

All participants must have a strong familiarity with the following:

- UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials;
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Security Council Resolutions (please download from http://www.un.org/en/documents/):

- Concerning Children and Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1612), 2005.

- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1674), 2006.
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1894), 2009.
- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1325), 2000.
- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1960), 2010.

MATERIALS REFERENCED IN THIS MODULE

- DPKO/DFS Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping *Operations* (2010)
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2009)
- DRAFT Explanatory Note on Protection of Civilians Language in Security Council Mandates for Peacekeeping Missions
- Henry L Stimson Center, Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Washington, D.C, (2011)
- Integrated Mission Planning Process Guidelines: Role of the Field; Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences
- Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008)
- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2009)
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping
- Protection of Civilians (POC) Resource and Capability Matrix for Implementation of UN Peacekeeping Operations with POC Mandates (2012)

SYMBOLS LEGEND

☞	Note to the Instructor (Some background information for consideration and mention)
	Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic). Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words.
	Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information
e.g	Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
?	Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
	Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
	Film (A film that is suggested as either a core or optional activity)
	Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
+	Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit or part – as indicated in the text)
	Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

Session Notes

1. INTRODUCTION



Slide 1

Optional Learning Activity: Film "Mandated to Protect"

Instructor Guidance Notes

- This learning activity intends to present an overview of DPKO protection of civilians. The film **"Mandated to Protect"** offers in a logical and sequential way the most important concepts and ideas on POC for DPKO-led field missions. It contains short statements from senior UN and Member States leaders, field operators and local population of host countries. It is a valuable tool to introduce the subject.

- After projecting the movie (45 min), a 30 min plenary discussion could be conducted to capture the first impressions and questions from the audience. A white board should be used to record those impressions and doubts and at the end of Module 1, and before starting the mission-specific modules with scenarios, the instructor could get back to the board and return to the students' initial views on protection of civilians.

- The film "Mandated to Protect" can be obtained by peacekeeping training institutions with the DPKO/Integrated training Service (ITS) through the Permanent Mission in New York. Please contact ITS staff (peacekeeping-training@un.org). It was already distributed to more than 45 different TCC/PCCs through ITS regional training of trainers courses.



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

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- This presentation intends to set the relevant POC principles and ideas adopted by DPKO. It aims at discussing protection, types of violence and main protection actors, amongst other aspects.

- It also intends to discuss the importance of POC for modern peacekeeping operations and how failure to protect the host country's population decisively affects the mission, peacekeeping and ultimately the United Nations.

- It finally and briefly presents some international legal instruments and a first discussion on the use of force which will be deepened later in presentations 2 and 3.

2. BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF POC IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS



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- UN peacekeeping has evolved significantly from the early cease-fire monitoring missions of the Cold War. A spate of intra-state wars in the 1990s, where civilians became deliberate targets propelled the Protection of Civilians (POC) to the forefront of international concern. The press and public opinion held the Security Council responsible for genocide in Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995) for not having taken better preventative or responsive action.

- **In 1999, the SC then passed its first resolution on POC**. Since then 12 peacekeeping missions have been deployed, 11 of which have been authorized to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. In 2009, the Security Council requested Missions to prioritize the protection activities in their decisions about the use of capacities and resources.

- Over the last 15 years POC **has evolved from a diffuse concept to a disseminated idea** amongst the members of the international community. Such evolution was triggered by mistakes and horrible failures to respond to huge crisis in particular in Rwanda and Bosnia as mentioned before. **POC became a priority agenda and a recognized important issue** due to the efforts led by different actors, including the UN Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the humanitarian community.

- Nevertheless POC still generates a degree of controversy. Different forms of protection sometimes lead to different understandings by different protection actors.

- **Currently DPKO has a framework comprised of a significant amount of doctrine**. Relevant documents as the *DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the DPKO Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations, the DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations and the DPKO/DFS Protection of Civilian (POC) Resource and Capability Matrix for Implementation of UN Peacekeeping Operations with POC mandates*, among others, assist Member States and field missions to tackle and implement POC.



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- There are currently 9 missions with POC mandates. MINUSMA is the most recent addition to the list. The POC tasks vary according to each field mission specific mandate. Older missions as UNIFIL (1978) and MONUC (1999) had their mandates altered to respond to political and crisis situations and to incorporate POC as a mandated task.

- Currently, more than 90% of peacekeepers are deployed in missions with such mandates.

3. WHAT IS PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS



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

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- In the absence of a common UN position on the protection of civilians by UN peacekeeping operations, a wide range of views regarding what protection of civilians means for UN peacekeeping missions took root. **An independent study on the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations commissioned by DPKO and OCHA** illuminated that actors within and external to the field missions generally subscribe to one of three paradigms to frame their understanding of POC in UN peacekeeping.

- In general there are three visions on protection.

  a) The **first group sees protection as a broad concept encompassing international humanitarian law and human rights law**, similar to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee[5] definition of protection as "encompassing all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law." This is the paradigm utilized by most humanitarian and human rights actors (rights-based approach).

  b) The **second group believes that POC is fundamentally about ensuring that civilians are safe from physical harm** (Physical protection from harm);

  c) **The third group believes that POC is the inherent end result of peacekeeping** (Stabilization and peace building as durable forms of protection) and that it is therefore redundant as a distinct mandated task.

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *UN Multidimensional peacekeeping operations incorporate ALL THREE interpretations of protection.*



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

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☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *Pose the following question to the class: Based on quote and your own experiences, what types of violence are likely to see in the area of operations?*

- Military and police must recognize the different types of violence that occur in post-conflict situations where UN field missions are operating. Realizing the consequences brought by

violence on the local population it is the first step to later on identify threats and establish protection responses.

4. WHO PROVIDES PROTECTION TO CIVILIANS



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- The **primary role of the host state government** is also embedded in the standard mandate language associated with Protection of Civilians mandates**.**

- There a number of UN field missions` components dealing with POC and a number of actors outside of the mission addressing POC. **Coordination amongst these actors—particularly between the political and military actors and the UN and independent humanitarian actors— can be challenging.**



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Main protection actors:

a) The **Host State Government** always has the primary responsibility for protecting civilians within its borders. This protection should emanate from the full range of state security (military, police, and gendarmerie) and judicial structures;

b) **UN field missions** have a range of protection actors distributed amongst the components. Besides the military and police components, civilian components, such as civil affairs, human rights, political affairs and others, have specific mandates regarding POC. **UN Peacekeepers** under POC mandates are authorized by the UN Security Council to support or supplement the protection efforts of host-state institutions in cases where international peace and security is deemed to be at risk.

- The **Military Component** retains the monopoly of the use of force in the peacekeeping missions and its units are the tools to protect civilians from physical harm; however, no military or police unit can sustain protection without the assistance of other mission and non-mission actors.

e.g One good example to be mentioned refers to **crisis in which local population seek refuge in UN military bases**; the company or battalion might be capable to protect those civilians around the base from physical attack but are not capable to logistically support them for a large amount of time; hence, the military units needs the presence of other mission (human rights and civil affairs) and non-mission partners (UNHCR, OCHA) to provide the other types of protection actions.

c) **Other organizations** that have been mandated by the international community to provide supplementary protection in support of host government protection responsibilities include:

- **UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees)** staff work in urban areas, host communities and refugee or IDP sites. They attempt to promote or provide legal and physical protection, and minimize the threat of violence to displaced people. They also seek to provide at least a minimum of shelter, food, water and medical care in the immediate aftermath of any refugee exodus.
- **OHCHR (Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights)** is engaged in monitoring human rights situations on the ground and implementing projects, such as technical trainings and support in the areas of administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights treaty ratification, and human rights education.
- **ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross)** is the guardian of International Humanitarian Law. The mission of the ICRC is to "…protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles …" (ICRC Protection Policy, p. 1)
- **UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)** mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies, advocate for the rights of people in need, promote preparedness and prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions.
- **UNICEF (UN Children's Fund)** engages in Child Protection activities, preventing and responding to violence, exploitation and abuse. They monitor and report on IHL and human rights violations perpetrated against children in conflict.

d) Many **non-state actors** are also involved in the provision of protection related services (humanitarian assistance) the monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses (human rights monitors and advocacy organizations) and the rehabilitation and reform of judicial institutions. These are typically referred to as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and other civil society organizations.

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *The composition of mission joint assessment teams should include representatives from a broad range of mission units – human rights and other civilian, police and military units – as well as UN Country Team representatives, wherever possible.*

5. POC AS A PRIORITY



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- It has taken quite some effort and time, from previous crisis and the genocides Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, for the international community discuss and implement concepts on protection or civilians. Nowadays, it is absolutely clear that protection of civilians is a must and the horrible experiences and lack of action can not be tolerated anymore.

- The global communication net and information flow make **any POC crisis**, even in remote places, **to get immediate international attention**. If a peacekeeping mission is deployed, there is high **expectation** that those thousands of peacekeepers, particularly soldiers, will be able to protect the civilian population from physical harm.

- The UN Security Council has articulated the link between sexual violence and the restoration of peace and security, which **require protection actors, including peacekeepers, to respond to sexual violence with as much determination as they would to any other**

atrocity, and with specifically designed tasks and tactics to deal with the specific nature and consequences of this type of violence.



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- As discussed before, nine peacekeeping missions currently have POC mandates: UNMISS, UNAMID, UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), MONUSCO, MINUSTAH, UNOCI, UNIFIL, UNMIL and MINUSMA. **Together involve over 100,000 soldiers**.

- **POC is increasingly coming to define the reputation of UN missions**. As said before, expectations are high when a field mission is deployed in a post-conflict environment and does not deliver its protection tasks, especially the protection of civilians from physical threat. It severely affects legitimacy and credibility.

- All peacekeepers – whether civilian, military or police – are expected to promote and protect human rights through their functions including in situations of imminent threat of physical violence. However civilian, military and police components have tended to work in a compartmented fashion when approaching protection related tasks.

- Above everything else is the obvious fact that protection of civilians save lives and prevent other crimes like abduction or related to conflict related sexual violence.

6. FAILURE TO PROVIDE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS



Slide 15

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- The consequences are very serious and can vary according to the field mission. Ultimately failure to protect civilians puts in jeopardy the whole institution of peacekeeping and causes immense damage to the image of the United Nations.

- **At strategic level:** Diminishing of international support to the field missions with possible impact on political (renewal of mandate etc) and donor support;

- **<u>At operational level</u>:** Possible undermining of the political relationship with the host government, difficulties related to the host government consent, lack of population support, perception of lack of impartiality, credibility and legitimacy in risk;

- **<u>At tactical level</u>:** operational issues regarding animosity from local population, affecting information gathering, liaison, key leaders outreach and security (force protection issues related to base protection, patrolling, observation and other tactical tasks).



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

Slide 18

- The MONUSCO example briefly describes a sequence of mission responses that mixed reactive and pro-active activities, most of them ad-hoc responses. The Force Intervention Brigade is the latest effort to address POC issues and will be discussed later on following presentations.

- In general in the past field missions made ad hoc decisions to address POC challenges whenever they appear with the mission available resources and lack of a doctrinal approach. **In the recent years a number of positive developments took place**:

  - Development of a doctrinal framework comprised of the DPKO Operational Concept and several other associated documents;
  - Robust mandates designed by the UNSC to cope with protection challenges in mission environments;
  - DPKO efforts training to produce POC training materials for different levels and audiences;
  - DPKO/DFS and Member States efforts to give field missions human resources and equipment to enhance the protection capabilities.

- A **UN Peacekeeping Operation now receives better guidance from the UNHQ and develops and issues a Mission POC Strategy**. Mission components adjust their concept of operations and work plans to the POC strategy and develop guidance, directives, orders and plans to ensure consistency and implementation by the lower levels (tactical).

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *The international community granted MONUSCO with a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) that has a specific mandate and special protection capabilities that will be discussed in the following presentations.*

7. LEGAL ASPECTS

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Slide 20

- The slide outlines a number of legal instruments that form the core legal framework for field missions to operate. Military and police units and individuals, in particular commanders and staff, should be aware of the relevant elements of these legal documents and the mission plans and directives.

- For military units knowledge of the mission Rules of Engagement (as for the FPUs the DUF) is a vital document. **Understanding and being trained to apply the ROEs** is essential to be fully capable to perform the battalion operational tasks under this legal framework. In practical

terms, it requires **extensive practical training on the ROEs**. As an example, a single isolated infantry patrol commanded by a lieutenant or NCO must properly react to an incident that requires the use of force under the principles contained in the ROEs.

- Experience shows that in peacekeeping missions there is no lack of clarity on operational and tactical guidance for military units. The Mission Concept (plan for the entire mission), the Military CONOPS (plan for the military component), military operation order (order for the military implement tactical level actions), Force Commander Directive on the Use of Force, Rules of Engagement and other directives and orders provide sufficient operational guidance. **The challenge on the use of force does not reside in lack of clarity or guidance**; the issue is to conduct effective pre-deployment training for battalion key leaders who have the authority to use force as well as soldiers trained to adequately respond to the orders given. Another important aspect is to have **skilled military leaders** commanding units, subunits, platoons and squads. The **same rationale is applicable to the Police Component** and Formed Police Units with their peculiarities.



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

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

Slide 23

- **All UN Peacekeepers** (including UN civilian staff) have an inherent right to defend themselves, if necessary, by using force - up to and including deadly force. This is a reality since the first UN field missions (Chapter VI) on the grounds of the principle of self-defence.

- Peacekeepers who are authorized under a Chapter VII mandate to use force to implement the mandate, including to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence are **authorized to** use all means - up to and including the use of force – to prevent, pre-empt, and respond effectively to acts of or imminent threat of violence against civilians**.**

☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *There are also other factors analysed in military and police planning processes related to mission, adversaries, terrain, time, public opinion, leadership etc.*

Slide 24

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Slide 26

- The list of obligations and prohibitions comes from the International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, Refugee Law and relevant UN documents (e.g. SOFA) and guidance on the code of conduct of peacekeepers such as the Ten Rules**.**



Slide 27

- Military and police personnel follow the chain of command and normally receive guidance and orders from higher leaders.

8. SUMMARY OF KEY MESSAGES

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *Outline the main points that have been covered during the session.*

- Over the last 15 years POC has evolved **from a diffuse concept to a disseminated idea** amongst the members of the international community. Such evolution was triggered by mistakes and horrible failures to respond to huge crisis in particular in Rwanda and Bosnia as mentioned before. **POC became a priority agenda** and a recognized important issue due to the efforts led by different actors, including the UN Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the humanitarian community.

- In general there are three visions on protection.

  - Protection as a broad concept encompassing international humanitarian law and human rights law, (rights-based approach);

  - The **second group believes that POC is fundamentally about ensuring that civilians are safe from physical harm** (Physical protection from harm);

  - **The third group believes that POC is the inherent end result of peacekeeping** (Stabilization and peace building as durable forms of protection) and that it is therefore redundant as a distinct mandated task.

- **Main protection actors**. There a number of UN field missions` components dealing with POC and a number of actors outside of the mission addressing POC. Coordination amongst these actors—particularly between the political and military actors and the UN and independent humanitarian actors— can be challenging.

  - The Host State Government always has the primary responsibility for protecting civilians within its borders;

  - UN field missions have a range of protection actors distributed amongst the components.

    - The Military Component retains the monopoly of the use of force in the peacekeeping missions and its units are the tools to protect civilians from physical harm; however, no military or police unit can sustain protection without the assistance of other mission and non-mission actors.

  - UN agencies and many non-state actors are also involved, as NGOs and INGOs and other civil society organizations.

- **Importance of POC**. First of all the **human dimension** of the protection by actually saving lives and preventing crimes. **Credibility and legitimacy of the mission** and the UN are in the line due to the high expectations that the local population and the international community have on the field mission capacity to protect civilians. Global networks where fast **communications provide ample visibility of the facts on the ground** maximize the effects of success and failure to protect civilians. **POC is increasingly coming to define the** reputation of UN missions.

- In general in the past field missions made ad hoc decisions to address POC challenges whenever they appear with the mission available resources and lack of a doctrinal approach. **In the recent years a number of positive developments** took place as the development of a doctrinal framework, robust mandates, efforts on training and efforts on equipping the field missions to protect civilians.

- **For military units knowledge of the mission Rules of Engagement (as for the FPUs the DUF) is a vital document**. Understanding and being trained to apply the ROEs is essential to be fully capable to perform the battalion operational tasks under this legal framework. In practical terms, it requires extensive practical training on the ROEs.



Slide 28

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UN DPKO - Tactical Level Mission-Specific Scenario-based Exercises on Protection of Civilians

Slide 29

INTRODUCTION TO PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 2

Mandate language and challenges of implementation

Preparatory Notes to Instructors

AIM

To familiarize peacekeeping personnel with:

- Mandate language, the DPKO Operational concept on Protection of Civilians and some of the main challenges of protection.

AUDIENCE

This module has been designed for UN uniformed personnel at **tactical level to be trained during the pre-deployment training (PDT) phase**, especially battalion and FPU commanders and staff and individually deployed military and police personnel as military observers, military liaison officers, military advisers and individual police officers.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

On completion of Introduction to POC 2, participants will be able to:

1. Explain the meaning of critical language in UN POC mandates;
2. Understand the DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on Protection of Civilians;
3. Understand the challenges in the Implementation of POC.

TRAINING SEQUENCE

Introduction to POC 2 is the second session of Module 1, Introduction to Protection of Civilians. This session should be followed by the Introduction to POC 3 and the Learning Activity.

DURATION

Part 1 Introduction to POC 1	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.
Part 2 Introduction to POC 2	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.
Part 3 Introduction to POC 3	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.

Part 4	Explanation of the exercise	Group discussion	Group presentations in plenary
Learning Activity	5 min	45 min	50 min

METHODOLOGY

- The following points outline a suggested methodology. Experienced instructors may choose to use alternative methods and activities to present the material and key messages in this unit. Availability of time may permit additional students to formulate questions after each presentation.
- Training is divided into 50 minute blocks with 10 minute break periods between each block.
- This module will include lecture issues followed by group questions/discussion and learning activities as appropriate.

Part 1, 2 and 3:

- Presentations using the provided PowerPoint slides;
- Informal question and answer periods (as determined by instructor).

Part 4:

- Small group discussion and solution to the requirements of the Learning Activity;
- Short presentations to be made by the small groups, followed by plenary discussion on the questions proposed by the Learning Activity.

INSTRUCTOR PROFILE

Module 1 (Introduction to POC 1, 2, 3 and the Learning Activity) is best presented by an instructor who has personal experience in a peacekeeping operation with a Protection of Civilian (POC) mandate, preferably as battalion and FPU commander or staff or company commander, with a solid understanding of the operational concept of POC and how it's implemented in the mission(s). Instructor should have undergone a formal training course on the UN Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) and UN POC at national or international level.

INSTRUCTOR PREPARATIONS

Required Readings:

- Charter of the United Nations;
- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (also known as the Capstone Doctrine);
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges (2009);
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians;
- DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations;

- DPKO/DFS Policy on Mainstreaming the Protection, Rights and Well-being of Children Affected by Armed Conflict within UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- Analytical and Conceptual Framing of Conflict Related Sexual Violence (UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict);
- Secretary General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law;

Equipment:

- Computer and provided session slides;
- Projector and screen for slides.

Materials:

- Copies of the *Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations* and of the *DPKO Protection of Civilians Operational Concept* (one per participant). For copies, please download the electronic file at:

http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx

PARTICIPANT PREPARATIONS

All participants must have a strong familiarity with the following:

- UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials;
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Security Council Resolutions (please download from http://www.un.org/en/documents/):

- Concerning Children and Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1612), 2005.

- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1674), 2006.
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1894), 2009.
- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1325), 2000.
- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1960), 2010.

MATERIALS REFERENCED IN THIS MODULE

- DPKO/DFS Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping *Operations* (2010)
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2009)
- DRAFT Explanatory Note on Protection of Civilians Language in Security Council Mandates for Peacekeeping Missions
- Henry L Stimson Center, Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Washington, D.C, (2011)
- Integrated Mission Planning Process Guidelines: Role of the Field; Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences
- Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008)
- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2009)
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping
- Protection of Civilians (POC) Resource and Capability Matrix for Implementation of UN Peacekeeping Operations with POC Mandates (2012)

SYMBOLS LEGEND

☞	Note to the Instructor (Some background information for consideration and mention)
	Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic). Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words.
	Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information
e.g	Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
?	Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
	Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
	Film (A film that is suggested as either a core or optional activity)
	Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
+	Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit or part – as indicated in the text)
	Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

Session Notes

1. INTRODUCTION



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

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

Slide 3

- This presentation aims at discussing how mandate language on POC should be understood by military and police commanders. It also presents the main elements on the DPKO Operational Concept, a fundamental document in the DPKO framework on POC. It is highly necessary that a mission battalion or FPU commander grasps what exactly a particular mandate says on POC from which his/her derived protection tactical tasks come from.

- A detailed discussion on some of the most significant challenges to accomplish POC tasks is also conducted with a view on how those challenges should be seen by tactical commanders and individually deployed military and police personnel.

2. UNDERSTANDING MANDATE LANGUAGE



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

Slide 5

- Since the first mission to have a protection of civilians mandate (UNAMSIL 1999), POC language has evolved consistently.

- UNAMSIL 1999 (Sierra Leone): "…Acting under Chapter VII **of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL** *may take the necessary action* **to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, *within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone"***. It was the first POC resolution adopted under Chapter VII and marked a landmark in the conceptual thinking about UN Peacekeeping. The language has been

repeated and expanded upon in subsequent resolutions, which have also tended to repeat the caveat phrases 'within capabilities', 'imminent threat' and 'taking into account the responsibilities' of the host government. Resolutions have increasingly stressed that POC should be the main priority of the mission when it comes to allocation of resources.

- UNMISS 2011 (South Sudan): *"…Acting under Chapter VII* of the Charter of the United Nations…authorizes . . . the following tasks… **Advising and assisting the Government . . . including military and police . . . in *fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians, in compliance with international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law*; (v)** Deterring violence including through proactive deployment and patrols in areas at high risk of conflict, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, *protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence**, in particular when the Government of the Republic of South Sudan is not providing such security***; (vi) Providing security for United Nations and humanitarian personnel, installations and equipment necessary for implementation of mandated tasks,…" Here there it important to note that emphasis is placed on the primary role of the host government to protect its own citizens.

- MONUSCO 2011 (DRC): "…[reiterated] that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo bears primary responsibility for security, peace- building and development in the country, and [encouraged it] to remain fully committed to protecting the civilian population through the establishment of professional and sustainable security forces and the rule of law and respect for human rights,. . . . . ***the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources*** and [encouraging] further the use of innovative measures implemented by MONUSCO in the protection of civilians…". Note that now POC tasks must be prioritized concerning the use of mission resources.

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *Remark the fact that currently most of the UN complex missions have POC as the priority mandated task. There are currently (as August 2013) 9 UN DPKO-led peacekeeping operations with POC mandates: UNIFIL, UNMIL, UNOCI, MONUSCO, UNIMISS, UNISFA, MINUSTAH, UNAMID and MINUSMA.*

Slide 6

- A **threat is imminent** from the moment it is identified as a threat, until such a time that mission analysis determines that the threat no longer exists. Threat is analysed at different levels within the mission and tactical military and police commanders need to conduct their own threat assessment. This should be part of the military and police normal information gathering and analysis processes. On the other hand, imminent threat is also defined by the commander on the scene who has the elements to judge on the use of force to protect civilians. Threat will be detailed discussed in the third presentation (Introduction to POC 3).

- The expression "necessary action" gives the mission authority to take all steps, up to and including the use of deadly force (as a last resort) to protect civilians under an imminent threat. **Peacekeepers with a POC mandate are authorized to use force** in any circumstance in which they believe that a threat of violence against civilians exists.

- Use of force by military and police forces must be supported by adequate intelligence. Due to existing limitations of collection assets and modern technology in field missions most of the information gathering work is done through reaching out to the local population and leaders, local protection actors etc. Battalion and FPU leaders (senior and junior leaders), MILOBs, MLOs and IPOs need to have **close interaction with the local population** and its representatives, to build confidence and to understand their protection demands, vulnerabilities and perceived threats.

Slide 7

- "Within capabilities" acknowledges **resource constraints and prioritize use of resources** through threat and vulnerability analyses, and coherent operational and tactical planning. Consider also the **impact of action and inaction on the credibility** of the mission and the consent of host state authorities.

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *It is useful to comment that POC by nature requires the existence of mobility assets, particularly helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. Helicopters are highly necessary to provide immediate response when crisis occur in remote locations. It is useful to comment that, as we will see shortly, the analysis of the POC risks must be derived from analyzing the threats posed to the population and their vulnerabilities.*

- The way the battalion establishes a visible presence and interacts with local actors and adopts a firm posture within its AOR generates a strong impact on the conducting of tactical tasks.

- It is also important to acknowledge that the existing **military resources**, even in large complex missions with thousands of soldiers, are not enough to protect all civilians from imminent threat. It is not rare that a battalion area of operations is huge, terrain is rough, lines of communications are poor, and logistics is challenging and communications inadequate or insufficient. Nevertheless it is expected by the local population that infantry battalions protect

civilians within their areas of responsibilities. Sound planning is always necessary to mitigate these constrains and accomplish tasks.



Slide 8

- **UN peacekeepers are responsible for undertaking protection activities in support of or in parallel with government actors**. In the absence of an effective host government effort peacekeepers may act independently to protect civilians within the mission's area of operations.

- Field missions do their best to have the host government engaged on the protection of civilians so the mission can perform a supporting role. **However, bearing in mind that missions operate within the principles of peacekeeping, missions are authorized to use force against elements of government forces where such forces are themselves engaging in physical violence against civilians**. Due to the possible negative impact on the strategic consent, the use of force against host country security forces shall have guidance from the FHQ or PHQ. Obviously, force should be use according to the rules of engagement in case of flagrant attack of civilians by host nation security forces.

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *It is relevant to note that the use of force against host nation security forces may have negative implications on the host nation consent. It is always preferable to take preventive measures and use political action to obtain*

compliance with principles of human rights and the use of force by the national security apparatus.

☞ *There may be a number of consequences including the loss of international support and the host country consent.*

3. DPKO OPERATIONAL CONCEPT ON POC



Slide 9

- The DPKO Operational concept is the conceptual framework for the development of mission POC strategies. Contingent, battalion and FPU commanders, as well as MILOBs, MILADs, MLOs and IPOs need to understand the multidimensional nature of protection responses in peacekeeping operations. Mission military, police and civilian components (as human rights, political affairs etc) as well as mission partners (UNCT, NGOs etc) can cooperate in providing optimum protection responses.

- The operational concept is organized around a three tiered approach to protecting civilians:
  - Tier 1: Protection through political process;
  - Tier 2: Providing protection from physical violence;
  - Tier 3: Establishing a protective environment.

- **Tier I - Protection through Political Process.** Includes the support to political processes (including peace negotiations and agreements, support to the development of governance and institutions and the extension of state authority) which seek to establish a safe, secure

environment where human rights are respected. It also addresses conflict management and support to reconciliation (can include local-level conflict resolution, as well as national or regional processes that seek to address past conflict and restore confidence and community stability).

- **Tier II - Protection from physical violence.** It has to do with establishing a deterrent presence through forward field military, police and civilian deployments and day and night patrols in vulnerable communities and targeted locations (such as markets or schools). It may be accomplished by taking pro-active actions to reduce the vulnerability of civilians through heightened human rights monitoring, political dialogue, conflict mediation and pressure and engagement with potential aggressors, as well as the establishment of physical defensive positions or cordons (e.g. around a community or refugee site) and joint protection teams. It finally may be necessary to act to reduce threats to the local population by conducting pre-emptive deployments or responding to violent attacks with all necessary means including, if necessary, the use of force,(to protect civilians and stabilize the situation.

- **Tier III – Establishing a Protective Environment**. It means: a) To create conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance; b) To promote and protect human rights; c) To reduce forcible displacement and create conditions suitable for return; d) To reform the police, judicial and defence sectors of the host country; e) To conduct a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme; and f) To conduct mine action activities.



Slide 10

- **POC is a whole of mission effort**. Military (with the mission monopoly of the use of force) and police components understand that isolated protection actions do not achieve the same results as a coordinated multidimensional response.

- **Liaison for information-gathering and sharing.** POC information should be collected from a multiplicity of sources, to get an accurate picture of threats and vulnerabilities. This relies on liaising with civilian colleagues within the mission, humanitarian partners, the local authorities and the local population. Information collected through routine military activities should inform protection planning. However. POC priority information requirements must be prepared to allow planners to design tactical operations to protect local population.

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor**: A commander should establish a reliable network with key civilian actors in order to increase situational awareness of the entire AOR. A strong network will build trust among all actors.*

- **Planning.** It is important to note that POC strategies help missions to define how each of the mission components contributes to achieving POC as an end-state. For military and police components, the POC strategy will furnish guidance to allow the incorporation of POC into operational level (Mission level: FHQ and PHQ) and tactical level (contingent, battalion, FPU).

- **Command and control (C2) in peacekeeping and POC coordination structures.** It is important to note that as per the DPKO C2 policy, the military and police components shall **coordinate** police/military/joint operations at the tactical level to ensure: a) Coherence of effort in the achievement of the mission plan at the local level; and b) Joint handling of local crisis situations. This arrangement allows for the POC mandate implementation, which relies on a consensus-based approach involving civilian and uniformed components.

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor**: In some missions, coordination structures have been set up that ensure the timely sharing of information between the armed and civilian components; empower senior managers, both civilians and military, with a common set of data necessary for the implementation of the mandate, and strengthen the capacity of military commanders to exercise C2 while not impinging on the integrity of the military chain of command.*

- **Conflict-related sexual violence / sexual and gender-based violence.** To ensure that the military component addresses sexual and gender based violence, in collaboration with others such as the gender component, mission guidance and coordination arrangements are put in place such as establishing SOPs and/or referral arrangements to respond to and report on sexual violence. It is also be possible to undertake preventive physical protection activities, such as specific patrols, or creating trust with the local community through community liaison and outreach.

- **Child protection.** There are a number of actions that military units and individuals can take that contribute to POC and to child protection. This may include observing and reporting on child protection concerns, such as sexual violence, trafficking of children, use of schools for military purposes, or cross-border recruitment of children or informing on restrictions when conducting armed operations.

☞ *DPKO is developing specific training modules on child protection for military and police commanders that will provide supplementary information and guidance on how to proceed regarding issues like child soldiers.*

Slide 11

- In UN peacekeeping, Battalion, Company and FPU Commanders and staff must understand that **protection in a post-conflict environment is performed by a wide range of actors**. The **Host State Government always has the primary responsibility for protecting civilians within its borders.**

- Other organizations that have been mandated by the international community to provide supplementary protection in support of host government protection responsibilities, include:

  - **UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees)** which promotes or provides legal protection and humanitarian assistance;
  - **OHCHR (Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights)** which monitors human rights situations on the ground and implements projects, such as technical trainings and support in the areas of administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights treaty ratification, and human rights education;
  - **ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross)** promotes and strengthens humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles and delivers humanitarian assistance;
  - **OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)** mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors and conducts advocacy actions;
  - **UNICEF (UN Children's Fund)** engages in Child Protection activities including monitoring and reporting on IHL and human rights violations perpetrated against children in conflict.

- Many non-state actors are also involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance, the monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses and the rehabilitation and reform of judicial institutions. These are typically referred to as non-governmental organizations (**NGOs**) international non-governmental organizations (**INGOs**) and other **civil society organizations.**

  ☞ *Coordination amongst these actors, including between peacekeeping missions and independent humanitarian actors, can be challenging. However, it is key to remember that military and police personnel should talk to all partners in the field, because* ***the strength of a joint effort is far greater than an individual impact.***

4. CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POC



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

Slide 13

- **Distinction. UN Peacekeepers are expected at all times to make a clear distinction between civilians and those taking part in the hostilities to harm civilians.**

- **Protected persons.** Under IHL, Civilians are "protected persons", meaning that they should be protected against acts of violence and reprisals.

- **Civilians lose this protection only if, and for as long as, they "directly participate in hostilities".** People unlawfully taking part in hostilities are not entitled to protection under the Third Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war.

- **Possession of a weapon……does not necessarily give a person the status of "combatant."** For instance, in South Sudan, cattle-guarding civilians do carry a weapon for self-defence but are not considered as combatants by virtue of their being armed. However, if they display a hostile intent towards other civilians and threaten to use their weapons against them, then they would become combatants and the Force could take action against them, in line with the ROEs.

- **Reasonable belief.** <u>If individuals instigate violence against another individual or group, or if there is reasonable belief that they are preparing to commit violence, then those individuals are no longer entitled to protection</u>.

☞ *Acknowledging the difficulties many times posed by situations in which civilians are armed but it is not easy to realize their intent, military and police commanders and individuals need <u>to conduct competent and frequent liaison and information gathering</u> activities as a way to facilitate distinction between civilians and combatants. .*



Slide 14

- **Impartiality is not the same as neutrality or inaction. From the UN Capstone Doctrine:** a) **"**UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to conflict but not neutral in the execution of their mandate"; b) **"**Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not allow the parties to violate the peace process or the principles of the United Nations". Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity.

- **Impartiality means that all civilians will be protected without prejudice** and according to the level of threat against them. This includes the civilian dependents of armed actors.

☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *Respecting the ROE, military and police units should use force against a party to conflict that attacks civilians.*

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

Slide 15

- **Maintaining the consent of the Host Government.** Maintaining the consent of the Host Government is obviously critical to peacekeeping. Peacekeeping means that the field mission is authorized by the host country to operate within its territory under certain rules. In the implementation of its mandate, a United Nations peacekeeping operation must work continuously to ensure that it does not lose the consent of the main parties, while ensuring that the peace process moves forward.

- Peacekeepers should always bear in mind that their actions could have consequences on the Host State consent. That being said, **consequences of action should be weighed against consequences of inaction**.

- **Local consent**. Strategic consent (host country and main parties to conflict consents) does not mean that consent at tactical (local) level is guaranteed particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control.

- **Authority to use force.** It is important to bear in mind that peacekeepers operating with a protection of civilians mandate have the authority to intervene – including, if necessary, with the use of force – to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence from all sources, including elements of host state authorities when engaged in violence against civilians.

Slide 16

- **Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces**. Support by United Nations entities to non-UN security forces must be consistent with the Organization's Purposes and Principles in the Charter and its obligations under international law to respect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

- **UN support cannot be provided** where there are substantial grounds for **believing there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations** of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures. There is a policy that states that the United Nations cannot support non-UN security actors suspected of committing human rights violations.

- **Implementation of the HRDDP**. According to the HRDDP an effective framework should consider: a) procedures for monitoring the recipient entity's compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law; b) procedures for determining when and how to intercede with a view to putting an end to grave violations of any of those bodies of law and for deciding, if need be, upon the suspension or withdrawal of support; and c) general operational guidance, as required, by the respective UN entities to the country level on implementation of the policy.

- **Tactical level contribution to the implementation of the policy.** When military or police commanders are considering providing support to non-UN security actors, make sure this has been discussed with Force or Police Headquarters as appropriate so that the relevant screening actions have been taken.

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *According to the HRDDP, "support" does not include: a) training or sensitization regarding international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law; b) standard-setting (e.g. advice on and review of legislation, codes and policies) and capacity support directly related to the implementation and promotion of compliance with human rights laws and standards and to foster democratic governance of security institutions; c) engagement to promote compliance with humanitarian, human rights and refugee law or to negotiate humanitarian access and carry out relief operations; d) mediation and mediation-related support;* and e) MEDEVAC and CASEVAC.

e.g MONUSCO has been supporting the FARDC on the extension of the state authority in DRC while putting into practice the HRDDP principles and recommendations. In August 2013, following clashes in Goma, the MONUSCO Force Commander announced that the

Mission will support the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) to establish a security zone around the area of Goma and its northern suburbs.



Slide 17

- When an agreement is reached and a peacekeeping operation is mandated and deployed, **parties to conflict (and in certain cases the host government) committed crimes and perpetrated violence against the population**. A process of national reconciliation is a tough political achievement and may require amnesty (not to be interpreted as general amnesties for genocide, war crimes against humanity, gross human rights violations etc) and punishment of individuals.

- The root causes of the violence against civilians must be addressed. A UN field mission has civilian components that are assigned to work on important mission-specific issues related to the causes of the conflict and the violence against civilians in close cooperation with the UNCT and other non-mission partners.

- **Tackling impunity** is a huge challenge for several reasons. It requires political engagement and pressure, reform of the host country security sector reform (including justice, corrections and police), arresting and prosecution of war criminals, amongst other important measures.

- The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The ICC prosecutor can initiate an investigation in a country which has ratified the statute or where a national of the state that has ratified it is suspected of crimes included in the statute (The ICC prosecutes these crimes where no national or regional court is able or willing to prosecute or when the Security Council refers the case to the Court). Crimes covered by the Rome Statute, and prosecuted by the ICC – broadly defined as genocide, war crimes (including rape and other sexual violence) and crimes against humanity. An attack on a peacekeeper is a war crime under the Rome Statute (except in situations where peacekeepers are considered to be parties to the conflict).

- **Military and police** will surely participate in a process of national reconciliation (Security and defense sector reforms, DDR etc). They may also be involved in providing support to activities related to tackling impunity like the arrest of war criminals.

e.g The UNSCR has provide **MONUSCO with a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)** which is authorized to conduct offensive operations. Amongst the FIB mandated tasks there is a provision to: *"Support and work with the Government of the DRC to arrest and bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, including through cooperation with States of the region and the ICC."*



Slide 18

- **Force protection.** Force protection is necessary to maintain safety and security of the force. Where the force is not able to ensure its own protection, this may give rise to credibility issues

with the local population and local spoilers. Lack of force protection has heavily impacts on the operational capabilities of the military and police contingents to fulfill their tasks.

- **Potential tension between Force protection and the protection of civilians.** Tension may arise between the necessity to protect the force and civilians under threat. Using UN premises for POC purposes may impact safety and security of the Force yet may be the only option to protect civilians from imminent threat. Such difficult decisions depend on the circumstances of the case.

- Any action to be taken has to consider the risks to our safety and the likelihood that the military or police intervention would be able to protect civilians at risk.



Slide 19

- The dilemma faced by field missions who have **to take action to protect civilians in remote locations where armed groups act freely is remarkable**.

- It is always difficult to operate in these areas where there is a bad combination of poor communications, dirty roads and dense vegetation with scarce mission resources to deploy and sustain to conduct military operations against armed groups**.** Situation is even more difficult if the target area is at the national border and armed groups take advantage of difficult terrain and absence of national security forces to move back and forth freely**.**

e.g On several occasions MONUC (former MONUSCO) deployed military peacekeepers to protect villages or conduct operations aiming at reducing the threat of rebel groups in remote areas of eastern DRC. Retaliatory attacks followed MONUC interventions in Eastern DRC resulting in violence, rapes, abduction and damage to property.

- **Need to assess the possibility of retaliatory attacks**. It is quite important to rightly asses the risk of retaliatory attacks to not deteriorate the situation. A careful examination of the consequences of action and inaction must be carried out before deciding to deploy military forces to conduct tactical operations.

- If an intervention is decided, the field mission has to be prepared to counter any increase in violence against the peacekeepers themselves or 'soft' targets as well as to be prepared for possibility of population displacement.

e.g **Neutralizing armed groups through the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade**. From the FIB mandate: *"In support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information collation and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and* ***mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations*** *through the Intervention Brigade referred to in paragraph 9 and paragraph 10 above, either* ***unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner*** *and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities;"*

Slide 20

- Retaliatory attacks may look for soft targets like local communities, refugee or IDP camps and the UN Country team staff or installations or other international organizations

- **Peacekeeping installations, patrols, checkpoints or other peacekeeping deployments** are also likely targets of retaliatory attacks.



Slide 21

- **The failure to protect has political and institutional consequences**, given that it can result in the <u>loss of legitimacy</u> of the peacekeepers in the eyes of the local population and therefore the ability of the PKO to achieve the mission's mandate.

- The inability of peacekeeping missions to address violence against civilians has damaged the standing of the United Nations and threatened to discredit the practice of peacekeeping in general." (OCHA/DPKO Study, p.24)

- Wherever peacekeepers deploy they raise expectations among the local population that the UN will protect them**. Failure to protect civilians is all the more visible at the tactical level since that is where the mission is in the closest contact with the local population.**

- **When such failures happen, military, and eventually police units as FPUs, may fall prisoner to a very difficult environment:** a) the local population ceases to cooperate and may become hostile; b) the information cycle is highly damaged with direct impact on planning of patrolling, observation, liaison and protection activities; c) the spoilers advance their agenda and get bolder**.**

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *To break out such negative cycle is an enormous task in face of the perception that the force is not willing or is incapable to protect the local population.*

  ☞ *In such situation, the local population tends to be unfriendly regarding the military and police peacekeepers bringing additional difficulties on information gathering and security.*

5. SUMMARY OF KEY MESSAGES

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *Outline the main points that have been covered during the session.*

- **POC mandates have evolved since UMASIL 1999**. The UNSC has given UN field missions robust mandates to protect civilians and has made clear that **POC has the priority in the allocation of resources**. Recent mandates have made more and more clear the primary **responsibility of the host government** to protect civilians.

- A threat is imminent from the moment it is identified as a threat, until such a time that mission analysis determines that the threat no longer exists. Threat is analysed at different levels

within the mission and tactical military and police commanders need to conduct their own threat assessment.

- The expression "necessary action" gives the mission authority to take all steps, up to and including the use of deadly force (as a last resort) to protect civilians under an imminent threat. Use of force is directly related to adequate intelligence.

- "Within capabilities" acknowledges resource constraints and prioritize use of resources trough threat and vulnerability analyses, and coherent operational and tactical planning.

- The **DPKO Operational concept** is the conceptual framework for the development of mission POC strategies. Contingent, battalion and FPU commanders, as well as MILOBs, MILADs, MLOs and IPOs need to understand the multidimensional nature of protection responses in peacekeeping operations.

- **POC is a whole of mission effort**. Military (with the mission monopoly of the use of force) and police components understand that isolated protection actions do not achieve the same results as a coordinated multidimensional response.

- Important challenges on the POC are related to the peacekeeping principles:
  - **Impartiality**. Military and police forces must be impartial in relation to the mandate. The battalions and units should not be impartial to a party to conflict who attacks the civilian population.
  - **Consent**. Maintaining the host country (strategic) consent is essential. Sometimes strategic consent does not mean tactical (local) consent and the military and police units and teams must be aware of that.
  - **Minimum use of force as use of force as the last resort**.

- Distinction is a principle of the International Humanitarian Law that must be applied to all situations involving the use of force to protect civilians.

- Support to be given to host country security forces must be aligned with the HRDDP.

- **Good planning based on solid intelligence is the key to conduct tactical tasks to protect civilians**. Military and police courses of action, especially at tactical level (results are always visible) should be assessed regarding the consequences of action and inaction. The possibility of retaliatory attacks must be fully analyzed.



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INTRODUCTION TO PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 3

Implementing POC

Key considerations for the tactical level

Preparatory Notes to Instructors

AIM

To familiarize peacekeeping personnel with:

- Planning considerations at tactical level and their connection with the mission POC strategy.

AUDIENCE

This module has been designed for UN uniformed personnel at **tactical level to be trained during the pre-deployment training (PDT) phase**, especially battalion and FPU commanders and staff and individually deployed military and police personnel as military observers, military liaison officers, military advisers and individual police officers.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

On completion of Introduction to POC 3, participants will be able to:

1. Understand field missions POC strategies and its linkages with tactical aspects
2. Understand the four phases of the protection response
3. Identify key partners in the mission to implement POC mandates
4. Understand planning and cross-cutting considerations impacting the implementation of POC

TRAINING SEQUENCE

Introduction to POC 3 is the third and last session of Module 1, Introduction to Protection of Civilians. This session should be followed by the Learning Activity.

DURATION

Part 1 Introduction to POC 1	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.
Part 2 Introduction to POC 2	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.
Part 3 Introduction to POC 3	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.

Part 4	Explanation of the exercise	Group discussion	Group presentations in plenary
Learning Activity	5 min	45 min	50 min

METHODOLOGY

- The following points outline a suggested methodology. Experienced instructors may choose to use alternative methods and activities to present the material and key messages in this unit. Availability of time may permit additional students to formulate questions after each presentation.
- Training is divided into 50 minute blocks with 10 minute break periods between each block.
- This module will include lecture issues followed by group questions/discussion and learning activities as appropriate.

Part 1, 2 and 3:

- Presentations using the provided PowerPoint slides;
- Informal question and answer periods (as determined by instructor).

Part 4:

- Small group discussion and solution to the requirements of the Learning Activity;
- Short presentations to be made by the small groups, followed by plenary discussion on the questions proposed by the Learning Activity.

INSTRUCTOR PROFILE

Module 1 (Introduction to POC 1, 2, 3 and the Learning Activity) is best presented by an instructor who has personal experience in a peacekeeping operation with a Protection of Civilian (POC) mandate, preferably as battalion and FPU commander or staff or company commander, with a solid understanding of the operational concept of POC and how it's implemented in the mission(s). Instructor should have undergone a formal training course on the UN Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) and UN POC at national or international level.

INSTRUCTOR PREPARATIONS

Required Readings:

- Charter of the United Nations;
- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (also known as the Capstone Doctrine);
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges (2009);
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians;
- DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations;

- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Mainstreaming the Protection, Rights and Well-being of Children Affected by Armed Conflict within UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- Analytical and Conceptual Framing of Conflict Related Sexual Violence (UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict);
- Secretary General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law;

Equipment:

- Computer and provided session slides;
- Projector and screen for slides.

Materials:

- Copies of the *Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations* and of the *DPKO Protection of Civilians Operational Concept* (one per participant). For copies, please download the electronic file at:

http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx

PARTICIPANT PREPARATIONS

All participants must have a strong familiarity with the following:

- UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials;
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Security Council Resolutions (please download from http://www.un.org/en/documents/):

- Concerning Children and Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1612), 2005.
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1674), 2006.
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1894), 2009.
- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1325), 2000.
- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1960), 2010.

MATERIALS REFERENCED IN THIS MODULE

- DPKO/DFS Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping *Operations* (2010)
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2009)
- DRAFT Explanatory Note on Protection of Civilians Language in Security Council Mandates for Peacekeeping Missions
- Henry L Stimson Center, Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Washington, D.C, (2011)
- Integrated Mission Planning Process Guidelines: Role of the Field; Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences
- Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008)
- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2009)
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping

- Protection of Civilians (POC) Resource and Capability Matrix for Implementation of UN Peacekeeping Operations with POC Mandates (2012)

SYMBOLS LEGEND

☞	Note to the Instructor (Some background information for consideration and mention)
	Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic). Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words.
	Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information
e.g	Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
?	Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
	Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
	Film (A film that is suggested as either a core or optional activity)
	Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
+	Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit or part – as indicated in the text)
🗝	Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

Session Notes

1. INTRODUCTION



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

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

Slide 3

- This presentation intends to discuss responses to the important question on how operational (mission) level documents such as the Mission POC Strategy provide guidance to mission components when they are drafting their concepts of operations and work plans and how that is translated to tactical level plans and activities.

- The presentation also places focus on military and police tactical tasks to be preformed by infantry battalions and formed police units as a preparation for the mission-specific modules with scenarios and requirements.

- Finally a discussion on threats and vulnerabilities is presented. The idea is to call attention to aspects related to POC and not to discuss military and police planning processes since they may vary according to national peculiarities.

2. MISSION POC STRATEGY

Slide 4

- Comprehensive **POC strategies are designed to bring coherence in approach, minimize gaps, avoid duplication and maximize the mission's ability to ensure the protection of civilians** through the use of its available capacities (civilian, military, police and support elements of the mission).

- By **clarifying the role and activities of the mission and modalities of interface with key partners**, comprehensive POC strategies also ensure better coordination with other actors working on POC.

- Additionally, POC strategies are an important tool for senior mission leadership to ensure that missions take a pro-active approach to POC. Senior mission leadership have an important responsibility in this respect, and must remain engaged in both the development and implementation of comprehensive POC strategies.

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *Currently a number of POC mandate field missions are developing or reviewing their POC strategies, including the four missions object of scenario-based exercises (MONUSCO, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNAMID).*

- **A coherent protection response requires consultation and coordination with all protection actors (UN and non UN)** in order to organize all available protection resources to address protection threats in a proactive, logical way.

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *Acknowledge that it can be very difficult to coordinate between mission and non-mission partners with different agendas and mandates.*



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

Slide 6

- Each POC mandated field mission develops a mission-specific strategy. POC Mandate, leadership, threats, vulnerabilities and characteristics of the population, operational environment, terrain and other aspects are different and require the design of a specific strategy

- The strategy is for the peacekeeping operation but coordinating instructions and mechanisms with external partners should be present in the strategy in order to address cooperation with the UNCT and the Protection Cluster (Humanitarian actors).

- Once finalized the strategy should be endorsed by the Head of Mission and the UNCT. The document itself should be disseminated to all mission components involved in the protection of civilians so that they are aware of their responsibilities and can develop their own plans. Key partners, such as the Protection Cluster, shall also receive a copy of the strategy.



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- POC strategies are drafted at the operational level and aim to ensure that tactical-level tasks contribute to the mission's POC objectives. POC planning is a tool to anticipate POC risks so it can address them in coordination with other protection actors.

- **Operational**: Other important elements of the POC strategy, such as identifying activities to be undertaken by the mission to address those risks, analyzing the resources and capacities required to implement the POC mandates will be decided at the operational level.

- **Tactical**: **Identify actual and potential POC risks in the mission area:** The mission's efforts to protect civilians must be based on a thorough analysis of the POC risks facing the population.

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *As we will see shortly, the analysis of the POC risks must be derived from analyzing the threats posed to the population and their vulnerabilities.*

  ☞ *Military and police components operating at the tactical level contribute to risk analysis through collecting and sharing information they collect as part of their normal activities, as we have just discussed. The Military Component also normally conducts their own risk analysis at tactical level (infantry battalions, sectors and the FHQ).*

- **Tactical**: **Contribute to providing an overview of the protection actors:** Uniformed personnel at the tactical level are often familiar with protection actors they work alongside with. It is also important for the mission to have a picture of the local Government's capacity and willingness to protect civilians.

- **Tactical**: **Benefit from a clarification of roles and responsibilities and of POC coordination mechanisms:** Coordination of roles and responsibilities across components within the mission or with other protection actors is an important part of the strategy development. Uniformed personnel at the tactical level can use this opportunity to clarify the expectations placed upon them and their capacity to meet them.

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor: It is very important for the tactical level operators at battalion and FPU level*** *to understand a mission POC strategy and how this document impacts on the Military and Police Components revised CONOPS and operation orders and plans. A POC strategy provides the operational level guidance to allow the components HQs to draft plans and orders that will ultimately affect the battalion and FPU levels, including the military observers, military liaison officers and individual police officers.*

e.g MONUSCO's **System-Wide Protection Strategy** was developed in 2010 in a joint effort with OCHA, and UNHCR in its role as protection cluster lead. The mission protection strategy recognizes that MONUSCO does not have the operational capacity to position troops in every locality, given DRC's size, infrastructural gaps and security challenges. <u>It therefore needs to</u>

maintain its ability to intervene decisively, by keeping a strategic and tactical reserve, and avoiding dispersal of its forces

3. THE FOUR PHASES OF PROTECTION RESPONSE



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

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- **Important aspects on the Four Phases of Protection of the DPKO Operational Concept**.
- **Non-sequential nature of the phases**. The DPKO Operational Concept lays out the four phases of the protection response. These phases may or may not be sequential. They could be understood as four categories of activities which might operate simultaneously depending on the nature of the threats. These phases are part of Tier II of the POC concept, which deals with physical protection.

- **Protection responses in each phase**. Ideally a protection response at tactical or operational level should be integrated in the sense it combines capabilities from the different mission components (military, police and civilian components) and is coordinated with mission partners.

e.g As such, during the Prevention phase, for example, patrolling carried out by an infantry battalion could have the participation of individual police officers and human rights officers in joint patrols to monitor developments in the security situation. The area infantry battalion commander could receive support from the mission Political Affairs Component to engage local leadership on how better to pre-empt violence amongst communities. FPU could be tasked to protect a important humanitarian food depot in close coordination with mission partners and etc.

- **Phase 1 – Assurance/Prevention**. The measures in this phase are aimed at reassuring the local population of the mission's intent to protect them, mainly through routine, passive measures. This is the phase in which units and MILOBs/IPOs teams conduct tasks to be visible, interact with local population, their leaders and local protection actors such as agencies and NGOs. **It is also a vital phase to gather and share information in a permanent attempt to anticipate threats.**

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *Most of the times conducting these actions helps units to prevent or pre-empt a threat from developing. In other situations, due to a lack of proper capabilities as communications, intelligence and mobility, a POC threat may not have been anticipated and there is a need to enter into the response phase.*

- **Phase 2 – Pre-emption**. Where measures under Phase 1 prove insufficient, or when heightened risks are detected, more active, pre-emptive measures may be required. It is important to note that it may be also the case that an infantry battalion has part of its area of operations with a company conducting tasks related to prevention and other part with another company conducting pre-emptive measures.

- **Phase 3 – Response**. When the threat of physical violence to civilians is apparent, more active measures aimed at deterring potential aggressors from conducting hostile acts may be

necessary. At this stage, the violent behavior is already underway and steps must be taken to compel the aggressor to comply. Direct military action should be considered as an option.

- **Phase 4 – Consolidation**. This range of activities addresses the stabilization of a post-crisis situation. The aim is to assist the local population and host authorities to return to a state of normalcy, and create the conditions in which a return to crisis is diminished.

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *The effective prevention and deterrence of violence against civilians requires an effective early warning system and a consistent, credible and proactive (as opposed to reactive) operational approach and a mobile posture.*

e.g Mobile operating bases (MOB / TOB) improve mission reach, enhanced deterrence and response capabilities.

☞ *Though the "phases" as described in the Strategic Framework relate primarily to Phase II (physical protection) activities actors operating primarily in Tier I (Protection through the political process) and III (Protection through the creation of a protective environment) must adjust their activities to reflect changes and escalation of the real time challenges in the mission's area of responsibility.*



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- **Protection Response**. It might take the form of mission (operational) level multidimensional response or an immediate tactical level response provided by an UN infantry battalion,

company or FPU who has to address a critical situation related to protection of civilians from physical harm. **These concepts should be integrated into military and police planning processes of contingents whatever are the national peculiarities or different planning processes.**

- **Military tactical tasks such as patrolling, observation and liaison, amongst others are basic tools to understand the environment**. Most of the times rightly conducting these actions permits units to prevent or timely pre-empt a threat to develop. In other situations, due to a lack of proper capabilities such as communications, intelligence and mobility, a straight forward response must be delivered.

- **In all cases, good information sharing and coordination with other actors deployed in the area of operations is highly necessary**. HUMINT (human sources) is normally the main source of information and remains decisive to have an accurate picture of the situation.

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *The Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, in consultation with Member States, are making efforts to provide POC mandate field missions with modern means of surveillance, information gathering and early warning (as an example, unmanned aerial vehicles are planned to be furnished to MONUSCO).*

4. PLANNING AND CROSS-CUTTING CONSIDERATIONS



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- **Importance of planning and cross-cutting considerations**. Planning for these tactical tasks require full understanding that protection of civilians is the mission end-state, **an operational purpose that triggers several different tactical tasks**.

- It might take the form of mission level multidimensional response or an immediate tactical level response provided by a UN infantry battalion, company or FPU. These concepts should be integrated into military and police planning processes of contingents in addition to other planning processes that may happen concurrently.

- The four phases of response (prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation) should be **reflected in the tactical plan of infantry battalions, companies and eventually FPUs**.



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- **The real military and police capacities to protect civilians must be clearly defined and understood by the operational level (Mission)**. It is not uncommon that the mission HQ , host government and mission partners create high expectations of military capabilities of infantry battalions without recognizing aspects as:

a. UN infantry battalions / companies are tactical elements designed to operate under a Brigade which provides guidance and assets; battalions when acting independently are not tactically self-sufficient;

b. UN infantry battalions operate isolated in an environment with several constrains on information gathering and are not well equipped to perform intelligence driven operations, essential to protect civilians;

c. Battalions normally operate in a huge area of operations: there are communication and mobility issues that can not be underestimated (here we are talking of wheeled versus tracked vehicles for example).

☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *There are also other factors present in military and police planning processes related to mission, adversaries, terrain, time, public opinion, leadership etc.*



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Contingent and battalion commanders / FPU need **to understand when and how concepts and guidance issued in the mission POC strategy are incorporated in the military / police plans and how they should be translated to the tactical level battalion / company / FPU orders.**

☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *this slide requires a sound understanding on how the UNHQ and the mission military component (and similarly the police component) plan.*

☞ *In the context of the integrated mission planning process and after guidance is provided, the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in the UNHQ prepares a strategic military concept of operations (CONOPS) that translates the military tasks present in the mission mandate into a solid concept. The concept informs the mission military employment concept, phases of operation, threats, task organisation, lines of operation, structure and boundaries, partners and coordination structures and other relevant aspects. At this stage, DPKO also drafts the rules of engagement.*

☞ *The mission FHQ receives and refines the CONOPS by incorporating senior guidance and other inputs, including the mission POC strategy and as soon as it is finalised. The FHQ also develops an Operation Order that derives from the refined military CONOPS and the Force Commander issues his/her FC directives.*

☞ *When it comes to the tactical level, battalions also develop their own operation orders based on higher (FHQ) guidance and documentation. In the whole process, from the mission (operational) to sector or battalion level (tactical), POC must be inserted as a relevant if not the most relevant issue, depending on the emission mandate.*

☞ *A mission that has POC as the main mandated task, should have a military component preparing orders and plans that put* ***POC at the center of the planning process and as the main tactical goal.*** *In such situation, the tactical orders should reflect an analysis that took into consideration POC local threats, the local population vulnerability and the battalion capabilities to take action (prevent, pre-empt, respond and consolidate).*



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- **The four phases of response (prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation) should be reflected in the tactical plan which main goal is protection of civilians.**

- Planning for these tactical tasks require full understanding of higher guidance on protection of civilians. **It makes all difference to have POC as the desired end state. It changes the way you plan and conduct routine and special tasks, how you gather and share information and your degree of preparedness to tackle POC situations.**

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *Naturally amongst the eight POC mandated missions there are huge differences. A brief comparison between MINUSTAH and MONUSCO is enough to realize that the military components from these missions plan and conduct operations to protect civilians differently. In Haiti, for example, the threats against civilians are quite different from those existing in DRC.*

e.g **UNOCI has developed an Implementation Matrix** which identifies relevant actors and actions to counter risks identified. This should form the basis of operational documents, such as work plans, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and other instructions to the mission and its components in implementing the POC mandate. **The Implementation Matrix is based on four phases of action: preparing for risk in day-to-day activities, responding to heightened risk through pre-emptive measures, responding to actual threats of physical violence, and stabilizing the situation after a crisis has occurred.**

5. EARLY WARNING AND CRISIS RESPONSE



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- Identify mechanisms that the mission will establish to articulate what role external actors, including the host authorities and local population will play in these mechanisms, as the systems function best when they are well coordinated with local counterparts. However, due caution is necessary in not exposing the population to harm in setting up such systems.

- Missions have many points of presence in the country. Those should be part of an early warning system and be properly orientated to interact with local communities under an early warning framework.

- Crisis response: The mission shall articulate the rapid decision-making process to address POC crises, involving the relevant components.

e.g **UNMISS developed a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for Conflict Early Warning and Early Response (CEWER)**, which sets out a process for the systematic collection and processing of threat information. The CEWER states that the Chief of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), in consultation with the Protection of Civilians Advisor, heads of mission components and sections, State Coordinators and the UN Country Team (UNCT), shall develop national Priority Information Requirements (PIRs) and a mission-wide Collection Plan for approval by the Mission Leadership Team (MLT). Each State Operations Centre (SOC) shall develop state-specific PIRs and a Collection Plan for approval by the State Coordinator. The mission Military and Police Components and the subordinated units are an important part of the system.

6. EXPECTATION MANAGEMENT



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- Management of expectations is a mission crucial activity that affects the PKO`s credibility and legitimacy. It should be undertaken by a range of measures as:

  - At the UNHQ: SRSG briefing and reports to the UNSC, meetings with main TCCs, PCCs and donors, media conferences etc;

  - At mission level: undertaking of a consistent pubic information campaign, aiming to target the different elements that must be informed, conducting of media conferences, meetings and briefings with neighbour countries, meetings and briefings with host countries authorities and civil society representatives etc.

- **The mission must also clearly communicate its mandate, capabilities and achievements to host authorities and other key stakeholders**. Senior mission leadership must recognize that a pro-active and ongoing expectations management effort requires resource – both human and material – in order to be implemented.

- **Public information campaigns** are highly important, especially regarding the international community, the host government, the local population and the mission partners. However, particularly on POC, it is not easy to inform what peacekeepers can do and can not do to the local population only by radio. It seems necessary to establish good communication and liaison mechanisms to interact with local population, through local authorities and leaders (religious, ethnical etc), using interpreters, community liaison assistants and other mission-specific solutions.

- **At tactical level**, any tactical commander, battalion, company or FPU commander and also individually deployed personnel such as military observers, military liaison officers and individual police officers **must understand the need of managing expectations of the local population**. The battalion operation order should have a public information annex explaining how the battalion or equivalent unit intends to manage expectations, including liaison with local leaders, public information campaigns, etc.

7. INFORMATION GATHERING AND ANALYSIS



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

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- **One of the keys to protect civilians is intelligence activities. Information gathering is essential and to do it the battalion (company or FPU) needs to develop a collection plan.** The mission level joint structures as the JMAC and JOS expect unit commanders to

send timely, accurate and opportune information that will be processed and resent to end users as intelligence.

- Amongst several existing sources of information it is important to note that the population is by far the most relevant. Regular exchanges and meetings with local leadership as well as frequent contact with locals and the use of community liaison assistants or similar arrangements are valuable means to gather information.

- If a well prepared collection plan is in place, as any military / police unit, a battalion or FPU has good analysis capacity and can process information to produce limited intelligence needed for the unit and the higher echelons.

- Humanitarian organizations, NGOs and missions elements deployed in your AOR are also important sources of information. In general, all these organizations are partners for the protection of civilians and confidence must be built with them to interact and coordinate in case of necessity. Sharing information relevant to the protection of civilians is a delicate process that requires very good communication, transparency and respect by the different roles and responsibilities of the actors deployed in your area. It is important to respect their reservations on disclosing information that is vital for them to operate.

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *It is important to note, as said before, that DPKO/DFS are providing field missions with more intelligence related assets to conduct information gathering, analysis and dissemination. MINUSMA Military Component for example is structured with one Intelligence Unit.*

8. ROBUST POSTURE AND DETERRENCE



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

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- **Robust Posture**. A Chapter VII Mandate with language concerning the use of all necessary means and POC as a priority mandated task is normally enough to set the tone for a robust posture. In face of the mandate and the mission leadership guidance, **tactical level commanders will adopt the appropriate robust posture according to directives issued by higher military and police commanders**.
- **Presence**. The impact of mere presence cannot be underestimated. Deploying to the right place at the right time can have a deterring effect and add credibility to messages being delivered through other channels.

- **Posture**. It is the "body language" of the force, which should say: "one does not mess around with the UN." Posture can affect the perception of both rebels/opponents and the local population.

- **Deterrence: resolve, credibility, responsiveness**. Deterrence is the actions that the mission, particularly the military component, takes to make people aware that there will be consequences to harming civilians.

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *To ensure deterrence, the mission needs to show its resolve, i.e. to signal its unequivocal determination backed up with a robust capability.*

  ☞ *It also needs to be credible, through projecting a tough, alert and professional image. Credibility means that the aggressor believes in the mission's ability to achieve its mandate.*

  ☞ *The mission needs to be responsive to threats, through demonstrating its capacity to quickly muster overwhelming force.*

9. VULNERABILITIES AND RISK OF ATTACK: ANALYZING PROTECTION THREATS



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

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THREAT = CAPACITY X INTENT X OPORTUNITY

- Consideration of the history, motivation, and capabilities of the negative forces, as well as the group's logic for harming civilians and the relationship between that logic and the overall aim of the group.

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor: Threat Assessment*** *- A threat CONTINUES to be a threat until it is determined (through reliable intelligence and analysis) that the belligerent in question no longer has the MEANS, or the INTENT to carry out the threat.*

- **What is the motivation for the violence?** (e.g. is violence indiscriminate and aimed primarily at "soft", easily attacked targets, or is it targeted at specific groups or individuals for political or military strategic reasons? Etc).

- **Is the perpetration of violence against civilians essential to the *survival* of the belligerent group?** (e.g. Is violence mainly perpetrated for looting and re-supplying belligerents, for the purpose of forced recruitment or forced labour? Is it necessary to the *political* or *military* survival of the group?)

- **What does the *motive* for violence against civilians tell us about the necessary *protection response* to each given belligerent group?** (e.g. If violence is strategically used against specific communities then a deterrent posture might be effective, but if violence is opportunistic, then effective deterrence would require "a peacekeeper in every village and

behind every tree" and is not practical. In this case it might be necessary to employ a more proactive posture designed to seize the initiative from belligerent forces.) **Note that violence against civilians is never justified, regardless of the motive.**



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e.g

Walikale Attacks (North Kivu - 30 July to 2 August 2010)

(The following is information largely based on the Official UN Report on the Walikale mass rapes: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/BCNUDHRapportViolsMassifsKibuaMpofi_en.pdf)

*1. Walikale-centre, the administrative centre of the territory, is located around **135 km west of Goma.** The territory of Walikale is rich in minerals, and consists mainly of mountain ranges covered with abundant indigenous forests. From 30 July to 2 August 2010, a coalition of combatants of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Mayi Mayi Sheka as well as residual elements of Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Nsengiyumva,1 a group composed of dozens of fighters, systematically attacked civilians in 13 villages situated along the Kibua-Mpofi axis in the groupement of Ihana, Wanianga sector, Walikale territory, North Kivu province.*

*2. **During four days, assailants travelled across the 13 villages** along the Kibua-Mpofi axis, beginning with the village of Bunangiri, some 4 km from Mpofi, and proceeding towards Kibua. The coalition elements then reportedly divided into groups of two, three, and six individuals.*

Some travelled through the forests to reach the villages while others used vehicles stolen to traders in order to move more easily along the axis.

3. The security situation in the targeted villages prior to the launching of the attacks makes it clear that the ***weakness of the State authority in Walikale territory*** *has been one of the causes of the proliferation of the armed groups which have monopolized control over the mining industry and are trafficking arms in the region, thus causing increasing insecurity for the civilian population.*

*4. A large number of ci****vilians were raped, including women, men, girls and boy,*** *by a coalition of combatants from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and the Mayi Mayi Sheka, as well by residual elements of Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Nsengiyumva. In addition,* ***many houses and shops were looted, and civilians were abducted*** *and subjected to forced labour by the assailants*

5. ***While emphasizing that the primary responsibility for protecting civilians lies with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)****, the UNJHRO staff observed the* ***difficulties encountered by the soldiers of*** *the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* ***(MONUSCO)*** *based in Kibua in their mission to protect civilians, the core element of the MONUSCO mandate.*

6. FARDC and PNC. *Reliable sources indicated that FARDC soldiers deployed in Walikale are involved in minerals trafficking. However, there were no FARDC soldiers on this axis, because the 211th* ***FARDC brigade had moved out*** *to its new area of deployment, while the soldiers of the 212th FARDC brigade opposed the rotation.* ***The PNC is present along the attacked axis*** *and there are police stations in Kibua, Luvungi, and Kembe. However, these posts along the axis, each of which is equipped with one AK-47 assault rifle, have a total of about 10 men.*

7. MONUSCO Troops. The "Company Operating Base" (COB) in Kibua*, whose area of jurisdiction includes the villages attacked by the coalition of armed groups, received around 80* ***newly deployed troops*** *on 27 and 28 July 201020, as a result of MONUSCO troops' rotation. The troops had not undergone specific training regarding the protection of civilians and interaction with communities in the context of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The COB*

*had **no "Community Liaison Interpreter"** (CLI). Once or twice a week, the peacekeepers stationed in Kibua conducted day patrols to the east and west of Kibua. **No night patrol** had been conducted in the area of responsibility of the Kibua base prior to the attacks, although the civilian population was of the opinion that attacks and other acts of violence by the armed groups generally took place at night. **The capacity of Kibua peacekeepers to gather information and intervene was limited by operational constraints, in particular lack of military logistics, the inaccessibility of the telephone network, the poor road conditions, the insecurity in the region, long distances between villages and the remoteness of the area**. The previous team of the COB in Kibua used to hold security meetings every Monday with village chiefs and elders, as well as representatives of the FARDC and PNC. Since his arrival in Kibua at the end of July 2010, the **new COB commander has reportedly had sporadic bilateral meetings** with the deputy chief of the groupement, who was then told to relay the information to chiefs of localities and villages.*

*8. **Once informed** of this situation, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo **(MONUSCO) deployed**, on three occasions, teams, including staff from the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) to the area. The first team went to the area from 13 to 17 August 2010 to assess the security situation, evaluate the protection needs of the local population and verify the allegations of human rights violations against civilians. Given the scale and seriousness of these violations, the UNJHRO deployed a special fact-finding team (hereinafter "the team") from 25 August to 2 September 2010 in order to carry out an in-depth investigation into these human rights violations and determine the context and sequence of the attacks, as well as the victims, the alleged perpetrators, and possibly, their motives. **MONUSCO later deployed two Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs) in different locations. The DRC Government also deployed more FARDC and PNC troops in the region.***

- **It is essential that a permanent and regular threat analysis be conducted by battalions, companies and FPUs, and individually deployed peacekeepers (teams of MILOBS, IPOs and MLOs)**. Such assessment can only be effective if the military and police establishes a trustful relationship with the local leaders in the area of operation. UN PKOs still have very limited capacity to gather information using modern technology; therefore most of the information is collected through human intelligence processes. **To exercise a minimum**

ability of protecting local civilians it is necessary to have their confidence in sharing information on the existing threats.

- The assessment itself shall contain the analysis of the threat characteristics, its capacity to inflict damage, intent to commit attacks and the existence of a favorable opportunity to undertake an attack. **Military and police have to reach out to local communities as much as possible to establish ties, understand the local dynamics and the existing threats**. It means most of the time an intensive day and night patrolling and liaison plan. These activities also include information sharing with local UN partners.

- There may be many **operational constrains to protect civilians**. As a military and police commanding officer you know your capabilities. You can not alter or shape an unforgivable terrain. You can however do your best to cover your area of responsibility and be well informed. A sound threat assessment may give you the opportunity to proactively deploy your troops in the right location at the right time or even request the Force of Police HQ to support you deployment (with air assets for example) or to reinforce your positions.



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- Vulnerabilities are based on the characteristics of the civilians (individual and community factors) and the factors that can lead to and compound those vulnerabilities (environmental factors.)

- **VULNERABILITY = (INDIVIDUAL OR COMMUNITY FACTORS) X (ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS) / (ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE)**

- **Individual or Community Factors:** Age, gender, sex, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, social status (both rank and different social powers and freedoms e.g. between men and women.

- **Environmental factors (of the civilians):** Status as an internally displaced person or a refugee increases vulnerability. Also, environmental factors such as geographic location (both a logistical consideration, and a tactical one – e.g. are you cordoning off and defending an IDP site, holding a town, or protecting civilians in a more diffused area – and what are the different postures required for each), level of urbanization, level of state authority and capacity in that area, level of infrastructures (e.g. roads) and communication (e.g. phone network) etc.

- **Access to Assistance:** Consider the ability of individuals, families and communities to access assistance and interact with outsiders/institutions – consider language barriers, relative freedom of movement, possible social or political barriers to communication with outsiders, etc. (e.g. would vulnerable women - whether in powerful or marginalized families – be able to seek assistance themselves, or would social norms or structures be a barrier to communication with peacekeepers?) … devise assessment (and communication…see Module 4, section 4) strategies to overcome these barriers.

- **Self-Sufficiency**: Many communities have developed self-protection strategies, including early-warning capacities, self-defence capacities, or even strategies as simple as flight when an attack is detected. UN protection assessments and plans should take into account the self-protection strategies and capacities of local communities and seek to support those to the extent possible.

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *Refer to the DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations.*

  ☞ *Refer to children – both boys and girls- as a specific subset of civilians that are particularly vulnerable in times of war. Children face unique threats and protection risks (such as heightened threat of recruitment, abduction and sexual abuse.)*

  ☞ *Remark on the differences in the broad category of civilians (example: the needs of civilians in villages or IDP sites in Haiti are very different from the needs of civilians in villages of IDP sites in South Sudan etc).*

☞ *'Self-Defence" forces have, in some cases, morphed into negative armed actors in their own right. These should be approached with extreme caution.*

10. PRIORITIZING RISKS AND ALLOCATING RESOURCES



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- **A multidimensional response is reflected in the components` individual work plans**. The articulation of roles and responsibilities shall be consistent with those spelled out in the ISF.

- Early warning and response measures are likely to work best when they are well coordinated with the local authorities. Inclusion of local communities in early warning efforts is equally important.

- A number of missions and troop contributors have pointed to a simple but at times overlooked lesson in protection: presence. Projecting mission presence, including through standing military and police patrols and other force deployments, is a measure that has been implemented by all peacekeeping operations, and is one of the most visible and reassuring forms of security that a mission can provide to the local populace. In addition to acting as a deterrent to potential aggressors, it allows mission personnel to build familiarity with the environs and better understand the concerns of the population.

- **The DPKO - OCHA Study concluded that ROE are not a major impediment to UN missions taking robust action to protect civilians,** including the proactive use of deadly

force when necessary (permitted in anticipatory self-defence or to protect civilians where there is a reasonable belief based on credible evidence that an attack or threat is imminent).

- The issue of ROE relates back to two issues: clarity of the CONOPS and political will.

☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *Options to address the gaps.*

- *At mission (operational) level*; Reprioritize objectives/activities; explore mobilization of resources available to external protection actors, where practical; redeploy resources and staff as required (e.g. to areas at risk); mobilize additional resources, such as through the creation of trust funds or groups of friends; training.

- At tactical level: After dominating the operational environment, Battalion, Company and FPU commanders **need to conduct POC risk analysis**. They will receive guidance from the FHQ / SHQ based on the CONOPS, operation orders and directives. However, they have also to prepare their own plans to address the local POC risks which analysis and planning fall under their responsibility. These plans should take into account how other UN and non-UN partners are expected to react under the envisioned circumstances

- *At NYHQ level: i*nform the Security Council and the 5th Committee of the General Assembly about the identified gaps; discuss with T/PCCs in NYHQ the possible removal of national caveats or to inquire the possibility for the contributing countries to bring additional resources; increase targeted training on POC, including on sexual violence and child protection, and the legal obligations of parties to conflict and the peacekeeping mission components themselves, to raise knowledge and awareness in pre-deployment and in-mission training through the integrated mission training centers (IMTC).

- **POC risks must be prioritized** by taking into consideration the relative **PROBABILITY** of attack (based on existing human rights reporting, intelligence and historical analysis) as well as the relative **IMPACT** that the mission can have on each given risk. (e.g. the Protection Clusters in DRC allocated mission POC resources by designating “Must Protect,” “Should Protect,” and “Could Protect” areas based on ongoing analysis of available resources and protection risks).

- **Good planning should incorporate civilian, police and military resources, allows a multidimensional response**, and should focus on the most **LIKELY** scenario, and the **WORST CASE** scenario, based on the analysis of risk, probability and impact.
- Planning processes should **take due consideration of the host Government's willingness and ability to protect civilians** in the face of the most likely and worst case scenarios as identified.



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11. REDUCING THREAT AND VULNERABILITY



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- A military or police force can take measures to reduce vulnerability of the local population and to reduce a threat posed against the same local community. Each area commander shall analyse local POC risks, prioritize them and determine his/her unit capabilities to protect civilians.

e.g **Joint Protection Teams JPTs** are designed to help military outposts—Company Operating Bases—to better understand the socio-political context around them and the threats to civilians. Composed of staff from the offices of Civil Affairs, human rights, political affairs, child protection, public information and sometimes the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) Section (as well as humanitarian agency staff), they are deployed on a temporary basis not only to provide information gathering and analytical support, but also to help design context-specific civil and military measures to protect civilians and liaise with local authorities. Civil Affairs plays a key role in organizing JPTs and in drafting 'protection planning' matrices with other protection partners to assist prioritize the military activities related to POC. The JPTs and joint planning matrices follow on from an established pattern in MONUC of civil–military cooperation and a 'joint protection' concept in operation since at least 2006. **Similar structures are also established in other missions like UNMISS** where Integrated Monitoring Teams (IMTs) were developed as a joint cross-mission mechanism to monitor the disarmament process in Jonglei in March 2012) and **UNAMID** (Sector Joint Protection Groups (SJPGs), Field Protection Teams (FPTs).

- There are other **patrolling techniques** (beyond the firewood patrols) to help protect civilians in areas where they may be exposed to threats. Many missions undertake similar protective activities for example in ensuring that regular patrols route through locations such as rivers where women or children wash clothes, or locations where civilians travel to collect water; or to and from markets and where crops are tended, Such patrolling decisions have been improved in missions such as MONUC where JPTs have allowed for greater information sharing and planning around vulnerability and threat assessments.

- Improving the capability of UN peacekeeping operations to operate at night can be a major factor in improving civilian security.

☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *It is important to balance the distribution of resources in order to develop/maintain the ability to prevent/deter violence, respond quickly to rapid onset*

crises, and implement proactive "operations" which "seize the initiative" (influence/compel) from negative forces.

☞ ***A multidimensional response** is reflected in the components` individual work plans. The articulation of roles and responsibilities shall be consistent with those spelled out in Mission-Wide Protection of Civilians Strategy. (That, in turn, shall be consistent with the ISF.)*

12. SUMMARY OF KEY MESSAGES

☞ ***Note to Instructor:** Outline the main points that have been covered during the session.*

- **POC strategies are drafted at the operational level** and aim to ensure that tactical-level tasks contribute to the mission's POC objectives. POC planning is a tool to anticipate POC risks so it can address them in coordination with other protection actors.
- A coherent protection response requires consultation and coordination with all protection actors (UN and non UN) in order to organize all available protection resources to address protection threats in a proactive, logical way.
- It is very important for the tactical level operators at battalion and FPU level the understanding of a mission POC strategy and how this document impacts on the Military and Police Components revised CONOPS and operation orders and plans. A POC strategy provides the operational level guidance to allow the components HQs to draft plans and orders that will ultimately affect the battalion and FPU levels, included the military observers, military liaison officers and individual police officers.
- The **four phases of the protection response** must be incorporated to the military and police planning processes. The phases relate primarily to Phase II (physical protection) activities. Nevertheless, actors operating primarily in Tier I (Protection through the political process) and III (Protection through the creation of a protective environment) must adjust their activities to reflect changes and escalation of the real time challenges in the mission's area of responsibility.
- A mission that has POC as the main mandated task, should have a military component preparing orders and plans that **place POC at the centre of the planning process and as**

the main tactical goal. As such, tactical orders should reflect an analysis that took into consideration POC local threats, the local population vulnerability and the battalion capabilities to take action (prevent, pre-empt, respond and consolidate).

- Military and police units and individually deployed personnel (MILOBs, IPOs and MLOs) are a very important part of the mission early warning system. Both components normally have a significant number of points of presence in the mission area to cover the entire mission area of operations. The same rationale applies to the information and gathering system.
- At tactical level, any tactical commander, battalion, company of FPU commander but also individually deployed personnel as military observers, military liaison officers and individual police officers must understand the need of managing expectations of the local population.
- In face of the mandate and the mission leadership guidance, tactical level commanders will adopt the appropriate robust posture according to directives issued by higher military and police commanders.
- It is essential that a **permanent and regular threat analysis** be conducted by battalions, companies and FPUs, and individually deployed peacekeepers (teams of MILOBS, IPOs and MLOs). Such assessment can only be effective if the military and police establishes a **trustful relationship with the local leaders** in the area of operation.
- POC risks must be prioritized by taking into consideration the relative PROBABILITY of attack (based on existing human rights reporting, intelligence and historical analysis) as well as the relative IMPACT that the mission can have on each given risk.
- Good planning should incorporate civilian, police and military resources, allow a multidimensional response, and should focus on the most LIKELY scenario, and the WORST CASE scenario, based on the analysis of risk, probability and impact. Each tactical commander, following instructions given by the FHQ and PHQ must prepare its own plans.



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Learning Activity: Mission-specific Group Discussion

Instructor Guidance Notes

This learning activity presents simple questions to be responded by participants organized in working groups. It has the main goal of consolidating the main concepts discussed in the three "Introduction to POC" presentations.

The questions are in general direct and simple and want to trigger the discussion on the general understanding of the POC concepts as well as to foster participants to use the Country and Mission Overview document.

For each field mission, instructors should indicate that some questions and connected pictures are to be responded on the grounds of the Country and Mission Overview document.

DURATION

Part 1 Introduction to POC 1	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.
Part 2 Introduction to POC 2	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.
Part 3 Introduction to POC 3	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.

Part 4	Explanation of the exercise	Group discussion	Group presentations in plenary
Learning Activity	5 min	45 min	50 min

MONUSCO

Protected Persons



Question # 1: Who are the persons to be protected?

Persons to be protected are basically non-combatant civilians, referred to as 'protected persons' in international law who require/need protection from injury and harm during war/conflict. They are vulnerable groups who are likely to be abused during conflict and therefore need to be planned for by protectors. In Congo there are a lot of armed groups. This picture seems to show some of the helpless civilians, particularly women and children who may be at risk and require protection in Congo.

Question # 2: List different "categories" of civilians that need protection

Specific categories of civilians that need protection include women who must be protected from sexual abuse, children and the elderly whose special needs must be taken into account, refugees, internally displaced people, those who have gone missing as a result of conflict, particular groups/tribes who are being targeted as a result of conflict. In DR Congo, the people who need protection are found mainly in the east of the country. It shall be expanded with specific examples from different missions (Country and Mission Overview document).

Question # 3: List and discuss their protection needs

Protected persons have a wide range of needs. These include protection from physical harm/threat to their lives, threats to physical integrity (including sexual violation), threats to freedom and threat to property (including means of livelihood, public facilities such as schools). They will also require shelter, food, medicine, water, legal support, sanitation needs and

clothing. It shall be expanded with specific examples from different missions (Country and Mission Overview document).

Question # 4: Mention two consequences of the failure to protect civilians at the tactical level

If the UN is unable to protect civilians at the tactical level, the local population will loose confidence in the UN and be dissatisfied and disappointed with the organization. This will lead to ill feeling and animosity from local population which will have a rippling effect on key operational matters. Subsequently, information gathering, liaison, key leaders outreach and security (force protection issues) related to base protection, patrolling, observation and other tactical tasks are likely to be negatively affected. In MONUSCO, there have been several instances where the government and local population have blamed the UN force for failing to protect civilians in the face of brutalities and assaults meted out by armed groups. This has led to very negative attitudes to the force at various times and has a compounding effect in the loss of credibility.

Protection Actors



Ideas to be discussed in the plenary session after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 1: Who is this protection actor?

- The picture shows MONUSCO police officers and a humanitarian/public affairs officer in DR Congo. UNPOL in DR Congo is comprised of individual police officers and Formed Police Units.

Question # 2: What other protection actors are part of the mission? List protection actors that are not part of the Mission.

- Some protection actors that are part of MONUSCO: Mission Military and Police Components, Civilian Components (Human Rights, Political Affairs and Civil Affairs amongst others).
- Other protection actors: The Host State Government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UNICEF (UN Children's Fund), NGOs, INGOs, Civil Society Organizations like MSF. OXFAM etc.

Question # 3: Mention the capabilities / roles of the protection actors listed above.

- The capabilities of the various protection actors are:

• The Host State Government always has the primary responsibility for protecting civilians within its borders. This protection should emanate from the full range of state security (military, police, and gendarmerie) and judicial structures. Other organizations that have been mandated by the international community to provide supplementary protection in support of host government protection responsibilities include:

• UN Peacekeepers under POC mandates are authorized by the UN Security Council to support or supplement the protection efforts of host-state institutions in cases where international peace and security is deemed to be at risk.

• UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) staff work in urban areas, host communities and refugee or IDP sites. They attempt to promote or provide legal and physical protection, and minimize the threat of violence to displaced people. They also seek to provide at least a minimum of shelter, food, water and medical care in the immediate aftermath of any refugee exodus.

• OHCHR (Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights) is engaged in monitoring human rights situations on the ground and implementing projects, such as technical training and support in the areas of administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights treaty ratification, and human rights education.

• ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) is the guardian of International Humanitarian Law. The mission of the ICRC is to "…protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles …" (ICRC Protection Policy)

• UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies, advocate for the rights of people in need, promote preparedness and prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions.

• UNICEF (UN Children's Fund) engages in Child Protection activities, preventing and responding to violence, exploitation and abuse. They monitor and report on IHL and human rights violations perpetrated against children in conflict.

• NGOs (non-governmental organizations), INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) and other civil society organizations and many non-state actors are also involved

in the provision of protection related services (humanitarian assistance) the monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses (human rights monitors and advocacy organizations) and the rehabilitation and reform of judicial institutions.

Protection Risks



Ideas to be discussed in the plenary session after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 2: List possible measures to be taken to reduce the local population vulnerability

- Use Joint Protection Teams to carry out an assessment of the situation, to determine existing or potential threat and to enhance preventive and responsive action for the group when necessary. The CLA will be useful in information/intelligence gathering at this stage.

- This should lead to the preparation of an effective patrol plan to monitor the movement. A system of patrols and checkpoints should be put in place for the protection of the movement. The police should be part of this patrolling effort. Mobile Operating Bases may have to be used for this purpose.

- The basic tasks of the MOBs should be to dominate the given area with patrolling; liaise with local communities and community leaders, and obtain a 'pulse' on the exact security situation in the area. . The MOB should conduct day and night patrolling and liaison with village chiefs and local community representatives as well as with any national police and army units within the vicinity.

- Such patrols must be carried out jointly with the FARDC. The patrol may be accompanied by the CLA at all times and make pro-active efforts to talk to local people, and gather information.

- When the group sets up camp or goes into IDP Camps, the police should plan to maintain security in these camps. Military Observers should work with the infantry units to gather information, observe and monitor the area

- MONUSCO Police should work in conjunction to set up joint checkpoints at key areas for the protection of the movement.

- The development of an early warning system also helps reducing vulnerabilities to attacks and should be put in place. MONUSCO peacekeepers (military, police and civilian) should be part of the system, able to observe and communicate on indicators of violence.

- The civilian component, especially the humanitarian component has an important role to play in this scenario. They should make available basic food, water and medicinal needs for the group. This may be difficult to provide in unfriendly terrain. They should make arrangements to provide this both during movement and at stops.

Question # 3: List possible measures to be taken to reduce the threat

- Reducing threats to the civilian population requires solid plan and sound intelligence. In the case of DR Congo, the country is vast and difficult to dominate especially in remote, forested and inaccessible locations. Threats therefore exist in the form of rebel groups who may violently attack civilians in these remote locations. Sometimes even members of the FARDC have been accused of violence against civilians.

- MONUSCO has had to adopt robust military operations to counter the activities of armed groups on certain occasions. However, in view of the vast AOR and the paucity of resources, operations need to be intelligence driven in order to be effective. The force and units at all levels therefore need to intensify their intelligence gathering activities in order to make the best use of their resources

- Deployment of mobile bases in order to expand military presence or pre-empt attacks or acts of violence against the population are also resources used by military units.

- MONUSCO IP and FPU must intensify their presence among the local population in order to contribute to the information gathering effort.

- Local political engagement by civilian, military and police peacekeepers is vital to prevent the threat of violence to civilians. In DR Congo, the international press has reported several incidents of violence for which questions have been asked of the force. It is therefore important for all components to double their efforts to ensure positive results on the issue.

Protection Responses



Ideas to be discussed after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 1: What protection tier is related to the response depicted in the various photos? What phase of protection response seems to be indicated in the picture?

- There are three tiers of protection. These are:

Tier I - Protection through Political Process
Support to political processes (including peace negotiations and agreements), support to the development of governance institutions and the extension of state authority which seek to establish a safe, secure environment where human rights are respected. Conflict management and support to reconciliation (can include local-level conflict resolution, as well as national or regional processes that seek to address post conflict issues and restore confidence and community stability.)

Tier II - Protection from physical violence
Establishing deterrent presence through forward field military and civilian deployments and day and night patrols in vulnerable communities and targeted locations (such as markets or schools). It is also part of this tier taking pro-active actions to reduce the vulnerability of civilians through heightened human rights monitoring, political dialogue, conflict mediation, pressure and engagement with potential aggressors. Other relevant actions to be mentioned are: the establishment of physical defensive positions or cordons, (e.g. around a community or refugee

site) and joint protection teams. As a last resort, responding to violent attacks with all necessary means including, if necessary, the use of force, to protect civilians and stabilize the situation.

Tier III – Establishing a Protective Environnent
Some examples of measures related to this tier:
- Creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
- Promotion and protection of human rights
- Reduction of forcible displacement and creating of conditions suitable for return.
- Reform to the police, judicial and defense sectors of the host country, as well as DDR.
- Mine action activities.

- The picture depicts a MONUSCO troops firing live rounds from a support (mortar/artillery) weapon and it is related to Tier II, physical protection.

The four phases of response are:

Phase I – Prevention (Examples: Patrolling, human rights monitoring, mediation and conflict prevention, key leaders outreach).
Phase II – Pre-emption (Examples: Intensify patrolling, military and police presence, interposition operations, political pressure, human rights monitoring).
Phase III – Response (Examples: Offensive and defensive operations, mitigation of suffering, evacuation of civilians, human rights and humanitarian assistance).
Phase IV – Consolidation (Examples: Mediation between affected communities, human rights investigation, humanitarian assistance, liaison to reestablish ties and readjustment of security).

The picture depicts a Phase III Response – offensive/defensive operations.

Question # 2: Explain why physical protection, if delivered in isolation, is difficult to sustain.

- Physical protection if delivered in isolation is difficult to sustain because an effective strategy for the protection of civilians is based on a three tier structure comprising a political process, protection from physical violence and the creation of a protective environment. These three are linked in such a manner that to provide one without providing the others will not achieve the desired results. A political process is required to get the key parties to a conflict to agree to an end to hostilities and the protection of civilians. Without this overarching framework, there can be no basis for the other two to be effected. Physical protection is derived out of the political process. It derives its legitimacy from that process and is supported by it. The creation of a protective environment runs alongside and takes over after physical protection has ended. It ensures that the gains derived from physical protection are consolidated and prevents a relapse into conflict and violence to civilians. For these reasons, it is difficult to sustain physical protection if it is delivered in isolation.

- Normally physical protection addresses a need which is immediate and requires quick and decisive action to save lives. It does not address causes of the local conflict and it is commonly characterized as a short-term response. A successful physical protection action as a joint response from the Mission and the Government of DRC or conducted by the MONUSCO Military Component in isolation probably will not be sustainable due to the limit logistical capability of military forces. The Military Component needs the presence of other components, particularly mission civilian components (Human rights, Civil Affairs and Political Affairs for

example) and of non-mission partners as UNHCR local representatives to provide food, shelter and water to local population, attacked, displaced or that simply approached UN bases seeking for protection.

Question # 3: Discuss how "intelligence" (information gathering, processing and sharing), "early warning and crisis response" and "expectation management" might be related to the response showed in the picture

Intelligence represents the eyes and ears of any military operation. Intelligence informs us about our enemies/other actors in the theatre of operations, what their strength, disposition, equipment and intentions are. It fashions our response to any perceived situation/threat and without it, we cannot be effective in the protection of civilians or any other venture. Without intelligence, an army operates blindly and does not have a good chance of success.

Early warning and crisis response are closely related to quick and effective responses to threats to or attacks against civilians. An early warning system, like intelligence, alerts the protectors and civilians alike of looming dangers and enables them to respond in good time to such threats. Crisis response is the reaction to an emergency/crisis situation, in this instance, involving danger to civilians. It is closely tied in to intelligence/early warning. Effective intelligence will prevent a response after the incident/abuse of civilians has occurred. Poor early warning will result in the inability to effectively protect civilians.

Expectation management: Any communities in which peacekeepers are deployed expect something from the peacekeepers, basically protection, safety and security. If at any time, this expectation is not met, the community will be disappointed. The UN does not have unlimited resources. Very often, UN troops may be deployed in an area where their resources do permit them to effectively dominate their whole area of responsibility. In such circumstances, it is the duty of the UN, to inform the surrounding community of their capabilities such that the community does not expect them to provide what is beyond this capacity. If the expectation of the community is not thus managed, it will lead to a misconception on the part of the community that the UN force is not doing what they are capable of and result in strained relations with rippling negative effects on the operations of the UN detachment.

UNMISS

Protected Persons



Ideas to be discussed in the plenary session after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 1: Who are the persons to be protected?

Persons to be protected are basically non-combatant civilians, referred to as 'protected persons' in international law who require/need protection from injury and harm during war/conflict. They are vulnerable groups who are likely to be abused during conflict and therefore need to be planned for by protectors. The picture shows people in an IDP camp in South Sudan.

Question # 2: List different "categories" of civilians that need protection

Specific categories of civilians that need protection include women who must be protected from sexual abuse, children and the elderly whose special needs must be taken into account, refugees, internally displaced people, those who have gone missing as a result of conflict, particular groups/tribes who are being targeted as a result of conflict

Question # 3: List and discuss their protection needs

Protected persons have a wide range of needs. These include protection from physical harm/threat to their lives, threats to physical integrity (including sexual violation), threats to freedom and threat to property (including means of livelihood, public facilities such as schools). They will also require shelter, food, medicine, water, legal support, sanitation needs and clothing.

Question # 4: Mention two consequences of the failure to protect civilians at the tactical level

If the UN is unable to protect civilians at the tactical level, the local population will loose confidence in the UN and be dissatisfied and disappointed with the organization. This will lead to ill feeling and animosity from local population which will have a rippling effect on key operational matters. Subsequently, information gathering, liaison, key leaders outreach and security (force protection issues) related to base protection, patrolling, observation and other tactical tasks are likely to be negatively affected.

Protection Actors



Ideas to be discussed in the plenary session after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 1: Who is this protection actor?

- The picture shows a UNMISS police officer in South Sudan. UNPOL in South Sudan is comprised of individual police officers who are responsible to provide advice to and train the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS).

Question # 2: What other protection actors are part of the mission? List protection actors that are not part of the Mission.

- Some protection actors that are part of UNMISS: Mission Military and Police Components, Civilian Components (Human Rights, Political Affairs and Civil Affairs amongst others).
- Other protection actors: The Host State Government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UNICEF (UN Children's Fund), NGOs, INGOs, Civil Society Organizations like the Church etc.

Question # 3: Mention the capabilities / roles of the protection actors listed above.

- The capabilities of the various protection actors are:

• The Host State Government always has the primary responsibility for protecting civilians within its borders. This protection should emanate from the full range of state security (military, police, and gendarmerie) and judicial structures. Other organizations that have been mandated by the international community to provide supplementary protection in support of host government protection responsibilities include:

• UN Peacekeepers under POC mandates are authorized by the UN Security Council to support or supplement the protection efforts of host-state institutions in cases where international peace and security is deemed to be at risk.

• UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) staff work in urban areas, host communities and refugee or IDP sites. They attempt to promote or provide legal and physical protection, and minimize the threat of violence to displaced people. They also seek to provide at least a minimum of shelter, food, water and medical care in the immediate aftermath of any refugee exodus.

• OHCHR (Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights) is engaged in monitoring human rights situations on the ground and implementing projects, such as technical training and support in the areas of administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights treaty ratification, and human rights education.

• ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) is the guardian of International Humanitarian Law. The mission of the ICRC is to "…protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles …" (ICRC Protection Policy)

• UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies, advocate for the rights of people in need, promote preparedness and prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions.

• UNICEF (UN Children's Fund) engages in Child Protection activities, preventing and responding to violence, exploitation and abuse. They monitor and report on IHL and human rights violations perpetrated against children in conflict.

• NGOs (non-governmental organizations), INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) and other civil society organizations and many non-state actors are also involved in the provision of protection related services (humanitarian assistance) the monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses (human rights monitors and advocacy organizations) and the rehabilitation and reform of judicial institutions.

Protection Risks



Ideas to be discussed in the plenary session after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 2: List possible measures to be taken to reduce the local population vulnerability

- One of the best ways to reduce vulnerability is to be present and visible. Military units deployed in the area carry out patrolling and observation, interact with the local population and reach out key local leaders, including the Church.

- Military Liaison Officers are tasked to interact and build confidence with the SPLA (Government of South Sudan)who has the primary responsibility of protecting civilians. MLOs should provide sound and timely advice to DPLA on protection matters, especially when there is a need for military deployment to protect communities or establish interposition between different tribes.

- UNMISS IPOs (individual police officers – UNPOL) are also co-located with SSPS to advice and train on police matters. They can play a role in reducing vulnerability by planning and conducting joint patrols with the SSPS in order to be visible and help creating a more safe and security environment.

- The development of an early warning system also helps reducing vulnerabilities to attacks and should ideally be put in place with local communities. UNMISS peacekeepers (military, police and civilian) should be part of the system, able to observe and communicate on indicators of violence. An UNMISS staff member who becomes aware of credible information warning of an impending threat must report it to the State SOC and JOC immediately as a Flash Report. UNCT members are also requested to provide information on impending threats.

- Inter-ethnical fighting in South Sudan is a sad reality and engagement of local key leaders is a decisive action to reduce vulnerabilities of locals. It serves for several purposes: understand what is happening and protection needs; manage expectations; mediate and negotiate with local leaders; gather information etc.

Question # 3: List possible measures to be taken to reduce the threat

- Reducing threats to the civilian population requires solid plan and sound intelligence. In the case of South Sudan threats in the form of rebel groups exist in several States.

- UNMISS has not adopted military operations to neutralise rebel armed groups. Military units has been tasked whenever necessary to exercise a robust posture in patrolling activities and eventually to show force or support SPLA activities directly related to reduce the threats posed by particular groups. On the other hand, despite having huge areas of operation, military units strive to set area domination and be present and visible to local populations as a way to deter threats.

- Deployment of mobile bases in order to expand military presence or pre-empt attacks or acts of violence against the population are also resources used by military units.

- UNMISS police is always requested to provide advice and assist in the SSPS efforts to establish police presence and some degree of control in certain areas.

- Ethnic tensions, competition over resources, land disputes and grabbing, cattle-raiding, and migration, could also lead to serious inter-communal violence which poses threats to the security of civilians. Local political engagement by civilian, military and police peacekeepers is vital to prevent the threat of intercommunity fighting. In South Sudan the Church is a very important actor that actively participates in the political solution of crisis involving inter-ethnical violence.

Protection Responses



Ideas to be discussed after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 1: What protection tier is related to the response depicted in the photo? What phase of protection response seems to be indicated in the picture?

- There are three tiers of protection. These are:

Tier I - Protection through Political Process

- Support to political processes (including peace negotiations and agreements), support to the development of governance institutions and the extension of state authority which seek to establish a safe, secure environment where human rights are respected. Conflict management and support to reconciliation (can include local-level conflict resolution, as(well as national or regional processes that seek to address post conflict issues and restore confidence and community stability.)

Tier II - Protection from physical violence

- Establishing deterrent presence through forward field military and civilian deployments and day and night patrols in vulnerable communities and targeted locations (such as markets or schools). It is also part of this tier taking pro-active actions to reduce the vulnerability of civilians through heightened human rights monitoring, political dialogue, conflict mediation, pressure and engagement with potential aggressors. Other relevant actions to be mentioned are: the establishment of physical defensive positions or cordons, (e.g. around a community or refugee site) and joint protection teams. As a last resort, responding to violent attacks with all necessary means including, if necessary, the use of force, to protect civilians and stabilize the situation.

Tier III – Establishing a Protective Environnent

Some examples of measures related to this tier:

- Creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
- Promotion and protection of human rights
- Reduction of forcible displacement and creating of conditions suitable for return.
- Reform to the police, judicial and defense sectors of the host country, as well as DDR.
- Mine action activities.

The four phases of response are:

Phase I – Prevention (Examples: Patrolling, human rights monitoring, mediation and conflict prevention, key leaders outreach).
Phase II – Pre-emption (Examples: Intensify patrolling, military and police presence, interposition operations, political pressure, human rights monitoring).
Phase III – Response (Examples: Offensive and defensive operations, mitigation of suffering, evacuation of civilians, human rights and humanitarian assistance).
Phase IV – Consolidation (Examples: Mediation between affected communities, human rights investigation, humanitarian assistance, liaison to reestablish ties and readjustment of security).

- All the four phases should be integrated into the military contingent planning process. The existing constrains (mobility, communications, surveillance etc) indicate the essentiality of HUMINT as the main source of intelligence with consequent need to interact with communities, reach out key local leaders and cooperate with other deployed protection actors.

- The picture seems to depict a mobile operating base deployment and it is related to Tier II, physical protection. Photography not always permits precise idea of an event but it could be Phase II (Pre-emption) or Phase III (Response).

Question # 2: Explain why physical protection, if delivered in isolation, is difficult to sustain.

- Physical protection if delivered in isolation is difficult to sustain because an effective strategy for the protection of civilians is based on a three tier structure comprising a political process, protection from physical violence and the creation of a protective environment. These three are linked in such a manner that to provide one without providing the others will not achieve the desired results. A political process is required to get the key parties to a conflict to agree to an end to hostilities and the protection of civilians. Without this overarching framework, there can be no basis for the other two to be effected. Physical protection is derived out of the political process. It derives its legitimacy from that process and is supported by it. The creation of a protective environment runs alongside and takes over after physical protection has ended. It ensures that the gains derived from physical protection are consolidated and prevents a relapse into conflict and violence to civilians. For these reasons, it is difficult to sustain physical protection if it is delivered in isolation.

- Normally physical protection addresses a need which is immediate and requires quick and decisive action to save lives. It does not address causes of the local conflict and it is commonly characterized as a short-term response. A successful physical protection action as a joint response from the Mission and the Government of South Sudan or conducted by the UNMISS Military Component in isolation probably will not be sustainable due to the limit logistical capability of military forces. The Military Component needs the presence of other components, particularly mission civilian components (Human rights, Civil Affairs and Political Affairs for example) and of non-mission partners as UNHCR local representatives to provide food, shelter and water to local population, attacked, displaced or that simply approached UN bases seeking for protection.

Question # 3: Discuss how "intelligence" (information gathering, processing and sharing), "early warning and crisis response" and "expectation management" might be related to the response showed in the picture

Intelligence represents the eyes and ears of any military and police operation. Intelligence informs us about negative forces / spoilers /other actors in the theatre of operations, what their strength, disposition, equipment and intentions are. It fashions our response to any perceived situation/threat and without it, we cannot be effective in the protection of civilians or any other venture. Without intelligence, units and teams of MILOBs or IPOs operate blindly and do not have a good chance of success. In the picture we see a mobile operating base deployed. The idea here is to expand the military presence and cover more ground by deploying temporary forces. The area of operations is huge and this an important measure to be present and know what is happening. In summary the MOB permits the collection and processing of information, interaction with local leaders and population as well as with other mission and non-mission protection actors. Only understanding the operational environment it is possible to plan and conduct successful POC.

Early warning and crisis response are closely related to quick and effective responses to threats to or attacks against civilians. An early warning system, like intelligence, alerts the protectors

and civilians alike of looming dangers and enables them to respond in good time to such threats. Crisis response is the reaction to an emergency/crisis situation, in this instance, involving danger to civilians. It is closely tied in to intelligence/early warning. Effective intelligence will prevent a response after the incident/abuse of civilians has occurred. Poor early warning will result in the inability to effectively protect civilians. The MOB will surely interact with the local early warning system focal points established by the mission (remember that probably its higher military command is already part of it). The MOB`s capacity to quick react and respond to POC incidents will be obviously related to the existence of an early warning and crisis response system.

Expectation management: Any communities in which peacekeepers are deployed expect something from the peacekeepers, basically protection, safety and security. If at any time, this expectation is not met, the community will be disappointed. The UN does not have unlimited resources. Very often, UN troops may be deployed in an area where their resources do permit them to effectively dominate their whole area of responsibility. In such circumstances, it is the duty of the UN, to inform the surrounding community of their capabilities such that the community does not expect them to provide what is beyond this capacity. If the expectation of the community is not thus managed, it will lead to a misconception on the part of the community that the UN force is not doing what they are capable of and result in strained relations with rippling negative effects on the operations of the UN detachment. The presence of a new military unit deployed in the area certainly raises expectations amongst the local population. MOB Commander must instruct his/her staff on how to communicate to the local population and key local leaders the force capacity to protect the civilians in the region.

UNOCI

Protected Persons



Question # 1: Who are the persons to be protected?

Persons to be protected are basically non-combatant civilians, referred to as 'protected persons' in international law who require/need protection from injury and harm during war/conflict. They are vulnerable groups who are likely to be abused during conflict and therefore need to be planned for by protectors. In La Cote d'Ivoire, the population was divided broadly along tribal lines with the groups targeting each other. The picture seems to depict some refugees or displaced persons moving from one place to another. La Cote d'Ivoire, people had to move frequently from one location to the other to avoid flare ups of violence that was so common at the time. These kinds of people required protection.

Question # 2: List different "categories" of civilians that need protection

Specific categories of civilians that need protection include women who must be protected from sexual abuse, children and the elderly whose special needs must be taken into account, refugees, internally displaced people, those who have gone missing as a result of conflict, particular groups/tribes who are being targeted as a result of conflict. In La Cote d'Ivoire, the violence was widespread in both cities and the countryside. Civilians who needed protection included people from tribes other than the tribe of the aggressors, women, children and migrants. It shall be expanded with specific examples from different missions (Country and Mission Overview document).

Question # 3: List and discuss their protection needs

Protected persons have a wide range of needs. These include protection from physical harm/threat to their lives, threats to physical integrity (including sexual violation), threats to freedom and threat to property (including means of livelihood, public facilities such as schools). They will also require shelter, food, medicine, water, legal support, sanitation needs and clothing. It shall be expanded with specific examples from different missions (Country and Mission Overview document).

Question # 4: Mention two consequences of the failure to protect civilians at the tactical level

If the UN is unable to protect civilians at the tactical level, the local population will loose confidence in the UN and be dissatisfied and disappointed with the organization. This will lead to ill feeling and animosity from local population which will have a rippling effect on key operational matters. Subsequently, information gathering, liaison, key leaders outreach and security (force protection issues) related to base protection, patrolling, observation and other tactical tasks are likely to be negatively affected. In UNOCI, the failure to protect civilians after the elections left many unarmed civilians dead and wounded.

Protection Actors



Ideas to be discussed in the plenary session after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 1: Who is this protection actor?

- The picture shows UNOCI police officers (FPU/UNPOL). UNPOL in Cote d'Ivoire is comprised of individual police officers and Formed Police Units.

Question # 2: What other protection actors are part of the mission? List protection actors that are not part of the Mission.

- Some protection actors that are part of MONUSCO: Mission Military and Police Components, Civilian Components (Human Rights, Political Affairs and Civil Affairs amongst others).
- Other protection actors: The Host State Government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UNICEF (UN Children's Fund), NGOs, INGOs, Civil Society Organizations like MSF. OXFAM etc.

Question # 3: Mention the capabilities / roles of the protection actors listed above.

- The capabilities of the various protection actors are:

• The Host State Government always has the primary responsibility for protecting civilians within its borders. This protection should emanate from the full range of state security (military, police, and gendarmerie) and judicial structures. Other organizations that have been mandated by the international community to provide supplementary protection in support of host government protection responsibilities include:

• UN Peacekeepers under POC mandates are authorized by the UN Security Council to support or supplement the protection efforts of host-state institutions in cases where international peace and security is deemed to be at risk.

• UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) staff work in urban areas, host communities and refugee or IDP sites. They attempt to promote or provide legal and physical protection, and minimize the threat of violence to displaced people. They also seek to provide at least a minimum of shelter, food, water and medical care in the immediate aftermath of any refugee exodus.

• OHCHR (Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights) is engaged in monitoring human rights situations on the ground and implementing projects, such as technical training and support in the areas of administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights treaty ratification, and human rights education.

• ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) is the guardian of International Humanitarian Law. The mission of the ICRC is to "…protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles …" (ICRC Protection Policy)

• UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies, advocate for the rights of people in need, promote preparedness and prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions.

• UNICEF (UN Children's Fund) engages in Child Protection activities, preventing and responding to violence, exploitation and abuse. They monitor and report on IHL and human rights violations perpetrated against children in conflict.

• NGOs (non-governmental organizations), INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) and other civil society organizations and many non-state actors are also involved

in the provision of protection related services (humanitarian assistance) the monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses (human rights monitors and advocacy organizations) and the rehabilitation and reform of judicial institutions.

Protection Risks



Ideas to be discussed in the plenary session after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 2: List possible measures to be taken to reduce the local population vulnerability

- The military and police must work closely with humanitarian agencies, particularly in relation to areas of tensions and of return of displaced persons, to collect information on and identify potential threats against the civilian population

- Identify the potential threats to civilians with particular reference in UNOCI to:
  - Intercommunal and intra-communal violence
  - Violence by national state security and defence forces, affiliated entities and non-state armed groups
  - Criminal violence by armed groups that pose a public security threat
  - Politically motivated violence

- Gather reliable information on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law; bring them to the attention of the Ivorian authorities and relevant international organisations as appropriate

- Monitor and report on violations and abuses against vulnerable populations, particularly children in line with resolution 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009) and 1998 (2011) and contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses

Question # 3: List possible measures to be taken to reduce the threat

- The Implementation Matrix to reduce the possibility of violence against civilians is based on four phases of action: preparing for risk in day-to-day activities, responding to heightened risk through pre-emptive measures, responding to actual threats of physical violence, and stabilizing the situation after a crisis has occurred. In each phase the civilian, police and military components of the mission must have a clear understanding of how they should act to implement the POC mandate. A central part of the strategy rests on establishing effective coordination structures with both national and international actors to ensure the regular and timely exchange of information and analysis to ensure that there is effective preventive action and rapid response.

- Determine whether or not hostile intent is intended and act pre-emptively to reduce threats. This determination must be done by the on-scene commander based on his or her professional judgement on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:

- the capability and preparedness of the threat;
- the available evidence which indicates an intention to attack; and
- historical precedents within the Mission's Area of Responsibility (AOR), depicting patterns of behaviour exhibited by parties to the conflict which may require the application of a worst case scenario.

Protection Responses



Ideas to be discussed after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 1: What protection tier is related to the response depicted in the picture? What phase of protection response seems to be indicated in the picture?

- There are three tiers of protection. These are:

Tier I - Protection through Political Process
Support to political processes (including peace negotiations and agreements), support to the development of governance institutions and the extension of state authority which seeks to establish a safe, secure environment where human rights are respected. Conflict management and support to reconciliation (can include local-level conflict resolution, as well as national or regional processes that seek to address post conflict issues and restore confidence and community stability.)

Tier II - Protection from physical violence
Establishing deterrent presence through forward field military and civilian deployments and day and night patrols in vulnerable communities and targeted locations (such as markets or schools). It is also part of this tier taking pro-active actions to reduce the vulnerability of civilians through heightened human rights monitoring, political dialogue, conflict mediation, pressure and engagement with potential aggressors. Other relevant actions to be mentioned are: the establishment of physical defensive positions or cordons, (e.g. around a community or refugee site) and joint protection teams. As a last resort, responding to violent attacks with all necessary means including, if necessary, the use of force, to protect civilians and stabilize the situation.

Tier III – Establishing a Protective Environnent
Some examples of measures related to this tier:
- Creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
- Promotion and protection of human rights
- Reduction of forcible displacement and creating of conditions suitable for return.
- Reform to the police, judicial and defense sectors of the host country, as well as DDR.
- Mine action activities.

- The picture depicts a UNOCI troops deploying for offensive operations in support of the mandate. Such action is related to Tier II, physical protection.

<u>The four phases of response are:</u>

Phase I – Prevention (Examples: Patrolling, human rights monitoring, mediation and conflict prevention, key leaders outreach).
Phase II – Pre-emption (Examples: Intensify patrolling, military and police presence, interposition operations, political pressure, human rights monitoring).
Phase III – Response (Examples: Offensive and defensive operations, mitigation of suffering, evacuation of civilians, human rights and humanitarian assistance).
Phase IV – Consolidation (Examples: Mediation between affected communities, human rights investigation, humanitarian assistance, liaison to reestablish ties and readjustment of security).

The picture depicts a Phase III Response – offensive operations.

<u>Question # 2: Explain why physical protection, if delivered in isolation, is difficult to sustain.</u>

- Physical protection if delivered in isolation is difficult to sustain because an effective strategy for the protection of civilians is based on a three tier structure comprising a political process, protection from physical violence and the creation of a protective environment. These three are linked in such a manner that to provide one without providing the others will not achieve the desired results. A political process is required to get the key parties to a conflict to agree to an end to hostilities and the protection of civilians. Without this overarching framework, there can

be no basis for the other two to be effected. Physical protection is derived out of the political process. It derives its legitimacy from that process and is supported by it. The creation of a protective environment runs alongside and takes over after physical protection has ended. It ensures that the gains derived from physical protection are consolidated and prevents a relapse into conflict and violence to civilians. For these reasons, it is difficult to sustain physical protection if it is delivered in isolation.

- Normally physical protection addresses a need which is immediate and requires quick and decisive action to save lives. It does not address causes of the local conflict and it is commonly characterized as a short-term response. A successful physical protection action as a joint response from the Mission and the Government of South Sudan or conducted by the UNMISS Military Component in isolation probably will not be sustainable due to the limit logistical capability of military forces. The Military Component needs the presence of other components, particularly mission civilian components (Human rights, Civil Affairs and Political Affairs for example) and of non-mission partners as UNHCR local representatives to provide food, shelter and water to local population, attacked, displaced or that simply approached UN bases seeking for protection.

Question # 3: Discuss how "intelligence" (information gathering, processing and sharing), "early warning and crisis response" and "expectation management" might be related to the response showed in the picture

Intelligence represents the eyes and ears of any military operation. Intelligence informs us about our enemies/other actors in the theatre of operations, what their strength, disposition, equipment and intentions are. It fashions our response to any perceived situation/threat and without it, we cannot be effective in the protection of civilians or any other venture. Without intelligence, an army operates blindly and does not have a good chance of success.

Early warning and crisis response are closely related to quick and effective responses to threats to or attacks against civilians. An early warning system, like intelligence, alerts the protectors and civilians alike of looming dangers and enables them to respond in good time to such threats. Crisis response is the reaction to an emergency/crisis situation, in this instance, involving danger to civilians. It is closely tied in to intelligence/early warning. Effective intelligence will prevent a response after the incident/abuse of civilians has occurred. Poor early warning will result in the inability to effectively protect civilians.

Expectation management: Any communities in which peacekeepers are deployed expect something from the peacekeepers, basically protection, safety and security. If at any time, this expectation is not met, the community will be disappointed. The UN does not have unlimited resources. Very often, UN troops may be deployed in an area where their resources do permit them to effectively dominate their whole area of responsibility. In such circumstances, it is the duty of the UN, to inform the surrounding community of their capabilities such that the community does not expect them to provide what is beyond this capacity. If the expectation of the community is not thus managed, it will lead to a misconception on the part of the community that the UN force is not doing what they are capable of and result in strained relations with rippling negative effects on the operations of the UN detachment.

UNAMID

Protected Persons



Ideas to be discussed after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 1: Who are the persons to be protected?

Persons to be protected are basically non-combatant civilians, referred to as 'protected persons' in international law who require/need protection from injury and harm during war/conflict. They are vulnerable groups who are likely to be abused during conflict and therefore need to be planned for by protectors. The picture shows women and children walking to a village in Darfur.

Question # 2: List different "categories" of civilians that need protection

Specific categories of civilians that need protection include women who must be protected from sexual abuse, children and the elderly whose special needs must be taken into account, refugees, internally displaced people, those who have gone missing as a result of conflict, particular groups/tribes who are being targeted as a result of conflict.

Question # 3: List and discuss their protection needs

Protected persons have a wide range of needs. These include protection from physical harm/threat to their lives, threats to physical integrity (including sexual violation), threats to freedom and threat to property (including means of livelihood, public facilities such as schools). They will also require shelter, food, medicine, water, legal support, sanitation needs and clothing.

Question # 4: Mention two consequences of the failure to protect civilians at the tactical level

If the UN is unable to protect civilians at the tactical level, the local population will loose confidence in the UN and be dissatisfied and disappointed with the organization. This will lead to ill feeling and animosity from local population which will have a rippling effect on key operational matters. Subsequently, information gathering, liaison, key leaders outreach and security (force protection issues) related to base protection, patrolling, observation and other tactical tasks are likely to be negatively affected.

Protection Actors



Ideas to be discussed in the plenary session after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 1: Who is this protection actor?

- The picture shows UNAMID military, police and civilian peacekeepers. They represent the Military, Police and Civilian Components, including Human Rights, Political Affairs, Civil Affairs and others.

Question # 2: What other protection actors are part of the mission? List protection actors that are not part of the Mission.

- Some protection actors that are part of UNAMID: Mission Military and Police Components, Civilian Components (Human Rights, Political Affairs, Humanitarian Liaison, Gender Office and Civil Affairs amongst others).
- Other protection actors: The Host State Government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UNICEF (UN Children's Fund), NGOs, INGOs, Civil Society Organizations like the Church etc.

Question # 3: Mention the capabilities / roles of the protection actors listed above.

- The capabilities of the various protection actors are:

• The Host State Government always has the primary responsibility for protecting civilians within its borders. This protection should emanate from the full range of state security (military, police, and gendarmerie) and judicial structures. Other organizations that have been mandated by the international community to provide supplementary protection in support of host government protection responsibilities include:

• UN Peacekeepers under POC mandates are authorized by the UN Security Council to support or supplement the protection efforts of host-state institutions in cases where international peace and security is deemed to be at risk.

• UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) staff work in urban areas, host communities and refugee or IDP sites. They attempt to promote or provide legal and physical protection, and minimize the threat of violence to displaced people. They also seek to provide at least a minimum of shelter, food, water and medical care in the immediate aftermath of any refugee exodus.

• OHCHR (Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights) is engaged in monitoring human rights situations on the ground and implementing projects, such as technical training and support in the areas of administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights treaty ratification, and human rights education.

• ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) is the guardian of International Humanitarian Law. The mission of the ICRC is to "…protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles …" (ICRC Protection Policy)

• UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies, advocate for the rights of people in need, promote preparedness and prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions.

• UNICEF (UN Children's Fund) engages in Child Protection activities, preventing and responding to violence, exploitation and abuse. They monitor and report on IHL and human rights violations perpetrated against children in conflict.

• NGOs (non-governmental organizations), INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) and other civil society organizations and many non-state actors are also involved in the provision of protection related services (humanitarian assistance) the monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses (human rights monitors and advocacy organizations) and the rehabilitation and reform of judicial institutions.

Protection Risks



Ideas to be discussed after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 2: List possible measures to be taken to reduce the local population vulnerability

- Water is a scarce resource in Darfur and it might generate violence and disputes besides presenting and eventual opportunity to have people gathered and perpetrate violence. Surveillance and protection of water points might be an adequate measure to be taken to reduce the risk of violence against civilians. Escorting of women who are going to fetch water outside IDP camps may be also the right move for military units to protect civilians.

- One of the best ways to reduce vulnerability is to be present and visible. Military units deployed in the area carry out patrolling and observation, interact with the local population and reach out key local leaders.

- Addressing the challenges of protection against physical violence requires enhanced military presence at areas where civilians are most at risk of violence. This includes a permanent presence by both the military and Formed Police Units (FPUs) at IDP camps, and increased and extensive patrolling on main axes and known risk areas.

- In addition, targeted patrols for specific activities such as firewood collection, market activities, and grass cutting are required for immediate-term protection and an effective way to reduce the vulnerability of locals. A key factor, however, is deterrence, which is achieved through developing close community relationships that provide early warning, by maintaining a robust posture, and using proportional force when required, in accordance with the Mission's mandate.

- Sector Joint Protection Groups comprised of civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, human rights, child protection, military, police, and other officers, as needed, are being established at the Sector-level to carry out fact-finding missions to assess and report on protection risks, challenges. The mission representatives at tactical level need to understand the environment and to be capable to assess risks and reduce vulnerabilities.

Question # 3: List possible measures to be taken to reduce the threat

- UNAMID is confronted with numerous logistical and security constraints as it must operate in unforgiving terrain and in a complex and often hostile political environment. The Mission also faces shortfalls in critical transport, equipment, infrastructure and aviation assets.

- The Military component carries out long-range patrols and establishes, when necessary Temporary Forward Operating Bases (TFOBs), to show force and deter targeted attacks against civilians. Deployment of mobile bases in order to expand military presence or pre-empt attacks or acts of violence against the population are also resources used by military units. These actions are extremely important to mitigate the risks of violence, particularly sexual violence.

- UNAMID has not adopted full military operations to neutralise rebel armed groups. Military units has been tasked whenever necessary to exercise a robust posture in patrolling activities and eventually to show to reduce the threats posed by particular armed groups. On the other hand, despite having huge areas of operation, military units strive to set area domination and be present and visible to local populations as a way to deter threats.

- UNAMID Police Component is mandated to build the capacity of national police but also to improve security, especially by patrolling IDP camps and establishing community policing. FPUs are tasked to conduct protection activities inside IDP camps while military units are in charge of external security. Cooperation with humanitarian partners has been enhanced and joint long range patrols are conducted with military, police and humanitarian representatives. These measures produce a calming effect and help reducing the vulnerability of local population in Darfur.

Protection Responses



Ideas to be discussed after deliberation by the working groups:

Question # 1: What protection tier is related to the response depicted in the photo? What phase of protection response seems to be indicated in the picture?

- There are three tiers of protection. These are:

Tier I - Protection through Political Process

- Support to political processes (including peace negotiations and agreements), support to the development of governance institutions and the extension of state authority which seek to establish a safe, secure environment where human rights are respected. Conflict management and support to reconciliation (can include local-level conflict resolution, as(well as national or regional processes that seek to address post conflict issues and restore confidence and community stability.)

Tier II - Protection from physical violence

- Establishing deterrent presence through forward field military and civilian deployments and day and night patrols in vulnerable communities and targeted locations (such as markets or schools). It is also part of this tier taking pro-active actions to reduce the vulnerability of civilians through heightened human rights monitoring, political dialogue, conflict mediation, pressure and engagement with potential aggressors. Other relevant actions to be mentioned are: the establishment of physical defensive positions or cordons, (e.g. around a community or refugee site) and joint protection teams. As a last resort, responding to violent attacks with all necessary means including, if necessary, the use of force, to protect civilians and stabilize the situation.

Tier III – Establishing a Protective Environnent

Some examples of measures related to this tier:

- Creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
- Promotion and protection of human rights
- Reduction of forcible displacement and creating of conditions suitable for return.
- Reform to the police, judicial and defense sectors of the host country, as well as DDR.
- Mine action activities.

The four phases of response are:

Phase I – Prevention (Examples: Patrolling, human rights monitoring, mediation and conflict prevention, key leaders outreach).
Phase II – Pre-emption (Examples: Intensify patrolling, military and police presence, interposition operations, political pressure, human rights monitoring).
Phase III – Response (Examples: Offensive and defensive operations, mitigation of suffering, evacuation of civilians, human rights and humanitarian assistance).
Phase IV – Consolidation (Examples: Mediation between affected communities, human rights investigation, humanitarian assistance, liaison to reestablish ties and readjustment of security).

- All the four phases should be integrated into the military contingent planning process. The existing constrains (mobility, communications, surveillance etc) indicate the essentiality of HUMINT as the main source of intelligence with consequent need to interact with communities, reach out key local leaders and cooperate with other deployed protection actors.

- The picture seems to depict a patrol escorting vulnerable civilians in Darfur. Photography not always permits precise idea of an event but it could be Phase I (Prevention), Phase II (Pre-emption) or Phase III (Response). It would be always desirable that peacekeepers could prioritize phases I and II but it heavily depends on sound intelligence so units can anticipate and prevent or pre-empt the threat.

Question # 2: Explain why physical protection, if delivered in isolation, is difficult to sustain.

- Physical protection if delivered in isolation is difficult to sustain because an effective strategy for the protection of civilians is based on a three tier structure comprising a political process, protection from physical violence and the creation of a protective environment. These three are linked in such a manner that to provide one without providing the others will not achieve the desired results. A political process is required to get the key parties to a conflict to agree to an end to hostilities and the protection of civilians. Without this overarching framework, there can be no basis for the other two to be effected. Physical protection is derived out of the political process. It derives its legitimacy from that process and is supported by it. The creation of a protective environment runs alongside and takes over after physical protection has ended. It ensures that the gains derived from physical protection are consolidated and prevents a relapse into conflict and violence to civilians. For these reasons, it is difficult to sustain physical protection if it is delivered in isolation.

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Early warning and crisis response are closely related to quick and effective responses to threats to or attacks against civilians. An early warning system, like intelligence, alerts the protectors and civilians alike of looming dangers and enables them to respond in good time to such threats. Crisis response is the reaction to an emergency/crisis situation, in this instance, involving danger to civilians. It is closely tied in to intelligence/early warning. Effective intelligence will prevent a response after the incident/abuse of civilians has occurred. Poor early warning will result in the inability to effectively protect civilians. In the case of the picture a good early warning system would be of great value for the escort to be prepare to adequately respond to an attack against the protected locals.

Expectation management: Any communities in which peacekeepers are deployed expect something from the peacekeepers, basically protection, safety and security. If at any time, this expectation is not met, the community will be disappointed. The UN does not have unlimited resources. Very often, UN troops may be deployed in an area where their resources do permit them to effectively dominate their whole area of responsibility. In such circumstances, it is the duty of the UN, to inform the surrounding community of their capabilities such that the community does not expect them to provide what is beyond this capacity. If the expectation of the community is not thus managed, it will lead to a misconception on the part of the community that the UN force is not doing what they are capable of and result in strained relations with rippling negative effects on the operations of the UN detachment. Concerning the picture and the escort being carried out to protect the movement of civilians, it is necessary to clarify what the protection capabilities are to be offered by the military to the local leaders and to the protected persons, including before and after the fulfillment of the task when the locals might be alone at their destiny.