Module 4 - UNOCI

UNOCI
Country and Mission Overview

Country overview

1. Côte d'Ivoire is a West Africa coastal country, which borders with Liberia and Guinea to the east, Burkina Faso and Mali to the north and Ghana to the west. Its principal city is Abidjan, which is the economic and de facto political capital, although the official capital city is Yamoussoukro. Côte d'Ivoire has a tropical climate in the south, but is arid in the north. **Its population is around 20 million**. The country has more than 60 ethnic groups, usually classified into five principal divisions. **There are also more than five million non-Ivorian Africans living in Côte d'Ivoire,** principally from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Benin, Senegal, Liberia, and Mauritania. The official language is French and there are also more than 60 native dialects, of which Dioula is the most widely spoken.

2. Agriculture accounts for around a quarter of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and the main products produced are coffee, cocoa beans, bananas, palm kernels, corn, rice, manioc (tapioca), sweet potatoes, sugar, cotton, rubber, timber. Oil was discovered off the coast in the late 1970s and gold mining began in the early 1990s. At the time of Côte d'Ivoire's independence, in 1960, the country was French West Africa's most prosperous. The economy maintained an annual growth rate of nearly 10 per cent, for two decades, the highest of Africa's non-oil-exporting countries. Its prosperity and political stability attracted a large number of foreign workers and this influx became a source of some resentment amongst sections of the native population, particularly in relation to land rights.

3. Côte d'Ivoire's first President was Félix Houphouet-Boigny, who ruled a one-party state until 1993. The country went through an economic crisis in the 1980s, leading to a period of political and social turmoil. Since the end of Houphouët-Boigny's rule, the country has experienced one coup d'état, in 1999, and a civil war, which broke out in 2002. Repeated attempts were made to mediate an end to this conflict and the security situation did improve sufficiently to allow elections to take place in 2010. However, these were followed by a political crisis, resulting in an upsurge of violence which led to at least 3,000 deaths and displaced up to a million people from their homes. **This only finally ended when the winner of the election, Alassane Outtara, was inaugurated as Côte d'Ivoire's new President on 21 May 2011**.

4. President Outtara has created a new national army, the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), which merged the old national army, loyal to the previous president, with the rebel group that had overthrown him. He also announced plans for a national programme of disarming and demobilizing armed groups, although progress to date has been slow. Security has improved dramatically since the election crisis, although the situation remains tense in the west of the country, close to the border with Liberia, where thousands of people remain displaced from their homes. Nevertheless the root causes of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire — land-related issues, unreformed security forces, impunity, and lack of reconciliation and political dialogue — need to be tackled urgently and in a transparent manner. **The fragility of the situation there was underlined in June 2012 when an ambush killed seven UN peacekeepers.**

Mission structure and organization

5. The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was established by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in its resolution 1528, in April 2004, which having determined that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire posed a threat to international peace and security in the region, **and acting under Chapter VII, also authorized UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate.**. It replaced the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), a small political mission, mandated to facilitate the implementation of peace agreement signed the previous year. UNOCI was initially established for a 12 month period. Its mandate was subsequently extended on several occasions and the UNSC has also reviewed and changed the authorized strength of UNOCI, depending on the situation in

the country and the needs of the mission. The UNSC has passed the following Resolutions concerning UNOCI : 1942 of 29 September 2010, 1951 of 24 November 2010, 1962 of 20 December 2010, 1967 of 19 January 2011 and 1992 of 30 June 2011. Following the 2010 Presidential election and the ensuing political crisis in (discussed further below) UNOCI has remained on the ground to support the new Ivorian Government.

ONUCI Facts and Figures

Initial authorization (4 April 2004 - 23 June 2005)

- 6,910 total uniformed personnel, including
  - 6,240 troops;
  - 200 military observers;
  - 120 staff officers;
  - 350 police officers.

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Current strength (31 January 2013)

- 11,018 total uniformed personnel including
  - 9,361 troops; (12 Battalions)
  - 195 military observer;
  - 1,462 police (including formed units)
- 400 international civilian personnel*
- 758 local staff*
- 290 United Nations Volunteers

Parties and conflict dynamic

6. Côte d'Ivoire was badly hit the world recession of the early 1980s, which caused a slump in demand for its agricultural exports. A local drought and a glut in timber production compounded these problems and the country's external debt increased threefold. Levels of poverty soared and crime rose dramatically in Abidjan. In 1990, hundreds of civil servants went on strike, joined by students protesting institutional corruption. The unrest forced the government to support multi-party democracy.

7. Laurent Gbagbo, a history professor and trade unionist, who had been imprisoned in the 1970s for 'subversive teaching' and 'fomenting insecurity' founded the Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivorian Popular Front, FPI) political party to run against Houphouët-Boigny in the 1990 elections. Houphouët-Boigny won in a landslide, but Gbagbo won a seat in the National Assembly one month later. Houphouët-Boigny appointed a new prime minister Alassane Ouattara, an economist and former official at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Central Bank of West African States. Gbagbo began to publicly denounce the 'foreigners' leading the government, a slur which was mainly aimed at Ouattara, whose father was rumored to have been born in Burkina Faso, where he spent much of his childhood. In March 1992, Gbagbo was sentenced to two years imprisonment following his arrest for leading large student protests against the government. Gbagbo apparently blamed Ouattara for the crackdown and arrest, which deepened an animosity between the two.

8. Houphouët-Boigny became increasingly feeble and died in office in 1993. He was succeeded by Henri Konan Bédié who went on to win a landslide re-election, against a fragmented and disorganized opposition, in October 1995. The economic outlook improved, at least superficially, with decreasing inflation and an attempt to reduce foreign debt. Bédié also tightened his hold over political life, jailing several hundred opposition supporters and excluding many potential opponents from the army. Unlike Houphouët-Boigny, who was very careful in avoiding any ethnic conflict and left access to administrative positions open to immigrants from neighbouring countries, Bedié emphasized the concept of 'Ivority' (French: *Ivoirité*) and overtly stirred up xenophobia against Muslim northerners, the power based of Ouattara, his main rival. As these migrant workers by now composed over a

quarter of the Ivoirian population, this policy led to an increasingly strained relationship between various ethnic groups.

9. In late 1999, a group of dissatisfied officers staged a military coup, putting General Robert Guéï in power. A new constitution was drafted and ratified by the population in the summer of 2000. It retained clauses that underscored national divisions between north and south and Christians and Muslims, and established stricter eligibility requirements for contesting political office, including that both parents of anyone wishing to run for president must be born in Cote d'Ivoire. This effectively disbarred Ouattara from the presidential election, of the same year.

10. General Guéï had also appointed a new Supreme Court, whose judges disqualified all of the candidates from the two main political parties. This enabled Laurent Gbagbo to emerge as the main challenger to the military government. When early polling results showed Gbagbo in the lead, Guéï stopped the process, claiming polling fraud, disbanded the election commission, and declared himself the winner. Gbagbo supporters took to the streets of Abidjan and a bloody fight followed as crowds attacked the guards protecting the presidential palace. Many gendarmes and soldiers deserted from the government side, forcing Guéï to flee. Gbagbo was declared President. However, the other political parties whose leaders had been disbarred from the poll then staged protests calling for new elections. More violence erupted in which hundreds were killed before Ouattara called for peace and recognized the Gbagbo presidency.

11. On 19 September 2002, government buildings and military and security facilities were simultaneously attacked in Abidjan, Bouake, and Korhogo. The government soon crushed the revolt in Abidjan, although the attacks resulted in the deaths of Minister of Interior Emile Boga Doudou and several high-ranking military officers. General Guéï was also killed under still-unclear circumstances. The government claimed that he had led a coup attempt, and state TV showed pictures of his dead body in the street. Others stated that he and fifteen others had been murdered at his home and his body had been moved to the streets to incriminate him. Ouattara took refuge in the French embassy when his home was attacked. President Gbagbo, who had been abroad at the time, cut short his trip and, on his return, stated that some of the rebels were hiding in the shanty towns where foreign migrant workers lived. Gendarmes and vigilantes bulldozed and burned homes, attacking residents and displacing some 12,000 people.

12. The rebel group, led by Guillaume Soro and calling itself the **Patriotic Movement of Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI),** retained control in Bouake and Korhogo, and within two weeks moved to take the remainder of the northern half of the country. French troops already garrisoned in the country deployed to establish a *de facto* buffer zone preventing a rebel advance. In mid-October 2002, government and MPCI representatives signed a ceasefire and the French agreed to monitor a buffer zone between the two forces. In late November 2002, the western part of the country became a new military front with the emergence of two new rebel groups--the Ivoirian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP). **MPIGO and MJP** were allied with the MPCI, and the three groups subsequently called themselves the New Forces (***Forces Nouvelles***). In January 2003, the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** deployed approximately 1,500 peacekeeping troops beside the 4,000 French peacekeepers. The troops maintained the east-west ceasefire line, known as the Zone of Confidence, dividing the country.

13. In late January 2003, the country's major political parties and the New Forces signed the French-brokered Linas-Marcoussis Accord (LMA), agreeing to a power-sharing national reconciliation government to include rebel New Forces representatives. The parties agreed to work together on modifying national identity, eligibility for citizenship, and land tenure laws. The LMA also stipulated a UN Monitoring Committee to report on implementation of

the accord. The same month, President Gbagbo appointed Seydou Diarra as the consensus Prime Minister. In March 2003, Prime Minister Diarra formed a government of national reconciliation of 41 ministers. In July 2003, the government and New Forces militaries signed an 'End of the War' declaration that recognized President Gbagbo's authority and vowed to work for the implementation of the LMA and a programme of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR). In September President Gbagbo named politically neutral Defence and Security Ministers, after consulting with the political parties and New Forces.

14. However, progress on legislative reform and rebel disarmament stalled during 2004 and, although several diplomatic attempts were made to re-start the process, violent flare-ups became more frequent. The ministers from the New Forces began to boycott the government. In November 2004 government forces initiated a bombing campaign of rebel targets in the north. On 6 November, a government aircraft bombed a French military installation in Bouake, killing nine French soldiers and one American civilian. French forces retaliated by destroying most of the small Ivorian air force and violent riots against the French broke out in Abidjan. On 15 November the UNSC issued an immediate arms embargo on Côte d'Ivoire and gave leaders one month to get the peace process back on track or face a travel ban and an asset freeze. For the first time in the UN's history, the resolution specifically cited violence against civilians as one of the criterion for the sanctions regime.

15. In April 2005, South African President Thabo Mbeki invited the leaders to South Africa for an African Union-sponsored mediation effort. The result was the Pretoria Agreement, signed 6 April 2005. The Pretoria Agreement formally ended the country's state of war, and addressed issues such as DDR, the return of New Forces Ministers to government, and the reorganization of the Independent Electoral Commission. A follow-up agreement in June 2005 laid out another framework for disarmament, elections, and the adoption of legislation required under the LMA.

16. Gbagbo's original mandate as president expired on 30 October 2005, but due to the lack of disarmament it was deemed impossible to hold an election, and therefore his term in office was extended for a year, according to a plan worked out by the African Union and endorsed by the UNSC. A new Prime Minister, Charles Konan Banny, was selected by the international community and given broad powers designed to reunify the country. Banny selected a new cabinet in collaboration with the opposition, the President, and the New Forces. In January 2006, militias loyal to President Gbagbo mounted violent protests against UNOCI and the authority of the Banny government. Initial steps toward DDR and elections began in May 2006. The government began a pilot identification programme for citizens and foreign residents lacking birth and nationality certificates. Government and New Forces military formations began pre-groupment activities as a prelude to actual disarmament. However, neither initiative was completed and elections were again posptoned. In November 2006, the UNSC issued a new resolution, which extended Prime Minister Banny's mandate for an additional 12 months. The resolution provided for the strengthening of Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny's powers. However, Gbagbo effectively blocked him from fulfilling this role.

17. Another peace accord between the government and the New Forces, was signed on 4 March 2007, and subsequently Guillaume Soro, leader of the New Forces, became prime minister. The agreement foresaw a new transitional government and the re-launch of the stalled voter registration and identification process to enable elections to be held within 10 months. It also called for an end to the Zone of Confidence, DDR and for rebel and government forces to form a joint integrated Command Centre to restructure the Defence and Security Forces. UNOCI withdrew from within the Zone of Confidence, but remained positioned on both sides, and six mixed brigades of New Forces, national

Gendarmerie soldiers, and impartial forces were established. The Zone of Confidence was dismantled in September 2007, but both the mixed brigades and impartial forces continued to carry out patrols throughout its former territory. **There was some limited progress on DDR and voter registration, but the date for fresh presidential elections was repeatedly postponed until they finally took place on 31 October 2010**.

18. The election was hailed by all candidates and observers as peaceful and fair, with nearly 80 per cent voter turnout and no significant irregularities reported. Ouattara and Gbago emerged as the two leading candidates in the first round of voting and a run-off took place between them on 28 November. **Ouattara was declared the winner by the electoral commission and credible and accredited observers assessed both rounds as fair and free of major irregularities. However, Gbagbo refused to cede power, and a period of fighting ensued**. Ouattara's forces seized control of most of the country, but Gbagbo remained entrenched in Abidjan, and mobilized troops, paramilitaries and mercenaries to entrench his position. On 16 December forces loyal to Gbagbo were responsible for an incident in which more than 50 people were killed and 200 wounded. According to a report by Human Rights Watch:

> Elite security force units closely linked to Gbagbo dragged neighborhood political leaders from Ouattara's coalition away from restaurants or out of their homes into waiting vehicles; family members later found the victims' bodies in morgues, riddled with bullets. Women who were active in mobilizing voters—or who merely wore pro-Ouattara t-shirts—were targeted and often gang raped by armed forces and militia groups under Gbagbo's control, after which the attackers told the women to "go tell Alassane" their problems. Pro-Gbagbo militiamen stopped hundreds of real and perceived supporters of Ouattara at checkpoints or attacked them in their neighborhoods and then beat them to death with bricks, executed them by gunshot at point-blank range, or burned them alive.
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> Abuses by pro-Ouattara forces—ultimately known as the Republican Forces, following a March 17 Ouattara decree—did not reach a comparable scale until the beginning of March, when they launched an offensive to take over the country. In Duékoué, the Republican Forces and allied militias massacred hundreds of people, pulling men they alleged to be pro-Gbagbo militiamen out of their homes and executing them unarmed. Later, during the military campaign to take over and consolidate control of Abidjan, the Republican Forces again executed scores of men from ethnic groups aligned to Gbagbo—at times in detention sites—and tortured others. . . . .
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> By the conflict's end, residents reported that wells in the west were stuffed with human remains. Several Abidjan neighborhoods were marked with communal graves dug in haste, turning dirt parking lots and children's soccer fields into constant reminders of the violence that had been visited upon the country. Other bodies littered the streets for days, particularly where pro-Gbagbo militias operated checkpoints. The stench became so horrible, according to residents that they themselves took to burning corpses. In certain areas of Yopougon and Koumassi neighborhoods in particular, all that remained of many victims were a few white bone fragments and a blackened patch of concrete—both still visible to a Human Rights Watch researcher several weeks after clashes ended. In almost every corner of Côte d'Ivoire—particularly in the west, the southern coastal region, and in Abidjan—the conflict left utter destruction. Almost everyone carried a story of a brother killed, a sister raped, a home burned to the ground or pillaged of all its valuables.

19. The UNSC adopted a common resolution recognizing Ouattara as winner of the elections, **while ECOWAS and the African Union suspended Côte d'Ivoire from its**

decision-making bodies to de-recognize Gbagbo's government. It also reinforced the UNOCI military component in December and January, amidst widespread fears of a possible genocide in the country. On 17 March mortars were fired by forces loyal to Gbagbo into a market area in the Abobo district of Abidjan, resulting in the killing of more than 25 civilians with more than 40 wounded. Thousands of civilians had now been killed, with up to a million people displaced from their homes.

20. On 30 March 2011, the Council adopted resolution 1975 imposing targeted sanctions against Gbagbo, his wife and three of his associates and reinforcing the authorisation for UNOCI to use force to protect civilians. **On 4 April, the Secretary-General announced that he had instructed UNOCI, in accordance with the provisions of the resolution, to take the necessary measures to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population. On 5 April UNOCI announced that it had launched operation 'Protect the Civilian Population.' UN attack helicopters were used on several occasions to destroy heavy weapons. On 11 April, Gbagbo, who had been hiding in the basement of the presidential palace, was captured and brought into custody.** He was subsequently transferred to The Hague to stand trial at the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity. Outtara was inaugurated as Côte d'Ivoire's new President on 21 May 2011.. Although security has improved dramatically since the post-election crisis on 2010-2011, a major concern remains about the composition and conduct of the security apparatus itself. **The new national army, the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), consists of the old national army, loyal to the Gbagbo, with the rebel group that had overthrown him. They cohabit but have not yet formed a unified structure.** Military hierarchy is not always respected and former rebel soldiers in the service of their former zone commanders often refuse to salute or obey orders from senior officers who previously belonged to the regular army. **Relations between the FRCI and police are also problematic**, since these are also sometimes identified with the previous regime. In many areas the police are not allowed to carry weapons, inhibiting their ability to carry out policing operations. As a consequence the FRCI often take a lead role on general policing, which can lead to conflicts with the local population.

22. Progress on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and DDR have been extremely slow and the disarmament operations conducted by UNOCI have so far only recovered a small proportion of weapons that are in circulation. This has contributed to a big increase in crime rates. In the west of the country, traditional hunters known as "Dozos", who fought as a militia group against Ggagbo's forces, remain a security problem. Armed and unarmed urban youth groups in Abidjan, Yamoussoukro and San-Pedro remain a serious threat to the population. Banditry and armed criminality are still commonplace, and there are frequent inter- and intra-community clashes in the west, particularly over land. Sexual violence continues to be widespread; according to UNICEF, twenty-five percent of girls and women between the ages of ten and 49 years have been victims of sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. High levels of such violence persist in the western and northern parts of the country where demobilized combatants and militias are concentrated.

23. Although charges have been brought against over 140 individuals of crimes committed during the 2010-2011 crisis, so far all of these have been against supporters of the previous regime. To date, none of the ex-rebels incorporated into the FRCI have been prosecuted, despite strong suspicions some committed serious crimes. This has led to criticisms of a two tier justice system. The ICC was invited by President Ouattara to investigate possible crimes committed during the post-electoral crisis of 2010 – 2011. It, controversially, decided to 'sequence' its investigations by examining first the allegations against supporters of former President Gbagbo, with a promise to then investigate those committed by his opponents in the future. It has so far issued four arrest warrants, all for supporters of the former President.

24. Gagbo's supporters responded to his transfer into ICC custody by announcing that it was boycotting the forthcoming parliamentary elections, giving the governing party a comfortable majority, on a very low poll. They also announced that they were suspending participation in all 'reconciliation processes', which further weakens their influence and entrenches the power of the ruling party. Moderates in both camps are being marginalized and the position of the extremists strengthened. These developments also reinforce the perception that the international community supports selective justice, which has further polarized society and damaged UNOCI's reputation for impartiality.

25. On 8 June 2012 an ambush carried out by a rebel militia group of allegedly comprised of Gagbo's supporters killed 1 FRCI soldier and seven UN peacekeepers.

Mission strategy for the Protection of Civilians

26. The protection of civilians has been part of the ONUCI mandate since the establishment of the mission. During the course of 2010 and 2011, the UNSC debated the evolving situation in Côte d'Ivoire on a number of occasions, reflecting the changes that were taking place in the run-up to the Presidential election of 2010 and the violence which followed it. **In July 2011 the UNSC passed Resolution 2000 which, reaffirmed the POC mandate and also called on the mission:**

- '**To revise the comprehensive strategy for the protection of civilians and to coordinate with the United Nations protection of civilians strategy in liaison with the United Nations country team, to take into account the new realities on the ground** and the specific needs of vulnerable groups, and to include measures to prevent gender-based violence pursuant to resolution 1960 (2010) and resolution 1882 (2009)

- '**To work closely with humanitarian agencies**, particularly in relation to areas of tensions and of return of displaced persons, to collect information on and identify potential threats against the civilian population, as well as reliable information on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, bring them to the attention of the Ivorian authorities as appropriate, and to take appropriate action in accordance with the United Nations system-wide protection strategy in harmonization with UNOCI's protection strategy,

- **'To monitor and report on violations and abuses** against vulnerable populations, including children in line with resolution 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009) and 1998 (2011) and contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses,'

27. A revised Comprehensive Strategy for the Protection of Civilians was published in June 2012 It is organized around the three tier element approach to protecting civilians: protection through political process, establishing a protective environment and providing protection from physical violence. The first element captures all political and advocacy efforts, including those made by the mission leadership with regard to the overarching principle to support the peace process. The second element comprises activities such as promoting legal protection, contributing to humanitarian assistance efforts, and backing up national institutions by supporting competent national authorities. The third element relates to the missions efforts to prevent, deter and, if necessary respond to situations in which civilians are under imminent threat of physical violence. The three elements are mutually reinforcing and should be taken forward simultaneously. The strategy identifies the potential threats to civilians as:

- Inter-communal and intra-communal violence

- Violence by national state security and defence forces, affiliated entities and non-state armed groups
- Criminal violence by armed groups that pose a public security threat
- Politically motivated violence

28. UNOCI has developed an Implementation Matrix which identifies relevant actors and actions to counter risks identified. This should form the basis of operational documents, such as work plans, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and other instructions to the mission and its components in implementing the POC mandate. **The Implementation Matrix is based on four phases of action: preparing for risk in day-to-day activities, responding to heightened risk through pre-emptive measures, responding to actual threats of physical violence, and stabilizing the situation after a crisis has occurred.** In each phase the civilian, police and military components of the mission have a clear understanding of how they should act to implement the POC mandate. **A central part of the strategy rests on establishing effective coordination structures with both national and international actors to ensure the regular and timely exchange of information and analysis to ensure that there is effective preventive action and rapid response.**

29. The UNSC resolution gives UNOCI the authority to act independently to protect civilians within their capabilities and areas of deployment, where the government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibility to do so. Bearing in mind that all UN missions operate within the principles of peacekeeping and in accordance with the mandate, missions are authorized to use force against any party, including elements of government forces, where such elements are themselves engaged in physical violence against civilians. Under Chapter VII, the UNSC has authorized UNOCI to use force to implement certain aspects of its mandate, including POC. Only a reasonable belief in hostile intent (defined as the threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through an action or behaviour which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act) is required before the use of force can be authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be determined by the on-scene commander based on his or her professional judgement on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:

- the capability and preparedness of the threat;
- the available evidence which indicates an intention to attack; and
- historical precedents within the Mission's Area of Responsibility (AOR), depicting patterns of behaviour exhibited by parties to the conflict which may require the application of a worst case scenario.

30. The circumstances in which force can be used and the prohibitions against it are described in more detail in the Rules of Engagement for UNOCI's military component and the Directives on Detention, Searches and Use of Force for members of UNOCI's Formed Police Units. The general principles governing the use of force are proportionality, minimum use of force commensurate with the level of threat and the requirement to minimize the risk of collateral damage. Any force used must be limited, in its modus, intensity and duration, to that which is necessary to achieve the authorised objective. UNOCI military component shall, wherever the operational situation permits, make every reasonable effort to resolve potentially hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force.

Module 4 - UNOCI

Advanced Scenarios

Important Remarks

1. The following scenarios are based on UNOCI's experiences on Protection of Civilians (POC) issues in Cote D`Ivoire. Although the scenarios are based on real incidents, they should not be seen as literal descriptions of events that have actually occurred. Places and names have been changed, some incidents have been amalgamated and other details have been added to draw out particular learning points. The scenarios are, therefore, set in the fictional case-study of Carana, which has its own national army, police and rebel groups. For legal reasons it should be clearly understood that the actions described by these fictitious groups in these case-studies do not reflect on the reputations of any real organizations or individuals.

Carana Context (See supporting map)

2. Carana is a coastal country, which borders Katasi to the west, Sumora to the north and Rimosa to the south. After independence, its first President ruled a one-party state until 1993. The first decades of his rule were marked by political stability and steady economic growth, which led to an influx of foreign workers. However, the country went through an economic crisis in the 1980s, leading to a period of political and social turmoil. Politicians increasingly emphasized the ethnic divisions in Carana's population, with some stressing the rights of 'natives' over 'foreigners'. There are three main groupings in Carana: Falins, Koris and Tatsis. The Falins were traditionally the main group in the south, east and west of the country, while the Koris were mainly based in the north. Many Koris have migrated southwards over the decades and so they now make up a significant minority in the east and west of Carana, as well as its main cities. Tatsi is a generic term referring to immigrants from neighbouring countries, particularly Sumora and Rimosa. Both Koris and Tatsis bought up farmland in the west of Carana, often through informal sales, which were not legally recognised and this has led to some land disputes with the 'native' Falins.

3. Carana experienced one coup d'état, in 1999, and a civil war, which broke out in 2002. The latter took on ethnic dimensions as the incumbent President Gee drew his main support from the Falins, while the rebels' main base of support was amongst the Koris. The UN and regional organizations made repeated attempts to mediate an end to the conflict. The security situation did improve sufficiently to allow elections to take place in 2010 and President Gee was challenged by Mr Oh, a northerner who had previously served as a technocratic Prime Minister.

4. Mr Oh was judged by most observers to have won the election. However, President Gee refused to accept the result. This led to a political crisis and an upsurge of violence, which caused at least 3,000 deaths and displaced up to a million people from their homes. The UN took military action to protect civilians after massacres carried out by President Gee's supporters. President Gee was eventually overthrown after several months of fighting. President Oh took office in May 2011. He has created a new national army, the Carana Defence Force (CDF), which merged the army loyal to the previous president with the rebel group that had supported his overthrow. He also announced plans for a national programme of disarming and demobilizing (DDR) armed groups, although progress to date has been slow.

5. Security has improved dramatically since the election crisis, although the situation remains tense in the west of the country, close to the border with Katasi. Thousands of people remain displaced from their homes in this region. In June 2012, seven UN peacekeepers were killed in an ambush by a militia group that had crossed the border to attack civilians. In July 2012 an attack took place on an IDP camp, in retaliation for an armed robbery in a nearby village, in which seven people were killed and 5,000 people displaced from their temporary homes.

Scenario 1: Cross-border attack

1. Armed Falin militants hostile to the new government of Carana have carried out a number of deadly cross-border raids on villages in south-west Tereni in recent months. Since July 2011, at least 40 residents of Carana, including women and children, have been killed during cross-border attacks that targeted Kori and Tatsi civilians who largely support the new government. In one attack, on 25 April 2012, eight people were killed in the village of Suppo. The attackers are primarily Falin supporters of the previous President Gee who remain violently opposed to President Oh. Some are from Carana, while others are from neighboring Katasi and fought for President Gee as mercenaries.

2. Many of those involved in the attacks are engaged in artisan gold mining along the border, and profits from this are believed to go up a chain of command – showing a considerable level of organization. **In some cases miners have been forcibly recruited to the militias' ranks**. The militias also receive financial support from members of the political and military elite of the former regime who are now exiled in Sumora. Carana has issued warrants for those alleged to have been involved in post-election crimes – and made extradition requests through Interpol– but the authorities in Sumora have so far not acted on them.

3. A high-level meeting of government officials from Carana and Katasi recently took place to discuss border security issues. Katasian officials promised to increase patrols along the border. Police officers in Katasi have raided one alleged training camp, where a large cache of weapons was found. The area is surrounded by dense vegetation and the fighters in the camp easily escaped. The government of Katasi argues that it does not have the resources to police the long border, much of which runs through deep jungle. However, some suspect that corrupt officials may be accepting bribes to 'look the other way'.

4. A few Katasian citizens have been arrested after returning from active hostilities in Carana, but so far there have been no such prosecutions. **At least two infamous Katasian citizens credibly implicated in atrocities in Carana committed in 2002-2003 have been released by the Katasian authorities after originally facing charges of 'mercenarism'. It is believed that these are now actively recruiting and training fighters who have been involved in cross-border attacks**. The impunity with which they can operate has appeared to embolden them and there are rumors that they are planning a major attack. **Some of the fighters are believed to be based in refugee camps, run by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), many of which are very close to the border between Katasi and Carana**.

5. Human rights groups have called on the government of Katasi to prosecute those accused of atrocities using its own penal code. The prosecuting authorities in Katasi have stated that it is very difficult to build cases against alleged mercenaries due to a perceived lack of collaboration with the authorities and civil society in Carana. Although diplomatic relations between the two countries is good, there is little cooperation between state institutions and civil society. Katasi has also recently emerged from an extremely destructive civil war, which weakened its own capacity and structures.

6. According to a human rights monitoring group the attackers have recruited by force dozens of children into their ranks. **Residents of several border towns in Katasi described the presence of children aged 14 to 17 at a training camp, while another resident described seeing several armed boys among those returning from the most recent attack**. One border town resident said that he had reported the recruitment of child soldiers to Katasi authorities, but that they told him there was insufficient evidence to make arrests.

7. You have just received information that a group of armed men were seen crossing the border between Katasi and Carana, and are heading for the village of Gwisek (West border to Katasi).

8. An Infantry Company is deployed in the town of Gwisek. In the village there is a small presence of OCHA and humanitarian NGOs. The CNP has a small detachment of 5 men deployed in the town. (See sketch below).

9. What should UNOCI do and which mission components might be involved in this situation? How is the Company commander going to coordinate and inform all necessary actors and what kind of assistance will he require from the other components in the locality? If military force is deployed, under what circumstances would they be permitted to use lethal force and what would be a good course of action to be taken by the Company Commander? Do UNOCI police and soldiers have powers of arrest and, if so, what should they do with their prisoners? How should any child soldiers that are encountered be treated? In future, how can UNOCI improve border monitoring in order to avert such incidents?



Scenario 2: Ambush on UN peacekeepers

1. UNOCI received information at the end of May 2012 that a cross-border attack on civilians was being planned between the 9 and 18 June, in the run-up to the trial of Carana's former President Gee. According to widespread rumours, Falin militia members based in Katasi had telephoned their family members to warn them to stay at home on 15 June 2012, as an attack was being planned on that date. Information was also received that some of the attackers were already in place inside Carana, although the reliability of the sources could not be confirmed. Patrolling was stepped up in the area. The military presence had already been reinforced after an attack on April 25, killed eight people in the nearby village of Suppo. According to a human rights monitoring group at least 40 people had been killed in the area in raids carried out from across the border over the previous year. **The raids are widely believed to have been carried out by supporters of Carana's former President Gee, who is currently in the custody of the International Criminal Court (ICC)**, and whose trial was due to start on 18 June.

2. On 1 June **UNOCI deployed a platoon section to the village of Gwisek made up of 15 soldiers with two Toyota Pick Up vehicles. On 3 June this was reinforced by a second echelon comprising 15 soldiers, another Pick-Up, an Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) and a Truck.** The Platoon carried out a patrol of the village on 4 June and recorded no unusual event. **Night patrols were carried out** on 5 and 6 June and these also recorded nothing unusual. On 7 June **the platoon was informed by a local man that he had seen about 60 armed men crossing the border** about 18km west of the village and that they had killed three people with machetes to prevent them from giving out information about their movements. The following morning a **UNOCI military patrol consisting of 20 soldiers using two UN Toyota Pick Up vehicles was sent to confirm this information**.

3. The Carana Defence Force (CDF) and Carana National Police (CNP) also mounted a patrol, which met the UNOCI patrol in Gwisek village. **The CDF patrol came under attack** just outside the village and one soldier was badly injured**.** The UNOCI patrol was sent to assist and tried to carry out a medical evacuation of the injured soldier. **During the evacuation the militiamen ambushed them again at about 500 meters from the first ambush site. The joint patrol came under heavy fire from about 10 militiamen. It suffered seven fatal casualties before withdrawing to the village leaving behind a damaged UN truck**. **The UNOCI and joint CDF/CNP platoon assumed a defensive position while they waited for reinforcements. They were first reinforced by 150 CDF soldiers and later by UNOCI reinforcements.**

4. The injured CDF soldier died from his wounds while still in the village. At least 15 civilians were also killed in the militia attack, which caused panic in the area leading to thousands of people fleeing from their homes. Some people sought shelter in the larger towns in the area, while others fled to the forest or crossed the border to Katasi. It is estimated that 6,000 people were displaced from their homes. **An initial UNOCI assessment of the incident has highlighted the need for greater troop mobility. The poor state of the roads** in the region is a significant factor in hampering movement.

5. Given existing resource constraints how can the various mission components address the challenges that this scenario creates for the protection of civilians at the tactical level? Still considering the reality in the mission and from a military stand point, what would be a key factor to improve force protection and operational efficiency? As a company commander, how best can you strengthen the protection of the village integrating all mission components?

Scenario 3: Clashes related to Security Sector Reform issues

1. Although security has improved dramatically in most of Carana since the post-election crisis on 2010-2011, a major concern remains about the composition and conduct of the security apparatus itself. President Oh, who is commander-in-chief, mainly depends on the former rebel troops that helped him to power and who now occupy an important role in new national army, the Carana Defence Force (CDF).

2. The CDF is a combination of two different armies: the former rebel groups and the forces loyal to the previous President Gee. They cohabit but have not yet formed a unified structure. Military hierarchy is not always respected and former rebel soldiers in the service of their former zone commanders often refuse to salute or obey orders from senior officers who previously belonged to the regular army. The former rebels' military leaders, some of who have been promoted to senior rank, have retained their most loyal and seasoned men.

3. Relations between the CDF and the Carana National Police (CNP) are also problematic. CDF officers often do not allow the CNP to carry weapons, inhibiting their ability to carry out policing operations. As a consequence the CDF often take a lead role on general policing. **This can lead to conflicts with the local population, particularly in Falin areas where many people continue to support the previous President Gee. These often call for the CDF to be withdrawn from their areas and for the CNP to be rearmed.**

4. The exact number of CDF troops is not known. The integration of 9,000 former rebels has not yet taken place and it is therefore very difficult to know who, among them, belongs to the new army. **There is a lot of frustration regarding this situation.**

5. Falin militias loyal to President Gee that were the main perpetrators of violence throughout the western region are now scattered and under surveillance, but they have not been disarmed and many are still hiding in the refugee camps in Katasi from where they carry out occasional raids, usually against Kori and Tatsi civilians in several towns.

6. Although some progress has been made in the dismantling checkpoints in the major cities and along the main roads, extortion of the general public in the rural areas remains a daily problem. Shops, businesses and foreign companies are often subject to extortion rackets**. Security sector reform (SSR) has been identified as a priority by the new government. However, progress has been slow.** International partners and donors are finding it very difficult to identify interlocutors to manage the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants. The disarmament operations conducted by UNOCI have so far only recovered a small proportion of weapons that are in circulation. **In Maui UNOCI has a FPU and an Infantry Company deployed.**

7. You are the Company/FPU Commander/ UN civilian representative located in Maui. You obtain information that there are increasing high tensions between the CDF troops and Fallin civilians especially in bars and pubs. The Fallins are very frustrated by previous violence and the failures on the SSR process, especially integration into CDF ranks.

8. Two near explosive situations have occurred in the immediate past and you must take action to avert a possible clash between the two groups. What options are open to you? As a company commander, what sequence of action will you follow to avert a possible clash between the two groups and what mission actors will you involve?

After 35 min

9. A clash inevitably occurred between the CDF and a group of Fallin civilians over a girl in a bar. The civilians were badly beaten and it is reliably learnt that they are planning to attack certain CDF installations the following day. Fallin militia is clearly identified amongst the civilians who are planning a demonstration to divert the attention of the security forces.

10. Their plan is then to concurrently attack the 2 CDF bases and 3 checkpoints in the town. Any civilian attack of the CDF base is likely to be met with force and possible mass injuries to civilians. What can the UN actors do in this situation?

Scenario 4: Internally Displaced People

1. The violence that followed presidential elections in Carana in November 2010 displaced hundreds of thousands of people. At the peak of the crisis in 2011, an estimated 200,000 men, women and children had sought asylum in neighboring countries, with Katasia, Rimosa and Sumora receiving the largest numbers. In addition, an estimated one million people were internally displaced in Carana. **The situation has improved significantly since April 2011, and displaced persons have been progressively returning to their homes. As of September 2011, 247,000 people remained internally displaced in Carana**.

2. The improvement in the overall security situation and progress towards reconciliation has supported hopes that most internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees will be willing to return home. However, significant challenges remain. Illegal occupation of private property is a significant cause of social tensions particularly in the west of the country, exacerbating generalized mistrust and strained inter-communal relations. Violations of human rights are reported, including arbitrary arrests, summary executions, looting and extortion.

3. Many IDPs are living in precarious informal urban settlement areas where they may be subject to eviction. Single female households, the elderly and disabled, and separated children are likely to require continued assistance and protection for some time to come. Security remains a significant source of concern. In the west of Carana, reconciliation is progressing at a slow pace and civilians remain subject to attacks. Wide-ranging reforms are urgently needed to build justice and administrative institutions to address violations of human rights, the right to citizenship and claims on land and property. Many IDPs and refugees who own property cannot get access to their homes or their farms, and there are many outstanding disputes over land and property deeds.

4. Tensions are particularly high in the west of Carana where it is alleged that some UN-guarded IDP camps are sheltering members of a militia loyal to the previous President. There have been accusations that these have carried out robberies in nearby villages. **Women leaving the IDP camp to gather firewood, fetch water or buy food have also reported incidents of threats and sexual violence. These have been made by both local men and soldiers of the Carana Defence Force (CDF).**

5. An armed robbery has taken place in a village near to Kissoli in Tereni province in which five people were killed. Villagers alleged that the robbers came from a nearby IDP camp. **Later that day, up to 1,000 villagers, accompanied by armed militiamen attacked the IDP camp. There are unconfirmed reports that some of the attackers wore CDF uniforms**. The assailants overcame security and set fire to the camp. Seven IDPs were killed and 56 injured, while the almost entire camp of 5,000 people have fled. **UNOCI had provided light security to the camp when it was established and had 12 police officers inside the camp and 34 military personnel outside the perimeter at the time of the attack. UN soldiers gave emergency medical treatment to the injured and then transported them to hospital**.

6. Seven people were subsequently arrested by the national police in connection with the armed robbery. No arrests have yet taken place in relation to the attack on the IDP camp, which the government has not yet officially condemned. **Some government officials have also stated that UNOCI was solely responsible for the security of the camp and that it should now be closed to force IDPs to return to their villages of origin**. **IDPs are now returning to the camp.**

7. You are a Battalion / FPU Commander in which the IDP camp lies in. What should UNOCI do at the tactical level to address the problems related to the IDP camp and other security issues? What action will you take, in conjunction with other mission components to earn the confidence of the people on security arrangements and finally encourage them to return to their home?

Scenario 5: Land disputes

1. Carana owed much of its economic success up until 1980 due to the development of the coffee and cocoa sectors. The government encouraged migration to the western forest area, where the soil is particularly fertile. Migrant workers from Tatsi and Kori were settled en masse and the forest zone was progressively occupied, even though much of this land was theoretically protected by both state and customary law. Informal sales, which had no legal basis, were frequent. A sharp fall in the values of commodities on international markets, coupled with an economic recession at the end of the 1980s exacerbated the tensions between indigenous inhabitants and migrant workers from abroad or from other areas of Carana. This was partly reflected in a clause in a land law passed in 1998, which restricted land ownership to citizens of Carana and stated that non-residents could only obtain long-term leases.

2. The return of young Falin city-dwellers to villages in western Carana following the economic crisis increased demand on rural land and created inter-generational conflicts as some contested the transfer of land to migrants in their absence. This was particularly true where the death of the seller provided an opportunity for indigenous 'guardians' who sold them the rights (tuteurs) to call into question the terms of agreements or the limits of the plots of land concerned. Such conflicts had already provoked minor localized violence and displacements before the war. **The conflict that broke out in 2002 was particularly intense in western Carana. Serial population displacements, occupations and returns, led to many individual and communal disputes over land**. **The post-election crisis of 2010-2011 led to an opportunity for people on all sides of the conflict to capitalize on the instability by grabbing land or questioning previously agreed contracts**. Years of conflict have weakened both state and customary institutions and disputes are increasingly 'resolved' through violence.

3. Land rights in Carana were traditionally regulated through customary law and an estimated 98 per cent conducted by this means in rural areas. Dispute resolution was by extended debate, with no known instance of physical punishment. However, prior to 1998 there was no legal recognition of customary land transactions and only those carried out in the presence of a notary were legally valid.

4. The 1998 law says one prerequisite for the recognition of customary land rights is a certified statement of <u>their 'continuous and peaceful existence' of these rights. Another is that people appear in person to assert them, both of which could penalize people who have been displaced.</u>

5. Six people have been shot dead near to the village of Koepi in Mahbek province in western Carana. A UN civil affairs officer visited the village and spoke to local residents. She said that the six had been killed by men from a nearby village who were trying to 'steal their land' and have asked for UNOCI's protection. **You are a Company Commander who is deployed 50 km far from Koepi. The civil affairs officer informs you that there is a high possibility of a clash between some communities over land and confirms the reports that this is attributable to the influx of young city dwellers to the village following the dire economic situation in the cities.** Lives could be lost if nothing is done to avert this looming clash.

6. What can the mission actors at the tactical level can do to resolve such disputes and prevent these escalating to violence/protect civilians? What coordination is required to be done with other mission components and state administration/national police to ensure POC? What will be the role of civil affairs and rule of law officers in the resolution of this problem? Additionally, you have reliably learnt that radio broadcasts/media are being used to agitate some sections of the

public to engage in violent acts against others from a different tribe. What can be done about this?

Scenario 6: Inter-communal violence

1. You have received a report of inter-communal violence in the town of Amsan, in Guthar province in eastern Carana, three days ago. At least three people were killed and up to forty others injured during two days of clashes.

2. Amsan, which has a population of around 20,000 people, contains two ethnic groups: the Falins who are the largest single ethnic group in Carana and the majority group in the town, and the Koris, who originate from the north of the country and are a much smaller group locally. Most of the Carana Defence Force (CDF) soldiers are also Koris and previously belonged to the rebel group that helped to overthrow President Gee. They replaced a detachment of the Carana National Police force (CNP) who they disarmed. The Kori minority supports the presence of the CDF, but the Falin majority wants the CNP to be returned to duty. **The Falins complain that the CDF are using check-points to extort money from people**. Three soldiers, in particular, were identified as having carried out abusive behavior. Tensions grew and eventually local youth mounted a protest outside the CDF barracks. This led to a confrontation in which youths abducted the three soldiers. A tribal leader intervened to negotiate the release of the soldiers, but the CDF misunderstood his intentions, surrounded his house, where the soldiers were being held, and opened fire. The protest then spread out onto the streets with Falin civilians making barricades of burning tires. The houses and shops of Koris were ransacked and people had fled the town in fear. One civilian was shot dead with a hunting rifle and others were wounded by unknown assailants.

3. UNOCI dispatched a patrol of 25 soldiers accompanied by three Military Observers (MILOBS) and six UN police (UNPOL). The CNP also arrived in the town and together they succeeded in defusing the situation. A meeting was held between the commander of CDF, representatives of the two communities, the CNP and tribal elders. The CDF formally requested forgiveness for firing on the house of the Falin tribal leader and the three CDF soldiers were released unharmed. **The following day UNOCI was informed that the CDF had raided the offices of the CNP, seized weapons and smashed equipment. Local Koris also burnt and destroyed Falin shops and houses in reprisal for the previous attacks**. One man was shot dead, with a 12-guage shot gun, while a woman was killed inside her home with a machete. Falin youth also mobilized and a stand-off developed between the two groups.

4. The UNOCI team arrived and managed to calm the situation. **They disarmed the youth with the hunting rifle and handed it over to the CNP**. A meeting was organized with the Mayor, who is locally elected, and the State Administrator, who is centrally appointed, together with neighborhood leaders and representatives of the two communities. **UNOCI reinforced its own troops with armored elements and more soldiers**. CNP reinforcements also arrived. Tensions remain high and some local Falin youth and police officers are openly hostile to the UNOCI presence. **UNPOL and MILOBS have held separate meetings with the CDF and CNP contingents in the town as well as with community leaders**. **The CDF and CNP both blame one another for not doing more to stop the violence. The community leaders have complained that UNOCI did not do enough to protect the civilians who were attacked**. It was also decided to invite Carana's Minister of Defence to visit the town, to reinforce the appeals for calm. The Minister will be accompanied by his senior advisors and a group of Generals. He will be officially welcomed by the Mayor of the town, meeting with community leaders and touring the affected areas. The national and international media will also be in attendance.

5. How do you assess the effectiveness of UNOCI's intervention in the above situation and is there anything more that they could have done to fulfill its mandate? What course should you follow to diffuse the tension, which mission actors will you

involve and how? A representative of UNOCI will have an opportunity to speak at the public meeting which the Minister of Defence will be attending. Draft some bullet point speaker notes, highlighting the key messages that should be conveyed by UNOCI to the Government of Carana, the people of the town and the national and international media.

Scenario 7: Road-block extortion

1. Extortion by members of Carana's security forces was a widespread practice before the current government headed by President Oh took office. Security forces in the country's south, then controlled by President Gee government, routinely targeted northern Koris and Tatsis from neighboring countries for extortion – at times arbitrarily detaining and beating those who would not immediately pay. In the northern part of the country – then controlled by the forces who subsequently supported President Oh soldiers reaped enormous profits off extorting businesses and at roadblocks.

2. In the first months after these forces took control of the country, there were reports of soldiers setting up roadblocks and demanding payments. However, in July 2011, the new Interior Minister, Prime Minister and military chief of staff General announced that they were **reducing the number of checkpoints and demanding that soldiers end extortion. Further complaints from the population led to a recent government statements that extortion would not be tolerated**. The Prime Minister demanded sanctions against perpetrators. The following day, the spokesperson for the Defense Ministry warned members of the Carana Defence Force (CDF) that they would be dismissed if caught racketeering.

3. While many roadblocks have come down along the main roads between the country's larger cities, **secondary, dirt roads in rural areas remain full of roadblocks where extortion is the norm**. After truck drivers went on strike on September 8 in protest over extortion along the Akkaba to Galasi highway, local government officials met with military commanders in the area to address the problem. Residents described soldiers demanding their identity cards as they passed through roadblocks and then insisting that passengers pay 500 CFA francs (US$1) to have the cards returned. If the person did not have an identity card, soldiers demanded 1000 CFA francs.

4. A prominent business leader has said that every citizen of Carana has been forced to pay at a check-point at some point and the total value of the money extorted was around $600 million USD, equivalent to 2 per cent of Carana's gross domestic product (GDP). He also told a news agency that the cost of charcoal was three times higher than necessary because of the bribes paid at checkpoints as it is transported into the country's biggest city, Galasi.

5. **The southwestern and western regions of Carana were some of the worst hit by the recent conflict, and residents are in a particularly vulnerable position that aggravates the impact of being forced to give money to soldiers**. One 62-year-old resident of a village outside Irasmok said, 'My house was pillaged of everything and burned during the war. I have nothing. Now they're demanding 500 CFA, 500 CFA from me. It's tiring. I have nothing to give, just my bread for that day.' **Not few of these situations have resulted in death of civilians who dared to resist.**

6. A routine UNOCI patrol of nine soldiers near to Trappek, in Leppko province encounters a CNP police officer who is stationed nearby. He tells the commander that a checkpoint has been established on a secondary road by armed men who are extorting money from people and asks them for assistance. The police officer says four people were killed yesterday when refusing to pay.

7. The checkpoint is a 30 minute walk away. What should the commander do and what is the basis on which any proposed use of force could be based? Would any of these decisions be different if the alleged perpetrators turn out to be government soldiers? Note that this scenario deals with an illegal road-block. There are many official and legal road-blocks all over the country manned by national security forces.

Scenario 8: Conflict Related Sexual Violence

1. The violence that followed presidential elections in Carana in November 2010 was characterized by human rights violations (HRVs) committed by both sides, in which at least 3,000 civilians were killed and 150 women were raped, often along political, ethnic, and religious lines.

2. A human rights monitoring organization claims that forces loyal to President Oh raped more than **20 alleged supporters of his rival, Mr Gee, and burned at least 10 villages in Carana's far western region, as their forces advanced**. People that it interviewed described how, in **village after village, these forces summarily executed and raped perceived Gee supporters. In one particularly horrific incident, hundreds of ethnic Falin civilians were massacred in the western town of Gwisek**. Abuses also occurred in Suppo, Hixop, Pukka and Batto, all formerly controlled by pro-Gee forces. A 47-year-old woman told the monitoring organization that she looked on as two fighters killed her father, husband, and 10-year-old son around the family's cocoa farm near Hixop. A 32-year-old man described entering Suppo and opening fire on civilians as they ran out to see which side's forces had entered, killing at least three people right in front of him. In at least 10 villages around Pukka and Batto, villagers said they hid in the bush and watched as they set fire to houses and buildings used to store crops and seeds, slaughtered animals, and stole everything of value.

3. One group was held captive in their villages for several days where 30 were allegedly executed. One 67-year-old woman described the fighters taking several captives out each day - often men and women between 60 and 80 years old - and executing them at point-blank range. Dozens of women were also detained for a day or longer and repeatedly raped. One woman from Suppo said the forces raped her in front of her children, then killed her husband who tried to intervene. In a few instances, combatants seized women and girls during their initial attack on a village, forced them into the surrounding bush, and raped them. Moreover, fighters held women captive in houses for one or several days, gang raping them repeatedly before moving on to the next town or village.

4. The human rights monitoring group also found evidence of **ongoing atrocities by pro-Gee forces including a massacre in Maki of more than 100 men, women, and children from northern Carana and neighboring countries**; the killing of another 10 northerners and immigrants in the town of Ysko; and the mid-March killing of eight people in a village just outside Maki. **Although some of these crimes have subsequently been investigated and 140 people charged with crimes, including former President Gee**. However, so far all of the accused are supporters of the former President Gee and no charges have yet been brought against those that overthrew him, many of whose soldiers and commanders have been integrated into the regular army.

5. A routine military UNOCI patrol of nine soldiers near to Hixop encounters an elder from a nearby village who tells the commander that several girls from the village were gang raped by government soldiers the previous day. The commander decides to investigate. On its way towards the place where the rape was allegedly committed the UNOCI patrol is stopped at a roadblock manned by nine government soldiers and told to turn around.

6. What should it do? What broader POC issues does this scenario raise? There is an SGBV and HR officer in the sector. What will their roles be in the resolution of the issue?

Module 4 - UNOCI

Instructor Guidance Notes and Training Pack

How to use this pack

1. This pack has been developed as a resource for trainers who are running the UNOCI scenario-based exercises on the Protection of Civilians (POC). The training pack contains 8 scenario-based exercises.

2. The **Scenarios are conceived for a detailed analysis of critical POC situations,** each of them consist of a one page hand out that participants are given to work on in groups of five to eight people. They are tasked with preparing a 10 minute presentation back to the plenary, which will be followed by a general discussion and de-brief. There is some flexibility around the timing of these exercises (depending on whether they are delivered as part of a broader training module or in a stand-alone format, and depending on how detailed the discussions on each scenario should be and obviously depending on the audience), but they will probably take between 1.5 and 2.5 hours to deliver. In addition, **the previous knowledge of the UN Core Pre-deployment training Materials is mandatory and essential**. Module 1 (Introduction to POC) is a pre-requisite before taking the scenarios. This will be broken down as follows:

Introduction	15 minutes
Scenario planning exercise	60 – 90 minutes
Presentations and de-brief	30 - 60 minutes

3. The scenario-based exercises can be cut or reduced if the scenarios are delivered as part of a broader training course, but more time should be allotted to an advanced course, to allow for more detailed discussion. The scenarios can either be run in conjunction with the generic POC pre-deployment modules that DPKO has produced, or with a smaller set of mission-specific materials. The latter consists of:

- **Introductory presentations**: a Map and a power-point presentation on the Carana context.
- **Country and Mission Overview**;
- **Scenario-Based Exercises**;
- **Instructor Guidance Notes and Training Pack Orientation**;
- **Glossary of Acronyms.**

4. Country and Mission Overview consists of a short briefing on Cote D`Ivoire and the POC challenges that it faces, which should be handed out in advance of the training. Full understanding of the Country and Mission Overview is an essential pre-condition to take the course. A summary of the UNOCI protection strategy is also contained in these Guidance Notes. DPKO has also produced other resource material, such as DVDs/Videos, which are available on request.

5. The scenarios are intended to provide a practical setting to explore the set of issues related to the implementation of POC. Participants need to decide what actions to take at the tactical level, but also to understand the context of their actions for the mission as a whole (operational level). They need to plan and implement actions, understand the impact of this within the overall context of the whole UN operation and be able to coordinate with other actors to ensure a synchronized response. By being pre-deployment training, most of the scenarios are mainly aimed at the military, or police, but all involve integrated planning between all the different elements of the mission. It is particularly important for all components of the mission to have a common understanding of the circumstances under which UNOCI troops may be used to deter attacks on civilians and in what circumstances they would be permitted to use force**.** It is important to understand that better training results will be achieved if the audience is comprised of military, police and civilian personnel**.** If the participants are exclusively military, civilian or police, the trainer/facilitator should remind

them to factor the role of other mission components into their planning. This does not involve role-playing, but is intended to ensure that they think about all elements of mission rather than just their own professional discipline. Member States are encouraged to bring civilian representatives to the training sessions (from the UN Country Team, ICRC, NGOs etc).

6. These Instructor Guidance Notes are intended to bring out learning points from the exercise and emphasize certain issues. They are not intended to be a comprehensive list of all of the issues contained in each scenario and hopefully more points will emerge during the discussion amongst the participants themselves. For some of the scenarios, there is no clearly right or wrong answer and the most important point will be for participants to have understood the dilemmas that the mission is facing and the constraints that it is operating under.

7. The trainer/facilitator should encourage interactive discussion amongst the participants and reflection on learning points that have come out of the modules rather than adopt a directive approach. Most groups of adults learn far more from discussing things amongst themselves than from sitting passively to listen to lectures. The trainer/facilitator should, therefore, use these notes to prompt questions and only interject if participants miss important issues, misunderstand things or state something that is clearly wrong. The trainer/facilitator should see his or her task as being to guide a boat with a rudder rather than to drive a car with a steering wheel.

Which scenarios to use?

8. **Despite the fact that the training is more focused on military and police audiences, all of the scenarios are aimed at the tactical level and all contain issues of concern to civilians, police and military.** Since the scenarios are all based on real incidents, they contain considerable detail and the trainer/facilitator should ensure that groups have sufficient time to read them through before starting their discussions. Each scenario contains a sufficient number of issues to be run over one or two hours and the easiest way to divide them into levels of complexity is to allow more time for the more advanced scenarios to allow more points to come out in the discussions and de-briefs. The table below gives a rough division of the scenarios by target and level of complexity, but different audiences may respond to each scenario differently. The facilitator/trainer should read them all through and decide which to use.

9. The scenarios have also been designed so that two or more can be run in conjunction with one another. To avoid repetition, much of the detail provided in the Guidance Notes to the earlier scenarios is not repeated in the later ones. The trainer/facilitator should, therefore, read the whole of these Guidance Notes as some of the information given for one scenario will be relevant to others.

10. Although the scenarios are set in a fictional country, all of the information contained within them is based on real incidents and challenges which have confronted the UN mission in implementing its POC mandate. Since there will probably not be time to run more than two or three scenarios in any course, the trainer/facilitator could consider giving out the one page descriptions as hand-outs to participants. Some of the scenarios contain inter-related information and so after participants have completed an exercise based on one, the trainer/facilitator could give them another as a hand-out to reflect upon this as well.

Scenario	Description	Target	Level of complexity
1	**Cross-border attack**	Mainly military	Basic/Intermediary
2	**Ambush on peacekeepers**	Military and	Basic/Intermediary

		civilians	
3	**Clashes related to Security sector Reform issues**	Military and police	Basic/intermediary
4	**Internally Displaced Persons**	Military, police and civilians	Intermediary/Advanced
5	**Land disputes**	Military, police and civilians	Intermediary/Advanced
6	**Inter-communal violence**	Military, police and civilians	Intermediary/Advanced
7	**Road-block extortion**	Military, police and civilians	Intermediary/Advanced
8	**Conflict Related Sexual Violence**	Military, police and civilians	Intermediary/Advanced

General Guidance Points

UNOCI's Strategy for the Protection of Civilians

11. The protection of civilians has been part of the UNOCI mandate since the establishment of the mission. During the course of 2010 and 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) debated the evolving situation in Côte d'Ivoire on a number of occasions, reflecting on the changes that were taking place in the run-up to the Presidential election of 2010 and the violence which followed it. **In July 2011 the UNSC passed Resolution 2000 which reaffirmed the POC mandate as the mission's priority task and called on the mission**:

- **'To revise the comprehensive strategy for the protection of civilians** and to coordinate with the United Nations protection of civilians strategy in liaison with the United Nations country team, to take into account the new realities on the ground and the specific needs of vulnerable groups, and to include measures to prevent gender-based violence pursuant to resolution 1960 (2010) and resolution 1882 (2009)

- '**To work closely with humanitarian agencies**, particularly in relation to areas of tensions and of return of displaced persons, to collect information on and identify potential threats against the civilian population, as well as reliable information on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, bring them to the attention of the Ivorian authorities as appropriate, and to take appropriate action in accordance with the United Nations system-wide protection strategy in harmonization with UNOCI's protection strategy,

- **'To monitor and report on violations and abuses against vulnerable populations**, including children in line with resolution 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009) and 1998 (2011) and contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses,'

12. A revised Comprehensive Strategy for the Protection of Civilians was published in June 2012. It is organized around the three tier approach to the protection of civilians: protection through political process, establishing a protective environment and providing protection from physical violence. The first element captures all political and advocacy efforts, including those made by the mission leadership with regard to the overarching principle to support the peace process. The second element comprises activities such as promoting legal protection, contributing to humanitarian assistance efforts, and backing up national institutions by supporting competent national authorities. The third element relates to the missions efforts to prevent, deter and, if

necessary respond to situations in which civilians are under imminent threat of physical violence. The three elements are mutually reinforcing and should be taken forward simultaneously. The strategy identifies the potential threats to civilians as:

- Inter-communal and intra-communal violence
- Violence by national state security and defence forces, affiliated entities and non-state armed groups
- Criminal violence by armed groups that pose a public security threat
- Politically motivated violence

13. UNOCI has developed an Implementation Matrix which identifies relevant actors and actions to counter the risks identified. This should form the basis of operational documents, such as work plans, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and other instructions to the mission and its components in implementing the POC mandate. The Implementation Matrix is based on four phases of action: preparing for risk in day-to-day activities, responding to heightened risk through pre-emptive measures, responding to actual threats of physical violence, and stabilizing the situation after a crisis has occurred. In each phase the civilian, police and military components of the mission have a clear understanding of how they should act to implement the POC mandate. **A central part of the strategy rests on establishing effective coordination structures** with both national and international actors to ensure the regular and timely exchange of information and analysis to ensure that there is effective preventive action and rapid response.

Use of force and the physical protection of civilians

14. `The UNSC resolution gives UNOCI the authority to act independently to protect civilians within their capabilities and areas of deployment, where the government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibility to do so. UNOCI is mandated to ensure that all available resources and capacities are used to protect civilians; this requires a continuous prioritization of risks to civilians to ensure that its assets are deployed accordingly. All components of the mission should have a common understanding about the overall approach.

15. UNOCI will deploy its military forces according to the priority threats to civilians identified by the mission. This means that the Force will be placed on high alert, ready to deploy additional reinforcements at short notice in places where attacks seem likely or are already underway. In such situations the Force Commander will review the Mission's Rules of Engagement for the Force, and issue any necessary clarifications. Bearing in mind that all UN missions operate within the principles of peacekeeping and in accordance with the mandate, missions are authorized to use force against any party, including elements of government forces, where such elements are themselves engaged in physical violence against civilians. Only a reasonable belief in hostile intent (defined as the threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through an action or behaviour which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act) is required before the use of force can be authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be determined by the on-scene commander based on his or her professional judgement on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:

- the capability and preparedness of the threat;
- the available evidence which indicates an intention to attack; and
- historical precedents within the Mission's Area of Responsibility (AOR), depicting patterns of behaviour exhibited by parties to the conflict .

16. The circumstances in which force can be used are described in more detail in the

Rules of Engagement for UNOCI's military component and the Directives on Detention, Searches and Use of Force for members of UNOCI's Formed Police Units. The general principles governing the use of force are proportionality, minimum use of force commensurate with the level of threat **and the requirement to minimize the risk of collateral damage. Any force used must be limited, in its modus, intensity and duration, to that which is necessary to achieve the authorised objective.**. UNOCI military component shall, wherever the operational situation permits, make every reasonable effort to resolve potentially hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force (e.g. through negotiations or assistance from local authorities). Force may be used only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the immediate objective. Before resorting to the use of force, every reasonable step must be taken to deter any person or group from demonstrating a hostile intent or committing a hostile act. When force is used, all feasible precautions are to be taken with a view to avoiding and in any event minimising collateral damage. Any confrontation involving the use of force or detention is to be reported to the chain of command immediately upon occurrence whether it results in casualties or not.

17. Short of the actual use of force, the basic elements of a strategy to protect civilians from imminent threat of violence could include: a) provide early warning through their leaders to civilian populations in areas which may come under attack so that they could remove themselves from harm's way; b) continue to help deter violence against civilians through physical presence in heavily populated areas where attacks are expected; c) evacuate highly vulnerable civilians, and d) provide life-saving medical assistance to wounded civilians. Civilians who have gathered around any UN bases for protection and are under imminent threat of attack should be allowed in and protected. Care should be taken to ensure that they are unarmed (or are disarmed) and UN facilities should not be used as a base for political or military activity by any parties to a conflict. Possession of a weapon, or previous participation in hostilities, does not necessarily make someone a combatant. Other scenarios and options might include the following:

- **Civilians being attacked seek refuge at a location with UNOCI's Area of Responsibility** – The UN, in coordination with the national army and police, and other friendly forces, will protect civilians with the minimum force necessary and, where possible, provide them with a safe corridor to leave the affected area. This depends on prior liaison and detailed passage of information to all concerned parties.

- **Attackers are seen to be looting and burning civilian property but the UN forces do not believe civilians are under threat**- UN forces will continue to monitor the situation and constantly check for any danger to civilians. The use of deadly force is not permissible unless there is a physical threat to UN personnel or civilians.Some deterrence or warning however may be required to prevent escalation and/or to avoid giving perpetrators the impression that UNPKs will not respond to threats against civilian life or property thereby undermining its credibility and increasing the vulnerability of both the mission and the civilians.

- **Attackers approach UN position to take individuals they suspect of having fought prior to taking refuge with the UN** – UN forces will protect all civilians seeking refuge with the minimum force necessary.

- **UN personnel witness or suspect imminent physical violence against civilians** – UN forces will protect all civilians seeking refuge with the minimum force necessary.

- **UN personnel believe killing or physical violence is being visited upon civilians not within their immediate area of influence** – The Senior UN Commander on the ground must make an assessment of his/her options with the forces available. It is possible that leaving the current position might weaken it to such an extent that civilians already being protected would be at additional risk. At a minimum, the Commander should alert the national authorities and HQ to establish whether another friendly force can intercede.

18. Obviously not all scenarios can be predicted in advance and it will be up to the Senior Mission Leadership and leaders on the scene to decide how to respond to specific situations. Most Rules of Engagement authorise detaining, searching and disarming individuals in all situations where the use of armed force or unarmed force is authorized. All detained persons must be treated in compliance with human rights standards and handed over to the appropriate local authorities as soon as possible within the time limits and conditions foreseen in the procedures on detention by UN personnel. However, hand over must not be carried out if there are substantial grounds to believe that the person runs a risk of being subjected to certain violations of his or her fundamental rights, in particular torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary deprivation of life (including as the result of a death sentence pronounced without fundamental guarantees of fair trial); persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

19. Military units also have an 'inherent right to use force in self-defence' which can include 'pre-emptive self defence against an anticipated attack'. The use of force should be governed by the principle of military necessity, which 'authorises the use of only that force which is required to achieve the authorised objective. Military necessity does not authorise acts otherwise prohibited under international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL), sometimes referred to as the laws of armed conflict.' When force is used, all feasible precautions are to be taken with a view to avoiding and in any event minimising collateral damage. Any confrontation involving the use of force or detention is to be reported to the chain of command immediately upon occurrence whether it results in casualties or not. The force used should be minimum and proportional to the threat. However, in some cases the force used to respond to a threat may have to be higher in order to minimise United Nations casualties and civilian casualties. Evacuation of aid workers and civilian staff of the mission should be a priority, so long as this can be done with available capacity and without diverting resources that could be better used to protect greater numbers of civilians from attack.

20. Even when a UN force cannot impose its will on the parties to a conflict, its visibility may have a deterrent effect. Mobile patrols may deter parties from committing crimes or human rights violations and can also be used to gather evidence of these which can subsequently be pursued through in-depth investigations by the mission's human rights component or referral for national or international prosecution, including to the International Criminal Court (ICC). If clashes escalate into all-out conflict, the Security Council will need timely and accurate information on which to base its decisions. The concept of 'protection by presence' is, however, a controversial one – as it sometimes cuts against a strategy of threatening to withdraw from an area where the Mission is being prevented from fulfilling its mandate. There are also circumstances where it could be directly counter-productive to the mission mandate. Peacekeepers can be taken hostage and their presence in an area may also inhibit the UN from taking more forceful action to protect civilians, such as air strikes. Civilians may also believe that the presence of UN peacekeepers will provide them with protection even when the force has neither the means nor mandate to do so. This could increase their vulnerability by encouraging people to stay in an area, which cannot in fact be protected.

21. It should be stressed that this is general guidance about the broad parameters of how the Chapter VII mandated powers that the UN Security Council has given to UNOCItto ensure the physical protection of civilians might be carried out at the tactical level. In all circumstances, the Head of Mission/Special Representative of the Secretary-General will have the discretion to interpret these powers and orders will be issued through the usual chain of command.

Military and civilian cooperation

22. Some of the following scenarios involve primarily a military response, some primarily a policing response and some primarily a civilian approach. All require the civilian, military and police elements of the UN mission to cooperate closely together and one of the intended learning outcomes is for the different components of the mission to gain a better understanding of how military, police and civilian peacekeepers/units plan, coordinate and implement actions in a given situation with the ultimate objective of protecting the lives of civilian populations against violence.

23. UN civilian staff cannot physically protect people from violence as this can only be done by the military or police. However, as the scenarios demonstrate, civilians have a tremendously important role in monitoring, reporting and political advocacy. Given the constraints which the mission is operating under, it is obvious that such monitoring, reporting and advocacy will be important in helping to prevent violence against civilians. The civilian component of the mission has a number of specific tasks which involve building close links with both local communities and the state authorities at a national and local level. Many civilians have also spent longer amounts of time in the mission, since they are not subject to regular rotations, and so have built up experience and contacts which the military often do not possess. They should, therefore, be seen as a valuable resource to draw on and partners to work with.

24. Civilians often have training in taking statements (particularly from traumatised or vulnerable people), writing reports and investigating incidents, which some soldiers may not possess. Equally, soldiers and police may come across information or witness events the civilian component of the mission may not. Sharing such information and ensuring that it is reported properly – while obviously respecting issues such as confidentiality and informed consent – will be a vital part of the mission's work during any crisis and the different component of the mission must work together to achieve this.

25. In any major crisis, consideration should be given to the establishment of a Joint Operations Room, to act as a hub of information-gathering and decision-making during a crisis, is a vital necessity. The civilian and military leadership of the Mission must coordinate effectively at Sector level. Too often the various components of a mission 'stove-pipe' their decision-making processes, fail to share information and coordinate and sometimes even cut across one another, which can have life-threatening consequences on the ground. Setting up one room, through which all information is passed and where all major strategic decisions get made is vital and should be amongst the first responses to a crisis.

Working with humanitarian actors

26. The humanitarian actors that the mission is likely to encounter (both UN and non-governmental) are likely to have been in place before the establishment of the mission, and will continue their functions after its departure, so will have considerable experience that can be drawn on. They can also play a critical bridging role between the mission and external protection actors including civil society and NGOs. It is important for military actors to understand the complex network of humanitarian assistance. This includes international organizations and local, national and international NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. Humanitarian access to a conflict zone is also largely dependent on acceptance by the parties to the conflict so humanitarian actors must remain independent and impartial at all times.

27. Humanitarian actors often use the term 'protection' as well, but it has a very different sense from the POC concept. While the military component may only use force to protect civilians against imminent threat of physical violence, the humanitarian conception of protection, sometimes referred to as a 'Rights Based Approach', encompasses 'all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.' This includes issues such as tackling poverty and food insecurity, which are not POC concerns. While there are obvious links between the two issues, the differences between them need to be understood and some of the scenarios are designed to illustrate this point.

28. Humanitarian responses are increasingly coordinated through a 'cluster approach', which has been designed as a way of addressing gaps and strengthening effectiveness through building partnerships. Protection is defined as a specific cluster and agencies involved in protection activities meet regularly to coordinate their activities. The Global Protection Cluster (GPC) is chaired by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which is the global lead agency for protection. Other UN agencies – including UNICEF, UN-Habitat and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) act as focal points within it. Some UN agencies maintain separate field offices in countries where the Security Council decides to deploy such missions. Others, such as OHCHR, are normally fully integrated into the Mission, with the head of the human rights component acting as a direct advisor to the Head of Mission, as well being a member of the UN Country Team and the Humanitarian Country Team. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can also provide invaluable expertise relating to the protection of civilians, while it is a neutral and independent organization whose mandate derives from the Geneva Conventions and its own statute, both of which emphasize its independence and impartiality.

Human rights and humanitarian law

29. Though UN peacekeepers are not generally considered parties to armed conflict, the Secretary General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law (ST/SGB/1999/13) stipulates that peacekeepers shall, when in situations of armed conflict, where they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement, adhere to the principles of IHL as it relates to the use of force and the treatment of civilians and other non-combatants, as well as persons placed

hors de combat. UNOCI's RoEs and DUFs have been drafted to ensure compliance with IHL. UN peacekeepers are also bound at all times by international human rights law, including its stipulations regarding the use of force.

Scenario One - Cross-border attack

1. Given the history of attacks in the area, military patrolling should already have been stepped up and reinforced. Frequent patrolling in remote areas can help to instill confidence among the population, increase situational awareness and establish an improved early warning mechanisms. This will require troops to interact with the local population, by patrolling on foot and engaging people in conversation. **The local population is the best source of information** about possible attacks and this must be actively cultivated. If the soldiers do not speak the local language then they should always be **accompanied by language assistants**. **The patrols should also interact with local elites, government authorities and the national police and army**. Maintaining a high profile visible presence can help to raise the morale of the national forces, deter possible attacks and gather information. **Showing that UNOCI is willing and ready to protect civilians against attacks is the best way of reducing the likelihood of it having to actually do so.**

2. The civilian and police components have the same responsibility to actively establish a presence in these areas through frequent visits and pro-active outreach. **The best way to protect the civilian population is to help it develop its own warning mechanisms and to strengthen the capacity of its national institutions.** Civilians may also be able to gather information, which soldiers cannot. For example, if conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) has been taking place in an area people may be reluctant to report this to male soldiers out of shame or fear. Civilians may find it easier to build up the trust and confidence of local communities over time. Similarly, civilians can more easily forge good relations with any humanitarian agencies that are implementing projects in an area, and who often also have very good links to local communities and an awareness of the threats that they face.

3. In this scenario specific information has been received that a group of armed men are heading towards a specific village where they are likely to pose a threat to the local civilian population. The mission mandate clearly authorizes the use of force to protect civilians in such circumstances and the precise circumstances in which force can be used will be described in more detail in the Rules of Engagement for UNOCI's military component and the Directives on Detention, Searches and Use of Force for members of UNOCI's Formed Police Units (In this scenario there is no FPU in Gwisek or nearby).

4. It is the primary responsibility of the government itself to protect its own population and to enforce the rule of law within its own territory. **UNOCI should, therefore, liaise with the national and local authorities, share information about the threat with them and attempt to coordinate a joint response.** This may involve conducting joint mobile patrols or reinforcing fixed positions such as police stations, military barracks or check-points. UNOCI may need to provide logistical support to its national counter-parts. Note should be taken of UNOCI's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) to ensure that no support is provided to units or individuals with a record of human rights violations (HRVs). UNOCI may also mount patrols independently. **However, time is of the essence here and probably action must be taken to protect the civilians in the town. It would be unacceptable for an infantry company not take action to protect civilians in the town it is deployed.**

5. A decision on whether to do so, and whether to seek to engage directly with the armed group, will be made by the Force Commander, who will also issue directives regarding the use of force. **This responsibility can be delegated and a local commander should not have to wait for permission to engage with armed actors who represent an imminent threat to civilians if such a delay would put their lives at risk and this seems to be the clear situation in this scenario**. The Chapter VII mandate provides UNOCI with

the authority to use force to protect civilians. The use of force, up to and including lethal force, is authorised, but subject to strict legal restrictions, as described above on the Use of Force.

6. A possible course of action for the Company commander, after reporting and received initial guidance from higher HQ, might be:
- Liaison with the CNP elements and UN and non-UN civilian personnel to gather information on how best to deal with the situation;
- Dispatching rapid recce patrols to confirm the threat strength and avenues of approach;
- If the situational awareness indicates it may probably be too late now for any kind of coordinated action or support given by UNOCI enablers, the best solution might lie in a quick military action;
- Secure the bridge to deny its use to attackers and establishing village defense perimeter might be an adequate course of action;
- If despite your best efforts, the armed men are able to access the village through the river and to all intents and purposes, an assault on the village is about to go in, as the Company Commander you could conduct a deliberate show of force, a negotiation if possible, and finally as a last resort use adequate warning and actual use of force.

7. Regarding legal provision on the use of force, UNOCI police and soldiers have authority to arrest disarm and detain members of the armed group and to use reasonable force, up to and including lethal force, if it is absolutely necessary to do so. **The prisoners should then be handed over to the national authorities as soon as is practicable** (subject to the qualifications above concerning their likely treatment). **If practicable, the CNP garrison in Gwisek could have the custody of prisoners temporarily**. Civilians do not have authority to use force (except in self-defense) and so would not be deployed. However, it might be useful to deploy a civilian team to the village to liaise with the local community and state authorities.

8. If child soldiers are found amongst the groups of armed men, after they have been disarmed and detained, these should be separated from the adults and handed over to the appropriate social services immediately. The moment that they are disarmed they should be treated as children and are entitled to the rights and protections guaranteed under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). **They should not, for example, be interrogated by adult soldiers. UNOCI Child Protection Unit is in charge of providing advice and takes action in these cases**. Prior to their disarmament, however, they should be treated in the same way as the armed adults. **Recruitment of child soldiers is a particularly serious crime and it will be important to identify those responsible for this so that charges can be brought.**

9. UNOCI could provide a sensitization program about HR, Child Protection, Sexual Abuse and Women Rights.

10. The scenario raises a number of broader issues which participants might also wish to explore. Clearly the most effective way to reduce these cross-border attacks is to encourage better security cooperation between the two countries. Existing legislation would appear to allow for the prosecutions of cross-border crimes and the problem seems to be either a lack of capacity or political will. Participants may have ideas based on their own experiences for how such cooperation could be encouraged and the facilitator/trainer should help to develop this part of the discussion. It will be particularly important for military, police and civilian participants to see how the three components of the mission work together to achieve the same objective particularly as regards border monitoring in this case. The trainer/facilitator should ensure in the de-brief that participants understand that this scenario raises issues which require a mission-as-a-whole approach. **While the military can provide physical**

protection, the civilian and police components play a vital role in monitoring, advocacy and liaison with local communities, government authorities and the national police force, which complement this activity and provide protection of civilians in the longer term.

Scenario Two - Ambush on UN peacekeepers

1. This is a real scenario based on the murder of seven UN peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire in June 2012. **All of the events described in it are public knowledge and the purpose of this exercise is not to discuss what went wrong with the operation in which they were killed**. **The mission suffers from a lack of armored vehicles and armored helicopters, which increases its vulnerability to these types of attacks**. It has also identified the poor state of the roads and a lack of good local intelligence as key factors which hamper its ability to respond sufficiently rapidly to incidents of violence.

2. The immediate humanitarian impact of the attack is that thousands of people have fled from their homes and there is now a large group of displaced people, who may be in need of assistance. UNOCI has a mandate to protect the humanitarian workers who are delivering this assistance and could also provide logistical support such as transport on request. UNOCI is not mandated to deliver such assistance itself. It also should not attempt to interfere with the work of the humanitarian actors, or in any way jeopardize their independence and impartiality.

3. Given existing resources, regular patrolling in remote areas, interaction with local people, frequent outreach visits by the military and civilian components of the mission are the best ways to gather intelligence and instill a sense of confidence in the affected community. In UNOCI, as happens in most missions, human sources are the vital sources for information gathering. By showing the presence of UNOCI in troubled areas they can enhance confidence, improve intelligence and provide prompt and timely responses to hostilities. **Such a pro-active strategy carries risks for the mission, since greater visibility provides more targets. However, the alternative is to remain isolated from the community UNOCI is there to protect, which will lead to a gradual loss of trust and confidence**. **The key factor to enhance force protection and operational efficiency is better information gathering and analysis at local level.**

4. The biggest security threat is that there is an estimated 200 armed militia members in the area who represent an imminent threat to both civilians and the UN. Note however must be taken of the fact that the actual ambush was carried out by not more than 10 fighters. The mission has no option other than to fully understand the group motivation and tactics to better address the challenge posed by it. To provide a mission response that addresses the threat and protect the vulnerable population is not easy and action or inaction generates consequences.

5. UN forces should continue to behave with absolute discipline, professionalism, and integrity. Commanders should be particularly sensitive to the emotional reactions of those most affected by the attack and be prepared to offer advice and support where necessary.

6. The killing of seven UN peacekeeping troops is both a tragedy for those most immediately affected by the loss and a potential crisis for the mission. There is a danger that troop contributing countries may either withdraw their soldiers or place greater caveats on their deployment, which will hinder their effectiveness. **The role of the national and international media should not be forgotten** as these play an important role in shaping perceptions and allocating blame when things go wrong. A pro-active strategy should be adopted towards the media, at mission level, providing them with accurate and up to date information and actively rebutting false or negative stories about the UN.

7. While this will be coordinated by headquarters, those working at the tactical level have a vital role to play through their accurate and comprehensive monitoring and analysis and timely reporting of incidents. Therefore, there should be proper coordination with the local population at the tactical level. The scenario also highlights the

need for positive outreach to local communities to reinforce the message that UNOCI is there to help protect them and needs their support and cooperation in order to do so.

8. Better intelligence is the key factor to improve both force protection and operational readiness. This is easier to say than achieve and only a multidimensional response to this challenge might work. It should combine improved collection systems from different actors working on the ground (field missions have hundreds of points of presence that could provide valuable and timely information to the mission level structures as the JMAC and JOC) with sound analysis and speedy sharing of information. From a force protection angle, infantry units, subunits, platoons and patrols can do some enhancement on tactics, techniques and procedures but there is little to do in terms of the actual equipment. Again, increased military, police and civilian presence, continuous joint meetings and planning with the other components, information gathering through all civilian and uniformed sources will assist the company commander to integrate all mission components for the protection of the village and restore the confidence of the local population in the UN. Patrols should be frequent and staggered to be present at all times and interact with the locals.

Scenario Three – Clashes related to Security Sector Reform Issues

1. This scenario is also based on a real incident which UNOCI's intervention helped to resolve. The key to its success appears to have been the holistic approach of the different mission components.

2. At tactical level, an immediate and preventive UNOCI possible course of action which requires coordination amongst components would be:
- Liaison with local police and military to identify which bars/pubs are the most vulnerable and intensify monitoring and patrolling in these areas with an eye on trouble makers;
- Try to establish a new dialogue mechanism between the two parties;
- Consider pre-positioning troops and police to dissuade attacks;
- Prevail upon the CDF to monitor and discuss with its local leadership to bring it's troublesome members in check;
- Both Infantry Company and FPU should be prepared to occupy key town positions and intervene if necessary.

3. If the situation escalates and clashes occurred with a high probability of demonstrations and new attacks to CDF facilities, possible actions to be taken after careful intelligence analysis:
- Liaison with CDF to close some/all of their checkpoints if not absolutely necessary;
- Use of the FPU to pre-position tactical sub-units to control the demonstration;
- Negotiate with CDU in order to temporarily withdraw CDU personnel to base;
- Deploy infantry sections / platoons to prevent demonstrators from getting to the CDU bases.
- Sensitisation program by UN to CDF in order to improve discipline.

4. Now as an after action review on what really happened in the mission area is concerned, It is worthy to understand and discuss the detailed actions taken by UNOCI.

5. UNOCI's first action was to rapidly deploy first a platoon of UN soldiers and then a contingent of police (UNPOL) who were able to negotiate with both parties and defuse tension. The first patrol consisted of 10 soldiers in two vehicles. This was then reinforced by a platoon, of 28 soldiers and an officer, which provided the **UN with sufficient force to ensure their own protection and to discourage violence**. **The UN did not, however, take forceful action to clear the streets, but instead negotiated with the two sides and provided a mechanism for them to open dialogue with one another**. **The platoon established a Temporary Operating Base (TOB)** from which to patrol the area and which enabled them to stay in the area for a month until the situation had stabilized. **UNPOL negotiated with the crowd and helped to secure the removal of the barricades.** The presence of UN soldiers also helped to discourage the national armed forces from taking more forceful action.

6. UNOCI also helped to facilitate a visit to the town by the Ministers for Defence and for the Interior to address people's concerns directly. This required political advocacy – to persuade the ministers to visit – as well as logistical support with transport. It is the primary responsibility of the government itself to protect its own population and to enforce the rule of law within its own territory, so it is right that UNOCI should play a supporting role in such situations. **The trainer/facilitator might ask the participants to explore what might have happened had UNOCI's forces come under attack from the crowd, or if they directly witnessed soldiers shooting at unarmed civilians.** There are no absolute right or wrong answers to either question, since it would depend on all of the surrounding circumstances, but participants **should be made aware both of their right to use force in self-defence**

and of their duty to protect civilians under imminent threat even when this threat comes from elements with the national security forces.

7. UNOCI has a mandate to support the national government in upholding and re-establishing, the rule of law and so should respond positively to requests to assist the national police in such tasks (given resource constraints, tactical considerations, etc.). It is also mandated to protect civilians – as a priority task – even from elements within the national state forces and this would apply to government-allied militias as well. The latter is clearly a controversial point, since it raises issues such as **host country consent**, and so each scenario would need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The trainer/facilitator should refer to the Guidance Notes on the use of force for more detailed discussion of this point.

8. The trainer/facilitator should also bring out the importance of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and its direct link to the mission mandate of POC this aim. The military, civilian and police components of the mission need to work together to achieve this. DPKO have developed a three tier model of POC, which should have already been explained during the presentations. Tier I - Protection through Political Process, Tier II - Protection from physical violence, Tier III – Establishing a protective environment. Those working at the tactical level will mainly be concerned with Tier II actions (protection from physical violence), but they should be aware of how their own actions contribute to, and often inform the development of the whole of mission POC strategy.

Scenario Four – Internally Displaced People

1. The two immediate priorities for UNOCI at the tactical level are to ensure protection to any civilians whose vulnerability has been increased by the attack and to investigate fully the circumstances surrounding it, including UNOCI's own response, while the evidence is still fresh.

2. It is likely that UNOCI would form a crisis management group in response to such an attack, which would include the **humanitarian agencies who are responding to the immediate needs of those displaced**. All UN system information collection and analysis need to be centralized through UNOCI and **an investigation launched into what happened**. This should be conducted in parallel to the government's own investigation, which should also be monitored.

3. UNOCI also needs to increase its advocacy efforts with the national and local authorities to strengthen information sharing and coordination, particularly in response to immediate humanitarian needs, and to press them for a firm condemnation of the attack and active efforts to hold those responsible for the attack to account. UNOCI should also support and call for appeals for calm by local authorities and traditional leaders**. The Battalion Commander and the FPU Commander as well as other UN civilian leadership at the area need to outreach to traditional, community and religious authorities and support for initiatives to defuse inter-community tensions should be actively pursued.** UNOCI could provide sensitization programs to CDF and local population on sexual violation and gender based HRV. UNOCI should also oppose all moves to forcibly return the IDPs to their areas of origin unless their safety can be guaranteed.

4. Timely, accurate and up to date information gathered at the tactical level will be a crucial role in enabling UNOCI to maintain a pro-active strategy in its public comments on the situation. **Obviously it is necessary to send out patrols to assess remaining threat and vulnerabilities of the remaining people at the camp and the dispersed people in the region.**

5. The humanitarian impact of the attack is that thousands of people have fled from the camp where they had been staying and are now dispersed and now may be in need of assistance and protection. **This group could be vulnerable to further attacks and so the priority is to deploy UNOCI's military forces to protect this group, a clear task for the Infantry Battalion**. The trainer/facilitator should refer to the guidance given for scenario two for more details of how to liaise with humanitarian actors and to scenario one and the general guidance on the use of force on this point.

6. The direct protection of IDPs remaining in or returning to the camp is clearly within the mandate of the mission and there are various examples of good practice that can be drawn of from both within UNOCI and other missions. **Camp perimeter defense by the battalion, FPU readiness to address riot control incidents that might occur in face of angry returning IDPs, intensive patrolling are all possible relevant measures that require good coordination, including with humanitarian personnel carrying out their tasks**. For example, **'firewood patrols'** have been **provided to women leaving camps, with the military escort being used to deter attacks and sexual violence**. Rotas for such trips need to be organized in advance so that there are sufficient soldiers or police available. These should be instructed to use minimum force, if strictly necessary, but should generally keep a low profile and take care not to antagonize people from neighbouring areas. Again, **UNOCI actors should also liaise with the humanitarian agencies and the IDP camp representatives to address the issue of security for women within the camp itself: is there adequate lighting, are women vulnerable when using the latrines and showers, is the security for female-headed households sufficient?** UNOCI should also

consider how they can strengthen the capacity of the national police on this issue, through training, awareness-raising, mentoring and monitoring.

7. The trainer/facilitator should ensure in the de-brief that participants understand that this scenario raises issues which require a mission-as-a-whole approach. **While the military can provide physical protection, the civilian and police components play a vital role in monitoring, advocacy and liaison with local communities, government authorities and the national police force, which complement this activity and provide protection of civilians in the longer term**. In all this, the commander, in liaison with the civil components of the mission, should prepare a realistic yet elaborate plan for the protection of the IDPs if they decide to return to their homes. This plan should include humanitarian/logistic support for people who decide to return as well as a deliberate plan for the protection of such personnel. This should be communicated to the IDPs to encourage them to return to their homes.

Scenario Five – Land disputes

1. There are two separate issues in this scenario: a) the violent clashes that are taking place which may result in civilians being killed and b) the potential underlying land dispute which may have given rise to the clashes. Both should be investigated, but UNOCI needs to be clear on the extent to which its POC mandate limits its involvement in the second.

2. UN civilian staff should visit the area, take statements and interview the local state authorities. **The Company Commander should give consideration to stepping up patrols for the purposes of gathering information and producing a calming effect by increasing mission visibility. Formed Police Units (FPUs) may also be deployed for the same purpose.** By showing the presence of UNOCI in troubled areas they can enhance confidence, improve intelligence and provide prompt and timely responses to hostilities. The Chapter VII mandate provides UNOCI with the authority to use force, up to and including lethal force, to protect civilians. The precise circumstances in which force can be used will be described in more detail in the Rules of Engagement for UNOCI's military component. **UNOCI should not involve itself in clashes between different armed groups, but restrict its involvement to when civilians come under imminent threat. It is important to understand that the UNOCI Civil Affairs branch has the lead on this issue and a mission course of action will encompass all the already mentioned actors at tactical level. All the different components will have a particular reading of the situation and will receive instructions from higher authorities; however, It is expected that they coordinate their actions and any use of force by the Company Commander and UN police deployed in the area is under a broad civil affairs vision on the short and long term solutions. This should not prevent military and police commanders from taking action in case of imminent threat.**

3. Land disputes are one of the commonest causes of violence in societies emerging from conflicts and so they should be monitored as part of the early warning and early response mechanisms developed to improve the protection of civilians. **The long-term solution is to strengthen the institutions** that uphold the rule of law, address the relationship between customary and state law and develop a strategy to reconcile the rights and interests of all stakeholders in a non-discriminatory way. Since most disputes over rural land are settled through customary law, the UN needs to understand how such mechanisms work and have a detailed knowledge of their 'jurisprudence'. Some non-government organizations (NGOs) have projects working on land rights, mediation or rule of law issues. These can be a valuable source of expertise

4. It is clearly better for disputes to be resolved through mediation than through a resort to violence and so UNOCI should encourage such efforts. However, people should be made aware – possibly through outreach and public information campaigns – that if either party which is not satisfied with this decision retains the right to take their case to the official courts and in any case of conflict between traditional law and the official law, it is the latter which should prevail. Discrimination against women, and other vulnerable groups, in a customary legal system often reflects social attitudes which may also be present in the official courts and administrative systems so these should also be monitored.

5. The trainer/facilitator should ensure in the de-brief that participants understand that this scenario raises issues which require a **mission-as-a-whole approach**. While the military can provide physical protection, the civilian and police components play a vital role in monitoring, advocacy and liaison with local communities, government authorities and the national police force, which complement this activity and provide protection of civilians in the longer term.

6. UNOCI, alone or in conjunction with local authorities must act swiftly to prevent the use of the radio/media for negative propaganda purposes. The owners of the radio station/media houses must be contacted and informed in no uncertain term to cease their negative propaganda activities failing which appropriate action, including sanctions must be employed to end such acts. Prompt action is required because of the capability of such media to spread hate messages within a short time to large portions of the population.

Scenario Six – Inter-communal violence

1. This scenario is also based on a real incident which UNOCI's intervention helped to resolve and many of the points covered here are already covered in the guidance provided for scenario three.

2. The national armed forces clearly committed a number of violations of people's rights, and it is claimed that they committed several more. These should be investigated and, where they are upheld, disciplinary action taken against those responsible. **These incidents also need to be independently investigated and recorded since it could impact on UNOCI's Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) in the future.**

3. Actions taken by UNOCI were very positive and actually helped to temporarily solve the problem. As known, the use of force is not always the best solution and all possible preventive measures must be taken through mediation and negotiation. The physical protection of civilians might be achieved through other means than the use of force, which should always be a last resort, and the simple presence of troops and police units work as a deterrent and the implicit threat of the use force limits the recurrence of violence. However situation remains tense and only the government can propose a long term solution.

4. The bullet points for the speech that UNOCI has been invited to give to a public media in front of the Minister and the national and international media, **should provide a succinct description of the POC mandate, UNOCI's successes to date in fulfilling it and the responsibilities of the national authorities to address the outstanding challenges. It should rebut attempts to blame the UN for the fact that civilians were killed and stress that the responsibility for the loss of civilian lives rests with those who carried out the attacks, or created a climate which encouraged the violence. The bullets might have a local flavor by using the episode as a basis for building the key ideas of the message**. The primary responsibility to protect civilians rests with the national authorities and the UN cannot be everywhere or protect everyone at all times and in all circumstances.

5. In attempting to defuse the tension, the approach should not differ much from what has been done before. Disarm anybody who is not supposed to be in possession of a weapon, get the leaders of the CDF, CNP and the communities to sit down at a meeting to iron out the differences. In so doing, police and relevant civilian components must be a part of the process. Intensified military and police presence must be maintained to prevent a further escalation of the conflict.

6. For the bullet presentation participants should be able to show that they understand the challenges that POC poses to both UNOCI and the national government within this specific context in which it is being applied. The presentation should outline UNOCI's POC mandate, outline what actions it is taking to fulfill this mandate, highlight the challenges that this poses and also stress that the primary responsibility for POC lies with the national authorities. The presentation should also include recommendations to the national government of UNOCI with views on the most urgent priorities: Security Sector Reform, land-related issues, political dialogue, tackling impunity and promoting reconciliation.

Scenario Seven – Roadblock extortion

1. As discussed in the guidance on the Use of Force, the Chapter VII mandate provides UNOCI with the authority to use force, up to and including lethal force, to protect civilians. The precise circumstances in which force can be used will be described in more detail in the Rules of Engagement for UNOCI's military component and the Directives on Detention, Searches and Use of Force for members of UNOCI's Formed Police Units. In this case there is an allegation that armed men are extorting money from civilians, which falls within the POC mandate.

2. It is the primary responsibility of the national authorities to protect civilians and uphold the rule of law. The government has publicly stated that such activities are illegal and will not be tolerated. **The CNP police officer has reported the issue to UNOCI and asked for assistance in upholding the rule of law. Besides being totally illegal, the armed groups mounting checkpoints are reportedly killing civilians who refuse to pay.**

3. The patrol commander should report back to his immediate superior to discuss the situation. **UNOCI should immediately contact the relevant local authorities and inform them of the existence of the illegal check-point and requesting that they take action**.

4. A decision also needs to be made whether or not the UNOCI patrol should intervene directly, to confront the illegal check-point or leave this to the local authorities to do so. This will depend on a number of circumstances, including the need to secure the mission's own freedom of movement, and the trainer/facilitator should ensure that participants have explored them thoroughly. **A delayed response could endanger civilians, or allow the perpetrators of the extortion to escape and engage in similar activities elsewhere**. The patrol commander and his immediate superior also need to make a **judgment about whether the local authorities are able and willing to take action against the illegal check-point.** If they are able to take prompt and effective action to uphold the rule of law then UNOCI should not take over this role or duplicate the efforts. They can monitor and serve as a sort of backup and intervene only where there is a threat or impediment to its own movement or an imminent threat to civilians.

5. However, since the request for assistance has come from a national police officer, the **information presented in this scenario suggests that the UNOCI patrol should accompany him to the check-point and physically confront those guarding it. The men should be disarmed, by force if need be, and detained until such time as the local police are able to charge them and take them into custody.**

6. None of these decisions would, in principle, be any different if the alleged perpetrators were ordinary armed criminals, belonged to a militia group or were government soldiers. If they are government soldiers then than the issue needs to be raised with their superior officers to ensure that appropriate disciplinary action is taken. An investigation also needs to be mounted to discover if this was a one-off incident or part of a general pattern and if the misconduct was limited to these individual soldiers or was more widespread. The patrol should follow up any such agreements with unannounced spot checks in the area.

Scenario Eight – Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

1. The patrol commander should report back to his immediate superior to report the situation. The perpetrators of the alleged rape clearly constitute an imminent threat of physical violence to civilians and UNOCI military and police are authorized to take action – including use of force – to protect civilians against host government forces if necessary.

2. The patrol should, therefore, proceed to the place where the alleged rape took place to investigate further. **The soldiers who attempt to prevent the patrol from proceeding have no lawful authority to do so**. UNOCI troops and police are provided **freedom of movement** in all Carana territory. They may also be interfering with an investigation, attempting to shield the perpetrators or may be the perpetrators themselves.

3. The patrol commander should inform the soldiers of his intention of proceeding and of his authority to do this under the Chapter VII powers given to him by the UN Security Council. Impeding the patrol's access will be an unlawful act for which its senior officer will be held accountable**. Although resort to the use of force should be the last possible option, the patrol should maintain a robust posture, and be prepared to use proportional force, if necessary. UNOCI should send a clear signal to everyone that interference with the mission's freedom of movement and ability to perform its core mandate is unacceptable and that forceful action will be taken.** Certainly tactical aspects will determine how the patrol commander would react, as to whether he should wait for reinforcements or take any other course of action.

4. The patrol initial report on the existence of the road block should trigger **UNOCI actions such as liaising with the national and local authorities about the incident and ensuring that the local police begin their own investigation. UNPOL could provide assistance to the local police in investigating the alleged incident and bringing those responsible to justice**.

5. A civilian team should be despatched to the area so that they can interview witnesses and investigate further. The victims of the alleged rape may need immediate medical attention and so arrangements should be made to locate her and transfer her to a medical clinic as soon as possible. Only after they have received medical attention should they be questioned about the alleged crime. The civilian component of the mission has specialist staff working on gender issues and sexual violence who should take overall responsibility on this issue. (In this case, the SGBV and HR officers should play important roles).

6. If there is a pattern of abusive behavior by soldiers in the area, this should also be raised with the local military and police authorities. It might be possible to insist that soldiers should only carry weapons during duties and not after duties. The patrol should follow up any such agreements with unannounced spot checks. **In an environment in which conflict-related sexual violence is a common feature there should be zero tolerance towards any illegal action that prevents UNOCI military and police to investigate, take action and protect civilians**.

7. All of these actions need to be reinforced at higher levels of the mission through advocacy and training on issues such as conflict-related sexual violence by the military, police and civilian components of the mission.

Module 4 - UNOCI

Glossary of Acronyms

UNOCI Glossary of Acronyms

AOR	Area of Responsibility
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
CDF	Carana Defence Force
CNP	Carana National Police
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRSV	Conflict Related Sexual Violence
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FPI	Front Populaire Ivorien
FPU	Formed Police Unit
FRCI	Republican Forces of C'ote d'Ivoire
GPC	Global Protection Cluster
HRDDP	Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
HRV	Human Rights Violation
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
LMA	Linas-Marcoussis Accord
MILOBS	Military Observers
MJP	Movement for Justice and Peace
MPCI	Patriotic Movement of C'ote d'Ivoire
MPIGO	Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights
POC	Protection of Civilians
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SSR	Security sector Reform
TOB	Temporary Operating Base
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCI	United Nations Operations in C'ote d'Ivoire
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Carana Context

Carana Context

- Scenarios were developed on the grounds of a fictitious country named Carana
- Although the scenarios are set in a fictional country, all of the information contained within them is based on real incidents and challenges which have confronted UNOCI in implementing its POC mandate
- Despite being mission-specific training materials, the scenario-based exercises can not furnish sensitive or classified information. They portray realistic situations but they do not use real names, locations and events

Carana Map


CARANA
Sumora
Katasi
Rimosa
Galasi
Koloni
Hanno
Fellari
Tereni
Mahbek
Barin
Guthar
Leppko
Akkabar
Maroni
Kalei
Lisbo
Jumi
Torta
Norke
Karo
Tekkla
Sureen
Lurok
Alur
Perkes
Arum
Amsan
Cereni
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Xalksa
Muka
Corma
Turen
Mia
Maldosa
Kika
Lora
Eres
Kilu Dam
Kalesi River
Salobo Dam
Mogave River
Toronga River
Carana
Elevation
0 to 200 m
200 to 400 m
400 to 600 m
600 to 800 m
800 to 1000 m
>1million
100,000 to 1,000,000
10,000 to 100,000
< 10,000
Dam
Lake
International Border
Provincial Boundary
Galasi Capital
Maroni Provincial Capital
Paved Roads
Unpaved Roads
Track
Railway
River
Airport
Harbor
0
50 km
100 km

Module 4 - UNOCI

- Coastal country bordered by Sumora, Rimosa and Katasi. Decades long one party rule by its first President - economic boom and influx of foreigners.
- Economic crisis in 1980s – political/social turmoil emphasising ethnic divisions.
- 3 main groups – Falins, Koris and Tatsi.
- Koris – north but have migrated south and a significant minority in east, west and cities.
- Tatsi – migrants especially from Sumora and Rimosa.



UNOCI

Most Koris and Tatsi bought farmland in West Carana, through informal sales, not legally recognised – land disputes with native Falins.

Carana experienced a coup d'etat in 1999, civil war in 2002 with ethnic dimensions and divided between north and south.

Elections held in 2010 and won by current President, a northener.

Former President refused to accept the results of the election though endorsed by most observers. Ensuing violence – 3,000 dead, 1m displaced.



UNOCI

- President sworn in on 11 May 2011, created new national army and announced DDR.
- Security generally improved but with areas of tension.
- People still displaced, June 2012, seven UN peacekeepers killed, July 2012, attack on IDP camp - 5,000 people displaced.